IMHO there are many flaws in his argument. He has basically written this in the more traditional Chinese style of argumentative essay, so that the flow includes quite a number of leaps and bounds in logics, plus some contested facts mixed with some more agreeable facts, which leaves his conclusion as debatable as where he starts. Nevertheless, I tend to agree with person who introduced this essay in immediahk, that this is something worth our attention, no matter you agree with him or not.
I won't delve into the details of Wang's reasoning (the flaws and the rights). But I believe his observations of his personal interactions are faithful, which means the Tibet issues is fundamentally different from what it was a few years ago (or for the past 50 years), for 2 reasons Wang rightly pointed out
- The efficient and speedy flow of information
- The fundamental change in the mechanism how power is transferred, and in particular, the role of population and war (see related post: War of Babies)
For the PRC's perspective on this issue, other than what Wang has proposed in the past (i.e. the Hu Yaobang way) of easing control, etc. and in particular, forcing the Han officials to study Tibetan (which I this is of utmost importance), the "end-game" situation Wang anticipated that people's power will eventually prevail in Tibet and hence lead to inevitable independence may push the PRC government to more aggressively pursue the counter-moves (which it has so far reluctant to do so) of playing the democracy game (i.e. population game)
- Encourage ethnic Han people's permanent migration to Tibet AR, (i.e. give them Hukou), they only need to move 2.5M people to TAR and they will most likely be occupying the cities (and mostly during tourist seasons) withou attracting attention in the (99%) rural areas
- (Ironically, this is what the D-L has been proposing), re-drawing the adminstration boundaries to includes parts of the neighboring provinces into Tibet AR, such that the ethnic Tibetan people are diluted by other minorities (Qiang) and Han in these regions
Were these counter-moves be adopted, Wang's endgame will not be what Wang has thought, it would be really no different from that of the Americas. Mao knew these games too well even back in the 1950s. If you create a "vote scaled district map" for Qinghai (like this) you will know what I mean -- Xining area, with less than 5% of the lands in Qinghai in the NE corner, is predominantly Han, has about 75% of the population (hence votes) of the province. This is how Mao has zoned China's provinces, he understood how democracy worked, he just didn't want to practice it.
The population density map of Qinghai in 1990
China population density map (and legends for the QH map above)
For those inside the GFW I will replicate it below, first the Chinese then the English version. via ESWN there is also this article which listed some errors in Wang's essay, which I will let you judge yourself.
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王力雄：西藏Du立路線圖
週四, 2008-11-20 16:21 — 牧草與早稻
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Roadmap of Tibetan Independence: Wang Lixiong
By Email[Tuesday, November 18, 2008 14:41]
By Lixiong, Wang
Translated by Lingxi Kong
Chapter One
March Incident in Tibet is the Watershed
1. Bureaucratic Institutions Became the Driving Force
This roadmap derives from the watershed. I had not taken the possibility of Tibetan independence into serious consideration before the incident in Tibet in 2008. It serves as the watershed that compels me to realize that Tibetan independence, for a long time being a fantasy, has turned into an emerging issue and reached the eyesight of the public. This change is brought by none other than the “anti-secession” institutions in China’s bureaucratic system.
The Party ideology sees China, during the mid 19th to mid 20th Century, as a victim of Western imperialism. The Chinese consequently have remembered the humiliations, but have rarely considered China itself as an imperial power. The vast territorial expansion from 17th to 18th Century, though beaten and humiliated by other world powers, rendered itself to modern China as a territorial heritage that includes Tibet.
Today, Tibet geographically accounts for one fourth of imperial China’s territory, and assumes a high level of importance in the politics of the empire. A considerable number of institutions in the power structure deals with Tibet, among which there are thirteen provincial/ministerial level institutions listed as following:
1. Tibet Autonomous Region
2. Qinghai Province
3. Gansu Province
4. Sichuan Province
5. Yunnan Province
6. CPC Tibet Work Co-ordination Group
7. The United Front Work Department
8. Ministry of Public Safety
9. Ministry of State Security
10. The Army
11. The Armed Police Force
12. The State Council Information Office
13. The State Council's Religious Affairs Bureau
Each of these institutions has a division that deals with Tibet, and fosters a large number of bureaucrats who have based their entire career on such issue. Besides, the following eleven institutions, not directly dealing with Tibet but assuming “anti-secession” responsibilities, have “anti-secession” divisions and personnel (listing only provincial or ministerial level or above):
1. The Central Commission of Politics and Law
2. CPC Xinjiang Work Co-ordination Group
3. Xinjiang Autonomous Region
4. Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
5. The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
7. The State Ethnic Affairs Commission
8. The State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office
9. Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office
10. The Liaison Office in Hong Kong
11. The Liaison Office in Macao
Adding together, there are twenty four provincial/ministerial level institutions that assume “anti-secession” roles in China’s bureaucratic system, which is a huge group with considerable amount of power, personnel and resources. These institutions acting like a league led the decision-making process in the March incident. This is unlike what would happen in Mao and Deng’s reign, during which the highest level of authority made decisions, to be executed by the bureaucracy, regardless of what the task is: to “unite the front”, to “suppress insurgence” or to “enforce the martial laws”. Yet in the Tibet incident, the highest authority took no actions; all executed alone by the ever growing bureaucracy.
This pattern of decision-making should not be simply regarded as devolution of power from the above. In fact, in the same month when the incident happened, Premier Wen Jiabao, attending the Greater Mekong Subregion Summit Meeting in Laos, called that the Dalai Lama should use his influence to calm down the Tibet incident. This was unheard of and aroused international attention seeing it as the highest authorities’ new pattern of thinking. However, nothing followed, and no change on the handling was made by the “anti-secession” institutions. From there, we may see that the decision-making process on the issue of Tibet requires no role played by the highest authority. Even if the highest authorities made any decision, it would not come into effect if it was not in accordance with the purpose or intent of the bureaucracy. This pattern would probably have constituted an inexplicit rule for future decision-making process. The causes that contributed to this situation will be elaborated later.
Decision-making at the highest level produce brutality and absurdity on the one hand, on the other hand, possibility remains that it may produce decisions with prudence and vision for change and breakthroughs. The two extremes are not too far away, often residing in the transient thinking of the ruler’s mind. However, when highly bureaucratic institutions dominate decision-making process, it is far less likely to see dramatic breakthrough in a given situation. Bureaucracy is inherently rigid, inflexible and hard-lined. Most importantly, it is expanding and interest-driven in that all decisions produced have to be in accordance with its self-interests. When its self-interests are in conflict with public interests, bureaucracy invariably becomes destructive. It is not only deserting the public interests, but also deserting the highest authorities it should be faithfully serving. Bureaucratic “anti-secession” institutions are acting in such a way that when they generate “anti-secession” actions, the outcomes are invariably pushing China towards the abyss of split. In light of this perspective, let’s analyze the veins of the March incident in Tibet.
Street protests with violence similar to the “3.14” Incident repeatedly occur in Mainland China. The tactics used to handle these incidents have already been very obtusely unskillful. But if the same tactics—news blockade, passively cooling down, not stimulating further conflicts, cracking down the hardcore while providing comfort to others, and finding scapegoats in lower level bureaucracy to calm down the anger—were used to deal with the March incident, the chain reactions throughout the Tibetan area that we had seen would not have been forthcoming.
However, the bureaucrats dealing with Tibet do not wish to have such impassive perspectives. First of all, the international community pays good intention on Tibet, and any incidents not well-handled would raise heavy discussions and criticism. Second, turmoil in Tibet would embarrass President Hu Jintao who had been in charge of Tibet, and each level of bureaucracy fears to bear this kind of culpability. Third, since the authority has announced in various occasions that “Tibet nowadays enjoys the best time in history”, any incident, therefore, would make the government unable to explain itself.
The dynamics of Chinese politics determine that if a few individual or one department hold responsibility for any serious incident, it is acceptable to find scapegoats to calm down the event; therefore tensions among different bureaucratic institutions would not be escalated and forthcoming. However, no single administration can take responsibility for the turmoil in Tibet, since after decades of huge spending and efforts, large-scale protests had openly announced China’s policy failure in Tibet. Yet China’s Tibet policy was co-designed and executed by various institutions and agencies, and admitting its failure is tantamount to announcing failure of the collective efforts of all the aforementioned institutions and “anti-secession” agencies: No one can be excused, and career prospects of many bureaucrats would be affected. Therefore, “anti-secession” bureaucrats must organize themselves as an interest group, to act together and help the bureaucrats in Tibet to shake off responsibility of policy failure.
The most convenient way to get excused is to translate the burden of failure as a result of the “sedition and secession” efforts organized and carefully planned by the “Dalai clique”. Because no matter what excuse is readily available, if it came from within, the bureaucrats have to bear responsibility for the failure; only by throwing the burden off the country can the bureaucrats be totally excused. The administration in Tibet Autonomous Region announced to Xinhua News on the very day of incident that “sufficient evidence demonstrates that [the incident] was ‘organized, premeditated, and carefully planned’ by the Dalai clique”. This announcement immediately became the official statement by all institutions and “anti-secession” agencies dealing with Tibet. They are unable to present “sufficient evidence” up till now, and they do not care if they could. Their goal is to guide the public opinion at the very beginning, which was successfully achieved: The lying statement became a model of language, with unquestionable certainty that guided and forced the society (including the highest authorities) to follow suit.
The starting point determines the course. This official statement, throwing the burden off the bureaucrats, modeled the framework of ensuing actions, as well as the course of the event. For example, on March 14th, there was a four-hour period when the armed force, occupying the peripheries, took no action in the commotion area, allowing the degree of violence to escalate. Many people were confused by this strange phenomenon. Among the various interpretations, I tend to believe that this non-interference was made deliberately for “breeding” purposes. On the one hand, it took time to set up video equipments in the commotion area; on the other hand, violence without necessary control would naturally grow, thereby contributing to the validity of the forthcoming crackdown and allowing journalists to record more poignant scenes of the violence. If the armed force had taken over the situation at the beginning, the scale of event would have been much limited. It would be better off for the general situation but unfavorable to the bureaucrats: suppressing violence, though at a small scale, would invite waves of international criticism, which might not please their bosses in Beijing. It would not allow the bureaucrats to wash off the smears and may irritate Beijing to charge them for improper handling. Therefore, they would rather take no action, allowing violence to increase until such a degree that it could be properly labeled as “organized, premeditated, and carefully planned”, so that when they actually began to suppress the turmoil, the outside world as well as Beijing would have nothing to hold against them.
This is the characteristics of autocracy—every agency in the system tends to place maximization of its personal benefit at the core of decision-making. Bureaucrats take no heed to the actual cause and would rather actively allow things to shift towards the extreme, in order to guard their own interests, no matter how serious the outcome could possibly be.
2. Ethnic Conflict Turned into Racial Opposition
After the 3.14 Incident, the bureaucrats had to prove its necessity and validity of the crackdown to the highest authorities in Beijing, to the people at home and to the international community. On the one hand, they took immediate actions, using all forms of media to repeat the official statement, and on the other hand, they blocked the commotion area, cutting off all forms of communication, so that no counter evidence could be obtained and public opinion could be well under control. When similar events took place in the Mainland, there was little or no media coverage, not to mention showing video recordings on TV. It was remarkably unusual that after several hours TV news reporting was sent through the whole country and even to the whole world, repeatedly showing Tibetan violence against the Chinese. It did not mention or analyze the causes, only showing the attacks launched by the Tibetans and attributing it to the efforts organized by outside separatists, thereby directing nationalistic hatred at the Tibetans.
Ethnic opposition/confrontation is the root cause that may ultimately lead to separation, and should be avoided by all means. Unfortunately, the “anti-secession” bureaucratic institutions are creating the split. They knew how serious the outcome could be, but knowingly utilized ethic opposition for their political gain: As long as nationalistic feelings of the Han Chinese are stirred up, forming bitter hatred towards the enemy, not only could they hide behind the curtain to avoid inquiries and investigation, but they could also use the nationalistic sentiments surging through the country to incorporate the highest authorities into their political trajectory. Any suspicions of the handling or suggestions to double check or soften the tension would receive no resonance under surging waves of extreme nationalism. The only thing exists is the absolutely unquestionable statement. It magnifies, amplifies, and wraps up all voices and actions in accordance with the lie of the “anti-secession” bureaucrats.
Pouring oil to the flames, propaganda efforts made in this way would not calm down the event. The protests in the 1980s were only limited in Lhasa, but now extended over the whole Tibetan area. TV is an important factor, a rare commodity in the 1980s, now available everywhere. Though showing the violent scenes may receive endorsement from the Han Chinese for the crackdown, it did just the opposite to the Tibetans. Graphic scenes on TV, acting as an order for mobilization, triggered the explosion of accumulated discontent all over Tibetan areas. Tibetans not only shared empathy towards what was happening in Lhasa, some would be misled by the scenes, thinking they should be acting in the same way to express discontent. In some Tibetan areas, violent actions that Tibetans made to other ethnic groups took place after they saw the violence scenes in Lhasa showing on TV. The bureaucrats deemed the protests as an evidence for being “organized, premeditated and carefully planned”. In fact, there was no need for organization, premeditation and careful planning: Allowing Tibetans to see the vivid actions that people in Lhasa were taking was tantamount to asking themselves going to the streets. This order of mobilization, marvelously, was sent out by the bureaucrats themselves.
On the other hand, due to prejudiced choice of materials and propaganda efforts that stirred up extreme sentiments, the incident was pictured as an event in which Tibetans slaughtered Han Chinese without a reason. It cut out a racial chasm between Han Chinese and Tibetans. The longing and intimate feelings towards Tibetan culture that Han Chinese people displayed in recent years were changed into fear and hatred towards Tibetans in general, seeing Tibetans as an ungrateful people. The Internet was inundated by extreme nationalists’ feverish and abusive words. Everywhere Tibetans experienced discrimination and unfairness, no matter it was in the airport, hotel or checkpoint. Tibetan children were also bullied by Han Chinese classmates. Out from sheer aversion to the official propaganda, Tibetans resist all forms of official language, and returned hatred to Han Chinese. It could be said that after March Incident, racial opposition was formed between Han Chinese and Tibetans, divided by blood. The most typical example is: During the Olympic Games in Beijing, Tibetan children, once cheering the Chinese term, cheered whenever China lost a gold medal. This change among children indicates the long-term trend of the Tibet issue.
Before the incident in Tibet, there were conditions sufficient for independence—single ethnicity, religion and culture, clarity of national boundaries and history, high recognition from the international community—except one condition carrying the greatest importance: the lack of driving force among Tibetans domestically to seek for independence. Although the issue of Tibet has existed for decades, it is concentrated on political, historical or cultural spheres. The people involved were mostly from the government, the upper-class, the intelligentsia and the international community. Even 1959 Uprising and the escape of the Dalai Lama were regarded by Mao as merely a result of class struggle, not at all ethnic opposition. Protests in the 1980s did not make a huge impact on Sino-Tibetan relationship in general, since the protests were exclusively in Lhasa, not reaching into other Tibetan areas. Common people of both ethnicities were more or less harmonious or even intimate. If there was no driving force among Tibetans to actively seek for independence, no matter how many outside conditions could be met, they would make little difference. Precisely because of this, I had not realized the prospect of Tibetan Independence.
But the March incident in Tibet has created a great chasm between Han Chinese and Tibetans. When ethnic relationship becomes racial opposition, the nature of the issue has changed. The conflict between upper-class and the elites were easy to resolve, as policy modification, institutional change or reversal of individual cases could all serve the purpose well. But ethnic conflicts treating people differently by blood and race made everyone involved, and made impact on every single detail of daily interaction between the two peoples. Any individuals in any form of interactions could become the cause of conflicts, and all conflicts would serve as a force propelling further conflicts, thereby accumulating racial hatred between the two peoples, eye for eye, teeth for teeth, making the two peoples going further and further apart, without a returning path. In that scenario, the weaker side, the suppressed and discriminated, would naturally yearn for independence. Once Tibetans in the Tibetan areas generally envision independence as their ultimate goal, all the conditions for independence that Tibet enjoys immediately become effective. Precisely because of this important change, Tibetan Independence becomes an emerging issue in reality. Though its actualization would depend on historical timing and external environment, at least for Tibetans themselves, the conditions are now all met. This is the turning point in the course of the Tibet issue. If people for a free Tibet would want to give out reward, the most deserved party is the “anti-secession” bureaucratic group that successfully turned Sino-Tibetan relationship into racial opposition.
3. Self-fulfilling Expectations
Since at the very beginning the nature of incident had been defined as “organized, premeditated, and carefully planned by the Dalai clique”, and since the authorities regard national unity as the paramount principle, the method of handling was to crackdown, determined and unconditional. This is the principle that government and bureaucrats would not violate, and is also the guiding ideology of the armed force executing crackdown operations. After the incident, all levels of authorities in Tibetan areas as well as the armed force had been over-reactive, with large-scale arrests, violent suppressions, cruel interrogations, temple blockades, persecutions on monks, which provoked widespread discontent, and got more common people involved, making the whole Tibetan people to become resistant. This is another major cause making the incident escalated to such a degree.
Under inculcation of Party ideology and propaganda, all Han Chinese soldiers brought to Tibet to execute crackdown operations regarded Tibetans as separatist enemies, with hatred and violence unleashed to Tibetans, further provoking unnecessary conflicts. For example, when Han Chinese soldiers saw the Dalai Lama’s pictures, the head of the separatist clique, they would destroy them violently, or would even force Tibetans to destroy. This is not acceptable by Tibetans who see the Dalai Lama as the supreme leader. If old Tibetans were beaten in order to protect the Dalai Lama’s pictures, their offspring was course very angry, and relatives and villagers were also very angry. So more and more people were involved, and the conflicts occurred, escalated, and become serious incidents, possibly leading to gun shooting and casualties. Thereafter, it would be ascribed to efforts being “organized, premeditated, and carefully planned”, and suppression followed. Similar events happened all over Tibetan areas, though often without any political content. They were but “resistance provoked by the government.”
After June 4th Student Movement in 1989, the Party concluded that “Destabilizing factors must be resolved at the grassroots and nipped in the bud", which become the basic thinking pattern of the bureaucracy, and is the highest guiding principle of the bureaucrats. According to their power-worship mentality, they believe, with power and might, anything can be done wantonly. The policy they were carrying out in areas with ethnic groups is to “take the initiative to attack, to hit the raised heads, and to take pre-emptive actions”. Later, the policy becomes “to attack and chase even if [the enemies] haven’t raised their heads”. This atrocity was well displayed in the March Incident. Many activities that have nothing to do with politics, such as holidays, horse-racing, religious ceremonies, etc, which are but traditional customs having existed since ancient times. However, for the bureaucrats, especially for the soldiers brought from outside, they know nothing of the culture and traditions, and believe that “all non-Han people must be rebellious”. They believe whatever gatherings might possibly lead to serious accidents. Since they need “to take pre-emptive actions” and “to attack even the heads yet to raise up”, the most reliable way is to forbid all forms of gatherings, and stop all non-governmental activities. Even if not to forbid entirely, they need to deploy a large number of troops, to surround and threat them by setting up heavy weapons. The reactions would be easy to imagine: “How come you can hold the Olympic Games but we cannot even hold horse-racing?!” Impatient Tibetans, facing insolent and atrocious soldiers who see them as potential enemies, might cause conflicts beginning at verbal engagement. To the authorities, it precisely validated their prediction that gatherings lead to incidents, thus putting more efforts limiting these activities but not knowing that their self-fulfilling expectations are exactly the cause of incidents.
In fact, even from the rulers’ perspectives, to “resolve everything by nipping in the bud” is by no means a good way, because the “bud” cannot display the nature of affairs. Some “buds” are not “destabilizing factors”, and their growth will help stability. To “resolve” atrociously would throw the bud to the opposite side, which is tantamount to having created new enemies. Even if the nipping created a situation that looked stable, destabilizing factors are becoming and accumulating. They are not finished, merely waiting for the next chance to explode in a larger scale.
The monks in Tibet are rational and peaceful. When they were using peaceful ways to express discontent, if the authorities could have listened carefully and interacted positively with an open-mind, it would in the long run contribute to the stability of Tibetan area. But the authorities see the monks as parasites, reaping without sowing, as the basis of the Dalai’s roots in Tibet, as the nursing soil of Tibetan independence, as the troublemaker and instigator—all very negative, so whenever being challenged by the monks, the authorities, as if pre-programmed, would act with atrocity. The violence in 3.14 Incident is directly resulted from the fact that soldiers had beaten the peaceful monks continuously for days. It was exactly the same with the cause that led to the Lhasa Incident in 1987. How surprising that the authorities learned no lessons from the past. A little knowledge about Tibetan culture would tell that, contrary to the disgust and contempt feelings that bureaucrats had towards the monks, they enjoy very high social status and respect among Tibetans: They are one of the Three Treasures of Tibetan Buddhism, traditional intellectuals of Tibetan culture, and are guiders and protectors in the spiritual world of Tibetans, being greatly respected by Tibetans. Therefore, the least thing that Tibetans could tolerate is to see monks being abused and humiliated. It was guaranteed that the abuse and violence that armed soldiers gave to the monks would lead to a commotion. Only the imperial bureaucrats being blinded by power could not foresee the outcome.
The authorities never reflected on what happened, but acted to worsen the situation. The monks in all areas became the main targets; many great temples were insultingly searched by the armed force. Besides those who participated in the protests were arrested, many were confined and lost freedom; some temples were being closed indefinitely; monks without registered residence were deported; all temples were ordered to engage in “patriotic education”, forcing the monks to openly denounce the Dalai Lama. Many monks fled from the temples in order to avoid such denunciations – it was required to be made by each individual. Some temples even became empty. Before the incident in Tibet, many monks were apathetic towards political issues, devoting themselves to spiritual practice. They did not object to China’s rule, with discontent only about policy issues. The incident, however, made the monks at large to think about Tibet’s political future, and the number of monks agreeing with Tibetan independence rapidly increased.
China’s authorities forced the monks to go to the opposite side, which is tantamount to having created the most difficult opponent to deal with. Traditional folk songs described the monks in this way: “Put him up, he is a piece of straight incense; put him down, he is still a piece of straight incense. Seize the head, you get only hairs; touch the butt you get only rags”. This explains the fact that monks have no family to worry about, and thus they are resolute, single-minded and uncompromising, not being afraid to challenge the authorities. This is the reason that the monks were always in the front during the past incidents. Meanwhile, given the highly respectable status that monks enjoy in Tibetan society and the far-reaching influence that monks exert, their discontent and appeals for independence would not be limited to themselves alone; it would have a broad impact on all the Tibetan people.
Another method that the bureaucrats often use— hurriedly hunting for evidence to demonstrate that incidents were “organized, premeditated and carefully planned by the Dalai clique”, created a large number of arrests, tortured confessions and wrong cases. These efforts also affected a large number of Tibetans and their relatives, creating a wide-spread discontent and disillusionment. After many persecutions, the bureaucrats still couldn’t justify themselves with convincing evidence. The charges that the media brought against the Dalai Lama, to Tibetans, were all lying. Even in those Tibetan areas without protest, these propaganda efforts provoked disgust and aversion, creating hatred and bringing further conflicts. This made more Tibetans to think if separation is better off. “Anti-secession” propaganda efforts are providing materials breeding consciousness for separation. “Tibetan Independence” in Tibetan --“博让赞” was a word and concept not very well known among Tibetans, but after long-term “anti-secession” educations, everyone, old and young, knows this word. In this Incident, “博让赞” became the slogan being cried out by monks, city dwellers, herdsmen and primary school students alike.
This is the so-called “self-fulfilling expectation”—treating Tibetans as enemies, they would eventually so become; everywhere preventing Tibetans from “secession”, Tibetans would eventually want to secede. Analysts have different views on the nature of protests in all Tibetan areas. The main disagreement is whether it was a political movement seeking independence, or just protests expressing discontent towards policy or economic disadvantage. To me, the course of this incident may not contain specific appeals for independence; many contributing factors exist, including the discrepancy of living standards, influence from the international community, “the effect of sheep flock”, discontent regarding economic issues, migration issues, etc, and official propaganda efforts and suppression had all been adding fuel to the flame. However, the outcome of the incident is that Tibetans in general widely planted in mind the consciousness of seeking independence. Therefore, when similar incidents happen, it will become a spontaneous movement, and Tibetan Independence will become the universal appeal of many Tibetans, serving as the driving force and guiding principle during the course.
4. Sore Conflicts between Chinese Society and Western Society
Chinese and Western societies in general in the past had little conflicts. Chinese people shared good feelings towards the Westerners, and relatively trusted Western media. Even during the time with most inflated nationalistic sentiments, the anger was directed at Western governments. Westerners also had little negative feelings towards the Chinese, criticizing the Chinese government but thinking the people are victims living under totalitarian regime. However, in regard to the Tibet Incident, common Chinese people launched a jihad against Western media, and treated Western people invectively. This change of attitude derives from the bureaucrats’ successful campaign over the media. Yet the condition on which successful opinion control was depended is the necessary condition to instigate Chinese people, but is the cause that will definitely raise suspicion and criticism from the international community.
In order to achieve information blockade, the authorities on March 14, the very day of Incident, restricted freedom of movement of foreigners, and soon after, drove out all foreigners out of Tibet. For a long time, foreigners were not allowed to visit Tibetan areas, and checkpoints were set up on the road. Graphical materials were treated as the most sensitive, and the armed force largely violated human rights. Besides preventing foreigners from getting pictures, some Tibetans who used cell phone cameras to take pictures were arrested and treated with cruel persecution. Even Han Chinese, if they were caught having taken sensitive pictures, were interrogated, equipments confiscated or pictures deleted. Western media could hardly get any first-hand material due to strict enforcement on information censorship, and could only use indirect sources for reporting purposes. Indirect sources were easily mixed with errors, which invited heavy criticism and damaged Western media’s image in Chinese people’s eyes. It was the first time China’s propaganda machine came out the bout fighting Western media victoriously; the bureaucrats were extremely pleased.
But this couldn’t convince Western media. Chinese people’s one-sided abuse and intimidation, along with Chinese government’s pressure and violation, could only push Western media, referred to as the Fourth Power, to the opposite side of long-term enemies. Although Chinese people’s enmity would make Western media to report with greater care, research and balance, it will also increase the media’s aversion, not only towards Chinese totalitarian regime, but also towards Chinese people’s fanaticism and violence. One can believe if any opportunity arises in the future, similar joint campaign against China will duly occur. Western people’s attitudes are by and large guided by the media. Once the media is insulted, pushing it to the opposite side, it is bounded that people in the West will think about China with more and more negative images.
In fact, it was due to China’s news control efforts that the people in the West could not get first-hand information from the media, and, without any trust in Chinese media, they began to hold suspicions towards every single word or statement that China provided in regard to the incident in Tibet, because it is commonsensical to the Westerners that only the act of lying needs information control and censorship. Even if such efforts of control could be so successful that people could not know the details of lying, a feasible way to thoroughly resist these efforts is to treat everything as lying. Many Westerners wanted and actually tried to boycott the Olympic Torch Relay. The reason behind it was due to the fact that they lacked other means to express their discontent towards China’s handling of Tibet and took it as an opportunity to direct their anger at China’s efforts to hide the truth.
The bureaucratic institutions do not really care about Westerners opinions. They need to use Chinese people’s hostility displayed towards the Western society in order to show the government’s popularity and support, and thereafter when individual Westerners tried to boycott the Olympic Torch Relay, the bureaucrats showed those scenes repeatedly, further stimulating Chinese people’s hostility towards the Western society. Mass movement and mobilizing the masses are a craft that totalitarian regimes are very adept in. When big issues occur, Chinese people lack sufficient information and knowledge to think critically and independently, and are easy to manipulate. Although people do not consent to the government on many issues, the majority, having accepted as a fundamental principle that national unity is inviolable, used “seeking secession or not” as a simple assessment in regard to Tibet, a place far away from their daily life. When all the media, controlled by the government, circulating the single voice and reprimanding Western society’s hostility towards China and its feverish support towards “Tibetan Independence”, it was not difficult to stimulate Chinese people’s enmity. The handling of the Incident not only turned the ethnic relationship between Han Chinese and Tibetans into ethnic opposition, but also pushed Chinese and Western societies into the course to become two opposing camps.
Indeed, it was unprecedented how much support that Chinese people gave to the government. On the internet, or on foreign streets, Chinese patriots and Westerners had close combat. Chinese people are not allowed to watch CNN, but can frenetically oppose CNN; back home there is no freedom to protest on streets, but abroad patriots gathered together to repeat the scenes as if back to the Cultural Revolution (though some of these performances were encouraged and organized by Chinese government and consulates abroad). One the one hand, it will make Westerners depreciate China in terms of cultural values; on the other hand, it will invite Westerns see China, a country with enmity towards the West, as a threat to the free world. They would not treat Chinese people and the government separately, as they did before.
No rationality can exist between two opposing camps. Both sides will use simple criteria for identification, as if soccer hooliganism humiliating the opposing side, without valid reasons and without right or wrong. Once Western people and media deemed that Chinese people in general possess colonizers’ mentality, they will believe that Tibet must be freed from Chinese rule, regardless of knowing what changes China’s political system will experience. The promise made by China’s dissidents holding that Tibet would be free once China becomes democratic will not be trustworthy, because institutional change is not the same with the change of people’s mentality. This will greatly increase the difficulties when future China handles the issue of Tibet.
Today, the CCP is no longer a revolutionary party that strictly sticks to founding ideologies; rather, it becomes a pragmatic and opportunistic interest group. Theoretically, out from preserving self-interests, it should avoid direct confrontation with the West. However, the course of development is always depended on its inner logic. One of the characteristics of autocracy is that, even if each part acts rationally, the general outcome could be far away from rationality, and would not serve the general interest of the group. The trend wherein rationality of parts evolves into irrationality of the whole, like Nash equilibrium, exerts vital importance in determining the course of affairs. In the following analysis, it will be evident that, it was due to the rational calculation of the “anti-secession” bureaucratic institutions that formed China’s whole logical fallacy in dealing with the Tibet Incident.
(To be continued…)
Chapter Two: Dilemma of the Imperial Regime
Chapter Three: Road to Tibetan Independence
p.s. Despite the observation above, I do not dispute that the "Hu Yaobang" approach could work (if well managed) and is much more preferrable, from the Han, the Tibetan, and the PRC perspectives.
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For those inside the GFW I will replicate it below, first the Chinese then the English version. via ESWN there is also this article which listed some errors in Wang's essay, which I will let you judge yourself.
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王力雄：西藏Du立路線圖
週四, 2008-11-20 16:21 — 牧草與早稻
稻子註：
第一，我並不完全同意王先生作出的形勢分析，尤其是他對所謂國際社会的描述。
不過，即使論中存有好些錯漏，但這仍是一篇 我．們．不．可．以．不．看．的文章。
西藏Du-立路線圖
王力雄
目 錄
西藏Du-立路線圖... 1
一、 西藏事件是分水嶺
1. 官僚集團成為主導
2. 民族矛盾變成種族對立
3. 預期的自我實現
4. 中西民間的交惡
二、 帝國政體的困局
1. 當“反分裂”成為飯碗.
2. “官僚集團的民主性”
3. 西藏問題何以無解
三、 西藏如何走向Du-立.
1. 流血與Du-立
2. 西藏是西方的政治正確
3. 西方政府的考量
4. 中國難以避免陷入內亂
5. 決戰在西藏
一、 西藏事件是分水嶺
1. 官僚集團成為主導
這個路線圖從分水嶺出發。在2008年的西藏事件之前，我從未認真地對待過西藏Du-立。這個事件是一個分水嶺，讓我第一次正視西藏有了實現Du-立的可能。如果說此前西藏Du-立只是夢想的話，此後西藏Du-立卻浮出現實的水面，進入了目力所及的視野。之所以發生這種變化，主要推動者不是別人，正是中國權力體系中擔負“反分裂”職能的官僚集團。
十九世紀中到二十世紀中的中國，一直是身受帝國主義之害的形像。近代中國人牢牢記住了那段屈辱，卻很少有人去想中國也曾是一個帝國，在十七世紀到十八世紀進行過巨大的疆土擴張，雖有過被其他帝國打敗和瓜分的屈辱，但至今仍然繼承著相當一部分帝國遺產，包括西藏在內。
今天，西藏領土占帝國版圖的四分之一，西藏問題在帝國政治中有重要地位，中國的黨政權力體系中有諸多部門與西藏有關，其中省部級以上的部門有如下十三個：
1、 西藏自治區
2、 青海省
3、 甘肅省
4、 四川省
5、 雲南省
6、 中共中央西藏工作協調小組
7、 中共統戰部
8、 公安部
9、 國家安全部
10、 軍隊
11、 武裝警察部隊
12、 國務院新聞辦公室
13、 國務院宗教事務局
這些部門都設有專門處理西藏問題的機構，有一批長期甚至終生行使這種職能的官僚。除了這十三個部門，還有以下十一個雖不直接涉及西藏，同樣擔負“反分裂”職能、設有反分裂機構與人員的（省部級以上）部門：
1、 中央政法委
2、 中共中央新疆工作協調小組
3、 新疆自治區
4、 新疆生產建設兵團
5、 內蒙古自治區
6、 外交部
7、 國家民族事務委員會
8、 國務院台灣事務辦公室
9、 國務院港澳事務辦公室
10、 香港中聯辦
11、 澳門中聯辦
加在一起，中國的官僚體系中具有“反分裂”職能的部門共計有二十四個，乃是一個相當大的集團，擁有的權力、人力和資源非同小可。在處理這次西藏事件中，他們是一個聯盟，主導了整個處理過程。這一點與毛時代和鄧時代不同。當年無論是對西藏實行“統戰”或“平叛”，還是“撥亂反正”或“戒嚴”，都是權力高端決策，官僚集團執行。而這次西藏事件，權力高端基本無所作為，完全由官僚集團自行處理。
這不能簡單認為只是高端下放權力。實際上，拉薩事件發生的當月，中國總理溫家寶曾在老撾出席大湄公河次區域領導人會議時呼吁，希望達賴喇嘛能夠施加他的影響平息西藏事件。這種前所未見的說法引起了國際廣泛關注，被認為是中國領導人的新思路。然而此後不再有任何下文，“反分裂”官僚集團對事件的處理方式沒有任何變化。由此可以看出，今日中共政權處理西藏問題，不僅不需要權力高端進行決策，甚至即使高端進行了決策，若不符合官僚集團的意圖，也不會生效。這種局面很可能會成為今後的定規。至於為什麼發生這種變化，容後再述。
在權力高端能夠獨裁時，一方面會有專橫、粗暴乃至荒謬，另一方面也存在高瞻遠矚、撥亂反正、突破和變局的可能。二者只是一步之遙，有時就在於當權者的一轉念。而當官僚集團成為主導時，就不會再出現那種戲劇性，而是落進明確的規則框架。官僚集團是一種互相牽制、按部就班、墨守陳規的結構。更重要的是，官僚集團是一個利益主體，如果由它控制決策，所有決策都必須符合其自身利益。當其自身利益與社會利益發生矛盾時，官僚集團就成為破壞者，不僅破壞民眾利益，也會破壞它本當為之服務的統治目標。“反分裂”官僚集團正是這樣，在它按照自身利益去驅動“反分裂”的行動時，結果是把中國推向更危險的分裂。我們不妨從這個角度，看一下這次西藏事件的脈絡。
類似拉薩的“3.14”街頭抗議和暴力事件，其實在中國內地屢見不鮮。內地處理事件的方式已經很糟，但如果對“3.14” 事件采用與內地同樣的方式——新聞封鎖、大事化小、不激化矛盾、鎮壓加安撫、在下級官僚中抓替罪羊以平民憤等——很可能就不會發生隨後波及整個藏區的連鎖反應。然而對西藏問題，官僚們卻不會有這種平常心。因為首先西藏被世界關注，事件會引發國際輿論；其次西藏動亂會使當過西藏主管的中共領導人胡錦濤難堪，層層官吏都怕被怪罪；其三，既然官方多次宣布“西藏處於歷史最好時期”，出了這種自打耳光的事必須自圓其說。在中國官場，如果是由少數個人或單一部門承擔責任的事，可以通過找替罪羊的方式處理，官僚之間的競爭也容易導致落井下石。然而西藏事件不是西藏一地之責，在花了那麼多錢、用了那麼長時間、下了那麼大功夫之後，仍然出現如此規模的民眾抗議，僅憑常識也會知道是治藏路線的失敗。然而治藏路線是由眾多部門共同推動和執行的，承認路線失敗，十三個涉藏部門都脫不了干系，其他的“反分裂”部門也會受連帶影響。這種責任是整體性的，面臨的問責也無法靠官僚之間的推卸化解得了，諸多官員的仕途前景都會受影響。因此，“反分裂”官僚們必須團結起來，結成聯盟，共同行動，幫助西藏的官僚推掉責任，才能讓他們一塊得到解脫。
責任如何推卸得最徹底？可想莫過於推給“達賴集團”。因為不管什麼理由，只要是出自西藏本土，就免不了官僚自身的責任。只有把責任推到境外，才能讓自己完全無關。西藏自治區當局在拉薩事件發生當天就對新華社宣稱，“有足夠證據證明這是達賴集團有組織、有預謀、精心策劃的”。這種宣稱立刻被所有涉藏部門和反分裂部門當作統一口徑。雖然他們至今也不能把“足夠證據”展示於世，可見只是推卸責任的謊言。然而官僚們並不在意能否拿出證據，他們的目的是在第一時間主導輿論。這一點的確是被成功地做到——他們的謊言立刻變為中國輿論的眾口一詞，成了一種不容置辯的話語模式，起到了誘導和迫使社會（包括權力高端）遵循同樣口徑的效果。
起點決定走向。起點失之毫釐，結果差之千裡。這種出於推卸責任的官僚口徑，決定了後續行動的框架，也決定了事態發展的走向。譬如3月14日拉薩發生鬧事的區域曾出現數小時放任狀態，外圍已經集合的軍警不進入，不行動，任憑暴力行為升級。很多人對這個奇怪現像困惑不解。在不同版本的解釋中，我比較傾向於這種做法是為鎮壓“培育”理由，以及為了拿到“宣傳攻勢”所需的電視畫面。一方面把攝制組部署進鬧事地點完成拍攝需要時間；一方面暴力不受抑制時會不斷升級，可以給鎮壓提供更充分的合法性，也容易拍到更有烈度的暴力畫面作為證據。如果從鬧事初起就動用警力控制，事件規模會小很多，有利全局，卻不利相關官僚。因為事件既已發生，在較低烈度時鎮壓會引起非議指責，包括北京也可能不滿，既不能讓官僚有效地轉移事件責任，還可能增加處置不當的罪名。因此他們寧可按兵不動，讓事態擴大，等待事件達到充分嚴重的程度，可以被認為是“有組織、有預謀、精心策劃的”之時，再進行鎮壓。那時外界無法指責，北京也難以怪罪。
這就是專制制度的特點——權力體系中每個角色都把自身利益置於核心位置，以個人得失決定行動。官僚為了個人算盤，寧可把事情推向惡性發展的方向，不管會造成什麼惡果。回顧此次西藏事件的脈絡，從拉薩僧侶的和平請願，一步步發展成遍及藏區的動蕩與鎮壓，以及擴大到全球的抗議和反抗議，很多環節都有這個因素在起作用。
2. 民族矛盾變成種族對立
3.14事件發生後，官僚們首先要向政權高端、國內民眾和國際社會證明鎮壓的必要與合法。他們采取的方式是先發制人，利用一切輿論手段進行頻繁的信息轟炸；同時封鎖現場，阻斷信息，不讓對手掌握不利自己的證據，由此達到壟斷輿論的目的。與中國其他地方發生類似事件時媒體幾乎不報道，更少見諸電視畫面相比，這次對拉薩出現的暴力卻一反常態，十幾個小時之後就通過電視新聞把畫面送到全國乃至全世界，密集播放藏人對漢人的施暴，不談事件起因，單一地表現成藏人攻擊漢人（盡管存在這種攻擊），歸咎於境外操縱的分裂，由此煽動漢人針對藏人的民族主義情緒。
民族對立是一個國家發生分裂的根本原因，本是首先應該避免的分裂，然而擔負“反分裂”職能的官僚集團卻在此次西藏事件中一手制造這種分裂。他們不是不知道後果，而是十分明白地就是要利用這種對立，需要的就是這種後果。只要煽動起中國主體族群——漢人的民族情緒，形成同仇敵愾的社會氛圍，就可以讓他們躲在後面，不但可以避免來自民意的質詢和追究，還能借助洶湧的民意把權力高端納入他們的軌道。任何對陰謀論的懷疑，對己方的檢視，力圖溫和的處理方式，緩和矛盾的用意，都會在激憤的民意威懾下無法伸張，只剩“反分裂”官僚的謊言成為不容懷疑的定論，不斷放大，裹挾所有聲音和行動。
這種宣傳不會平息事件，反而是火上澆油。一九八零年代的藏人抗議局限在拉薩，這次卻遍及整個藏區，其中電視是重要原因。當年少有的電視現在普及到各個角落。雖然藏人攻擊漢人的畫面可以讓漢人認同對藏人的鎮壓，但是對藏人的效果卻相反。各地藏人在日常生活中積澱的不滿，很容易被直觀的電視畫面引發出來。可以說，電視在相當程度上成了引發藏區抗議的動員令。作為藏人，不但理解和同情拉薩街頭發生的行為，有些人還會被電視內容誤導，認為應該用同樣行為表達不滿。藏區個別地方發生針對異族的暴力事件，正是在看到拉薩街頭的電視畫面後。當局把藏區各地同時發生抗議作為是“有組織、有預謀、精心策劃”的證明。其實哪裡需要組織、預謀和策劃，讓各地藏人同時看到拉薩人已經起來的活生生畫面，就足以讓他們同時走上街頭了。而這個動員令，正是當局自己發出的。
另一方面，單方面取舍材料、不探討理由只渲染現像的輿論煽動，把事件片面表現為藏人對漢人的無端仇殺，造成的結果是漢人與藏人的種族切割。近年漢人對藏文化表現出的向往和親近，發生一百八十度轉彎，變成了對藏人整體的畏懼和仇視，把藏人視為恩將仇報的民族。互聯網上充斥中國憤青對藏人的狂熱辱罵。對藏人的排斥成為中國社會彌漫的風氣。到處發生對藏人的歧視與不公。機場、旅館、各種檢查站，只要見到藏人，即使是位居高官者也免不了侮辱性對待。甚至藏族兒童在學校也受漢族同學欺侮。這種出自漢人的整體敵對，把藏人整體推到了漢人的對立面。出於對官方宣傳的反感，藏人對官方言辭一概抵制，同時也對漢人的仇藏還以相反的仇漢。可以說，從這次事件後，漢藏之間已經形成了以血緣劃分的種族對立。最典型的例子是在隨後舉行的北京奧運會期間，本無民族區分的藏族孩子從以往為中國加油變成每見中國失掉金牌就歡呼。孩子的變化，正是預示西藏問題的長遠走向。
在這次西藏事件前，西藏Du-立的其他條件一直相當充分—— 單一民族、單一宗教和文化，地域界限分明，歷史地位清楚，國際社會高度認可，有眾望所歸的領袖和運轉多年的政府……然而不具備的是最重要的條件，即作為藏人主體的境內藏人缺乏追求Du-立的足夠動力。雖然西藏問題長期存在，但是集中於政治、歷史或文化層面。雙方被卷進糾葛的主要是官方、民族上層、知識界或國際社會。即使是一九五零年代的藏人武裝反抗和達賴喇嘛出走，也被毛澤東化解為階級鬥爭，並未變成種族對立。一九八零年代的拉薩抗議因為沒有擴散到其他藏地，也未影響到整體的藏漢關系。兩個民族的普通民眾之間，可以說此前關系一直比較和睦，甚至比較親近，在境內藏人多數不追求Du-立時，有利於西藏Du-立的其他條件再多，也不會發生作用。我過去之所以沒有正視西藏Du-立前景，原因正是在這裡。
但是這次西藏事件卻在藏漢民族之間整體地切開了鴻溝。民族關系變成了種族對立，情況就發生了本質變化。上層和精英之間的民族矛盾相對容易化解，政策變化、體制改革、翻案平反等都可能成為出路，然而以血緣劃分的種族矛盾涉及每個人，遍布在兩個民族日常交往的所有細節。雙方任何成員、任何接觸都可能成為衝突之源。而所有衝突都會起到繼續動員的作用，使得種族之間仇恨增長，冤冤相報，衝突升級，兩個民族只能越走越遠，從此踏上不歸路。這時受到壓迫與歧視弱勢民族一方，產生要求Du-立的訴求幾乎是順理成章的。一旦境內藏人普遍把西藏Du-立當作願景，西藏原本具備的Du-立條件就立刻變得有效。正是這個重大變化，使得西藏Du-立進入了現實層面。雖然最終能否實現Du-立還要取決於歷史時機和外部環境，但至少從藏人自身而言，條件已經齊備。這是此次西藏事件完成的轉折。如果“ 藏獨” 方面要論功行賞的話，頭功理所應當該授予的就是把藏漢民族變成了對立種族的中國“反分裂”官僚集團。
3. 預期的自我實現
既然從一開始就把事件定性為“達賴集團有組織、有預謀、精心策劃的分裂活動”，對於把統一奉為最高原則的政權，處理方式就只能是堅決鎮壓，沒有緩和余地。這是藏區各地政府和官員不敢有違的立場，也是軍警執行鎮壓的指導思想。拉薩事件發生後，藏區各地政府及軍警的過度反應與草木皆兵——大規模逮捕、暴力鎮壓、刑訊逼供、封鎖寺廟、迫害僧人，人人過關等，引起藏人廣泛不滿，促使更多普通百姓卷入其中，致使反抗擴散到整個藏民族，應該是這次西藏事件規模如此擴大的另一主要原因。
在官方宣傳灌輸下，從外地調進藏區執行鎮壓的漢人士兵把藏人一概視為分裂國家的敵人，因此以仇恨心態對藏人施暴，引發了很多本來不該發生的衝突。比如漢人士兵見到藏人家裡供奉“分裂集團頭目達賴”的照片，會粗暴地進行損毀，甚至逼迫藏人自己動手損毀。這對把達賴喇嘛視為至尊的藏人是不可接受的。如果藏族老人為保護達賴喇嘛像而遭士兵毆打，老人的子女當然憤怒，親屬和鄉親也會不平，於是卷進更多的人。衝突就這樣發生和擴大，演變成事件，甚至導致軍警開槍，造成傷亡，再被歸於“有組織、有預謀、精心策劃的分裂活動”進行鎮壓。類似之事這次各地多有發生，其實往往並無政治內涵，完全屬於“激起民變”。
1989年六四事件後，中共總結的“要把一切不穩定因素消滅在萌芽狀態”，至今已化為官僚集團的基本思維，是所有官僚奉行的准則。按照他們的權力崇拜心態，只要有權力，一切都可以恣意妄為。他們在民族地區實行的政策是“主動出擊、露頭就打、先發制敵”，後來發揮成“不露頭也要打，要追著打”。這種窮凶極惡在這次西藏事件得到充分體現。本來許多和政治無關的活動，如過節、賽馬、宗教法會等，只是傳統風俗，自古已有，但是在把“非我族類”視為“其心必異 ”的官僚眼中，尤其是外地調來、全然不了解民俗的軍警來看，只要聚眾就可能出事。既然要“先發制敵”，“不露頭也要打”，最穩妥的就是禁止任何形式的聚眾，封殺所有民間活動。或者即使沒有禁止，也要重兵防範，軍警包圍，架設武器威懾等。可想藏人對此的反應——“憑什麼你們能開奧運會，我們不能開賽馬會？！”血氣方剛的藏人面對如臨大敵且態度蠻橫的軍人，一言不合就可能引發衝突，釀成事件。對當局來講，那正好驗證了聚眾就會出事的判斷，於是更加禁止民眾活動。孰不知之所以出事，恰恰就在於他們的這種判斷。
其實，即使從統治者角度，把全部矛盾“消滅在萌芽”也非好方法，因為“萌芽”不能真實地顯露事物性質。有些“萌芽”本來並非“不穩定因素”，讓其生長只能有利於穩定，而粗暴的“消滅”卻將其推到了敵對，等於制造了新的敵人。即使這種鎮壓一時造成穩定的表面，但是從長久看，不穩定的因素不會被消滅，只是壓抑和積累，等待時機形成更大的爆發。
僧侶在藏地本是理性與和平的群體。當他們以和平請願的方式表達不滿，如果當局能夠虛心聆聽，正面互動，對藏地的長遠穩定肯定只有好處。然而當局內心深處把僧侶視為不勞而獲的寄生蟲、達賴扎根西藏的基礎、西藏Du-立的土壤、鬧事者和煽動者，總之都是負面的，因此一遇到僧侶挑戰，就會條件反射式地做出粗暴舉動。3.14拉薩街頭出現的暴力事件，與此前連續幾天軍警毆打和平抗議的僧侶有直接關系。那幾乎是一模一樣重復1987年拉薩事件發生的起因，讓人驚訝當局不汲取教訓的顢頇。對藏人稍有了解就會知道，與官僚對僧侶的蔑視與厭惡相反，僧侶在藏人心目中地位極高，既是藏傳佛教的三寶之一，又是藏文化的傳統知識分子，作為藏人精神世界的引導者和護佑者，受到藏人極大尊崇。因此藏人最不能容忍僧侶遭受虐待和羞辱。軍警對僧侶的暴力行為會引發藏人騷亂幾乎是必然的，只有被權力傲慢遮蔽了雙眼的帝國官員才會看不到這種後果。
而當局並未反思，反而變本加厲。各地僧侶被當成主要打擊對像；眾多具有崇高地位的寺廟遭到軍警侮辱性搜查；除了參與抗議的僧侶大批被抓，還有很多僧侶被限制行動自由；一些寺廟長期被關閉；外地戶口的僧侶被驅趕；強令所有寺廟開展所謂“愛國主義教育”，逼迫僧侶們公開譴責達賴喇嘛。很多僧侶為了躲避這種人人過關離寺出走，有些寺廟竟走得幾乎無人。如果說在這次西藏事件發生前，僧侶中還有不少是不問政治、一心修行的，不滿只停留在政策層面，並未導致整體否定中國的統治，這次事件卻使西藏僧侶集體地轉向對西藏前途的政治思考，贊成西藏Du-立的比例大幅度增加。
中國當局把西藏僧侶整體地推到敵對位置，等於是給自己制造了最難擺平的對手。西藏傳統民歌這樣形容僧侶：“立起是一支香，倒下還是一支香，抓我的腦袋只有頭發，摸我的屁股只有破布。”說的就是僧侶無家庭牽累，無後顧之憂，因此無所畏懼，敢於反抗和挑戰。之所以西藏歷次事件總是僧侶打頭，這是重要原因。同時，以僧侶在西藏民眾心目中的地位，以僧侶在西藏民間的廣泛滲透，他們對中國統治的不滿和西藏Du-立的訴求絕不會僅限於自身，而是一定會對藏人百姓產生廣泛影響。
官僚集團的另一種行為——急於拿出事件是“達賴集團有組織、有預謀、精心策劃”的證據，為此大量抓捕藏人，使用刑訊逼供，制造冤假錯案等，在這次西藏事件中也波及眾多藏人及其家屬，造成廣泛的離心離德。在實施了眾多迫害後，最終也沒有拿出自圓其說的證據。媒體對達賴喇嘛的指控在藏人聽來全是謊言，即使對未發生抗議的藏區，也使民眾心生反感，造成擴大矛盾和制造仇恨的效果，反而會讓更多的藏人考慮 “分裂”是不是更好。當局進行的“反分裂”宣傳等於在給分裂意識提供素材。藏語中的“西藏Du-立”——“博讓贊”原本是多數藏族百姓不知道的詞彙，也沒有這個概念，但是經過長期的“反分裂教育”，這個詞現在變得家喻戶曉，婦孺皆知。在這次西藏事件中，“博讓贊”成了從僧侶到普通市民到農牧民甚至小學生都要喊的口號。
這就是所謂“預期的自我實現” ——把藏人當成敵人，藏人最終會真成為敵人，處處防範藏人“分裂”，藏人最後就會真要分裂。對這次波及整個藏地的抗議運動的性質，觀察者有不同解讀。其中主要分歧在於，這究竟是要求西藏Du-立的政治運動，還是僅僅在表達對經濟地位或官方政策的不滿。讓我來看，這次事件的過程不見得有明確的西藏Du-立訴求，而是諸多因素綜合所致，包括發展造成的落差，經濟層面的不滿，移民問題，境外影響和“羊群效應”等，官方宣傳的反向動員和鎮壓反彈更是起了推波助瀾之效。然而這次事件的結果，卻是讓藏人普遍有了西藏Du-立的意識，形成廣泛認同。因此，等到下一次再發生類似事件，西藏Du-立將會成為眾多藏人的共同訴求，成為自覺的運動，並會在發展過程中作為主要的驅動力和思想指導。
4. 中西民間的交惡
中國民間與西方民間過去沒有多少矛盾，中國人對西方人好感居多，對西方媒體也相對信任，即使在民族主義情緒高漲時，也只是針對西方政府。而西方人對中國人也無惡感，雖然西方社會與媒體經常批評中國政府，卻是把中國民眾當作專制政權的受害者。然而在這次西藏事件中，雙方民間卻直接交鋒並且對立起來。中國民眾對西方媒體大加討伐，對西方民眾也惡言相向。這種態度轉變，是中國官僚集團輿論戰的成功。不過輿論戰所依賴的條件——官方壟斷信息，對於成功煽動中國人是必要條件，同時卻是必然受到國際社會質疑的原因。
為了封鎖信息，當局於3.14事件發生當天就在拉薩限制外國人行動自由，隨之將所有外國人驅離西藏。此後各地藏區長期不許外國人進入，到處設卡檢查。圖像被視為最敏感資料，執行命令的軍警大量侵犯人權，除了防止境外人得到圖像，有的藏人僅因為用手機拍攝了照片就遭酷刑和長期關押；即使是漢人被發現在藏區拍攝了“敏感”圖像也會受審問、沒收設備或刪除圖像。嚴密的信息封鎖使得西方媒體幾乎拿不到第一手材料，只能利用間接消息進行報道。而間接消息容易出錯，授人以柄，使得西方媒體在中國人心目中被普遍抹黑。中共宣傳部門與西方媒體的多年鬥爭中第一次占據這種上風，十分得意。
然而這並不能讓西方媒體服氣。中國民眾一面倒的謾罵、恫嚇，加上中國政府對西方媒體的制裁與施壓，只能把被稱作“第四權力”的西方媒體整體地推到與中國長遠為敵的位置。雖然中國人的敵意會使西方媒體報道時更加仔細，更多考證和平衡，然而也會使他們對中國的厭惡增加，不僅厭惡專制政權，也厭惡中國人表現出的狂熱和暴戾。可以相信，今後只要有機會，類似這次西方媒體對中國的聯合圍剿還會發生。而西方民眾的態度很大程度上被媒體主導。得罪了西方媒體，將其推到對立面的結果，最終勢必轉化成西方民眾眼中的中國更加妖魔化。
事實上，正因為中國的新聞封鎖，西方公眾即使無法從本國媒體得到第一手消息，也決不相信中國媒體，並且質疑中國官方在西藏問題上的所有言詞。因為這對他們是簡單常識——只有謊言才需要封鎖信息。即使封鎖能做到讓人不知道謊言的具體內容，但是徹底的方法就是對封鎖信息者所說的一切全部當作謊言。之所以西方民眾對北京奧運火炬進行激烈抵制，也是因為缺乏其他渠道進行有效表達，借此發泄對中國當局封鎖真相的憤怒。
中國官僚集團並不在意西方民間的看法。他們需要中國民眾與西方社會的對立來證明自己得到民意支持，此後又利用奧運火炬在西方的遭遇進一步刺激中國民眾對西方的敵意。群眾運動和運動群眾是極權主義的擅長。在面對宏大問題時，民眾沒有足夠信息與知識進行Du-立思考，容易被煽動與操縱。中國民眾雖然在多數問題上對政府並不認同，卻接受了把國家統一當作基本價值觀。對遠離自身日常生活的西藏，多數中國人只能以簡單的“分裂” 與否進行判斷。當官方媒體以一個聲音指責西方敵視中國、偏袒“藏獨”時，激發起中國人的敵意不難做到。此次西藏事件除了把漢藏關系變成種族對立，同時又把中國民間與西方民間推向形成兩個對立陣營的發展軌道。
的確，中國民眾這次對政府的支持前所未有。在互聯網上，或是在國外街頭，中國愛國者和西方人短兵相接。然而中國人不被允許看CNN，卻狂熱地反 CNN；在自己國家沒有示威自由，卻在其他國家聚集起來再現文革場面（這些行動不乏中國官方支持和大使館幕後組織），一方面會讓西方人更強烈地在價值觀上否定中國，另一方面也會刺激西方民眾把中國視為具有強烈敵意、終有一天會威脅自己的整體，而不是像過去那樣把中國人和中國政府分開，區別對待。
陣營敵對最無理性存身之地，雙方都會采取簡化的認同，如足球流氓那樣聚在一起羞辱對方，不問理由，沒有是非。一旦當西方民眾和媒體認定中國人對西藏普遍存有殖民主義心態時，會使他們認定西藏必須從中國統治下解放，而不管中國政權性質將來發生什麼變化。中國民主人士堅稱中國民主後西藏就會自由的許諾不會得到信任，因為制度變化不等於民眾心態會變化。這將大大增加未來中國處理西藏問題的難度。
今日中共不再是意識形態至上的革命黨，而成了善於投機的實用主義利益集團。照理說從自身利益出發，它也應該避免與西方形成陣營對立。然而事情朝什麼方向發展，往往取決於內在邏輯。專制體制的特點正是即使每個局部都以自我理性行動，全局結果卻可能遠離理性，而且也不符合全局的整體利益。這種局部理性合成全局非理性的“納什均衡”，對事物走向往往更有決定性。下面我們會看到，正是“反分裂”官僚集團對自身而言的理性算計與趨利避害，合成了中國官方在此次西藏事件中的整體謬錯。
二、 帝國政體的困局
1. 當“反分裂”成為飯碗
帝國政權最重要的職能是保持帝國疆土的完整，所設立的“反分裂”部門因此地位顯赫。曾擔任過中共高官的西藏共產黨創建人平措汪傑先生對這些部門與人員的描述是“吃反分裂飯、升反分裂官、發反分裂財”。這是因為，所謂的“分裂”越嚴重，帝國賦予這些部門和人員的權力就會越大，輸送的資源也會越多。這決定了他們從本能上會希望“分裂”問題始終存在。為了部門利益和個人利益，不但不要民族問題最終解決，反而會有意強化衝突，渲染“分裂”危險，無限上綱，沒事找事，小事搞成大事；或是為了顯示政績，強化對事態的處置，促使衝突擴大；或是為推托責任，拒不承認錯誤，用更大的錯誤掩蓋較小的錯誤。對官方在這次事件中表現的不智，有人歸於行事官員愚蠢。其實那不對，官員們都很聰明。他們不是不知道自己的行為對整體不利，照做不誤的原因在於他們的目的不是為了辦好事情本身，而是為了自己從中得益。例如組織海外華人和留學生搞“紅海洋”的駐外官員，很多都在西方受教育，長期生活在國外，不會不了解那種場面一定讓所在國民眾和媒體反感，破壞中國的形像。但是他們的官運不取決於所在國的好惡，而是取決於中國領導人和主管部門的滿意。中國領導人在電視上看到西方國家布滿中國國旗和愛國華人，感到臉上有光、心頭解氣時，那些駐外官員就有了增加升遷的可能。這才是他們的出發點。至於對國家造成的危害，那不會落到他們個人頭上，也不由他們承擔責任，因此無需他們操心。
前面說了涉藏官僚集團把事件起因推給“達賴集團”能讓他們把責任推得最干淨，然而至少對其中的公安、國安、武警等部門卻不是這樣，他們的職責本來就是防止 “敵對勢力”和“境外勢力”破壞，竟然讓“達賴集團有組織、有預謀、精心策劃”如此得逞，責任本該最大，為什麼會默認這種不利於本部門的說法呢？除了為利益共同體所進行的必要擔待，由此還顯示官僚集團高超的另一面。單純推卸責任只是官僚的初級本能，更高手腕則是把危機變成撈好處的機會。那些情治和鎮壓部門不會由自己擔待責任，而是會歸咎於資源不夠、經費欠缺、權力所受限制過多，政策過於溫和等“外因”；當他們用強力把藏人的抗議血腥鎮壓下去，搖身變為“對敵鬥爭”的英雄，不但無過，反而有功，同時再次證明了只有強硬鎮壓才是有效法寶；這時再反過來總結以往資源不夠，權力所受限制多，政策過於溫和的“教訓 ”，要求權力高端給予更多資源和權力，實行加強他們地位的強硬政策。一般來講，這種手腕一定得逞，因為只要利用信息不對稱去渲染事件的暴烈、“分裂”的危險，可以輕易嚇住帝國的權力高端。而對帝國當權者來說，為了保持帝國疆土完整是從來不計代價的。
可以預期，這次西藏事件在很大程度上會打斷中國政權走向開明化的進程，那些力圖使中國擺脫警察國家的改革也可能夭折，尤其是在民族地區，原本已經實行的緩和措施正在取消，軟化的權力重新堅硬，並且再度集中。在“反分裂”和“反恐”名義下，中國民族地區的未來政局難免趨向法西斯化。這在很大程度上，正是官僚集團吃“反分裂飯”的結果。
官僚無論在什麼制度下都會追求自身利益，這並不奇怪。但是好的制度會把官僚追求自身利益合成好的機制，壞制度卻會把官僚追求自身利益合成壞的結果。讓聰明的官僚聰明地去做對政權和國家愚蠢的事，正是專制制度的弊端，也是專制終會垮於內部的原因。
2. “官僚集團的民主性”
不過，人們免不了奇怪，專制政權的特點是上級決定下級，雖然官僚追求自身利益或部門利益，但是高端當權者對下屬部門不顧全局的行為，為何會聽之任之，不進行干預和統籌領導呢？
這裡不設想專制者昏聵的情況，雖然在專制歷史上，被虛假信息包圍的專制者落入昏聵遠高於其保持明智的可能性。然而更能反映中國權力體系本質的，卻是專制者即使明智，也無法扭轉下屬部門共謀形成的局面。這是因為，在專制體制中，專制者的決策只有通過官僚體系進行具體操作才能貫徹。正是這一點決定了，專制權力對外雖可以絕對專制，對內卻存在專制失效的可能。只有在不損害官僚集團利益的前提下，專制者才有對官僚集團一言九鼎、說一不二的專制性，而只要損害官僚集團利益，官僚群體就會共謀合作，利用拖延、扭曲、不了了之等手段，在具體操作過程中把專制者的決策架空，使之無法推動和落實，這時，專制權力的專制性就大打折扣。我把這種狀況稱為“官僚集團的民主性”。
無論是在古代王朝還是近代的專制政體，“官僚集團的民主性”都廣泛存在，它不會體現於制度和程序，只是以官場潛規則的方式發揮作用，是一種物競天擇演化形成的機制。官僚之間在具體問題上有競爭，總體卻是相互聯合的共同體。他們對自身利益的得失極其敏感，精於謀利，容易形成共識，而且無需串聯和組織，利用現成的官僚體系就能默契地共謀，達成相互庇護，成本低，風險小。因此，專制者要想讓自己權力得到貫徹，便需要順應這種“官僚集團的民主性”，滿足（或至少是不觸犯）官僚集團的利益，才能使官僚集團成為得心應手的工具，而不是陽奉陰違的對抗者。
當然，歷史上也出現過力圖對官僚集團說一不二的專制者。那除了需要具有特殊權威，還必須使用極端手段——如啟用野心勃勃的新人充當酷吏，對官僚集團進行清洗，以肉體消滅的恐怖進行懾服。然而那種手段只是見效一時，飛揚跋扈的酷吏幾乎都無好下場。暴君終歸要死，或是清醒過來就會明白，以利益收買而不是恐怖威懾更能換取官僚集團的效力。對於多數只求利益和權力的專制者，達成與官僚集團的分肥，自己清閑地坐車，讓官僚們奮力地自覺拉車，豈不比與官僚集團南轅北轍地較勁要省心和實惠得多嗎？
即使以毛澤東對中共官僚體系的權威，在他要開展觸及官僚集團的運動時，甚至無法在他居住的北京發表一篇文章，可見官僚集團的能量有多大。毛最終采取的方式是越過官僚集團，直接號召底層民眾造反，摧垮阻礙他意志實現的官僚集團。那種被命名為“文化大革命”的方式是史無前例和登峰造極的，最終卻歸於失敗，原因就在於毛也離不開官僚集團。文化大革命可以摧毀舊的官僚集團，但仍然需要建立新的官僚集團來為他貫徹權力。而不管什麼官僚集團，最終都會演化成利益集團， “官僚集團的民主性”也就會起作用。毛澤東最終只能無奈地退到以“七八年再來一次”的恫嚇，把他的文化大革命降低到酷吏來使用。
在文革中吃了大虧的官僚集團就此留下刻骨銘心的記憶，他們決心不允許再出現專制領袖可以摧毀官僚集團的情況。毛後幾十年中共推行“黨的建設”、“發揚黨內民主” 等，說穿了就是在加強“官僚集團的民主性”，保護官僚集團不再受領袖傷害。而中國改革的主要內容——權力下放，本質也是讓官僚集團分掌更多權力。至今，中共內部已經形成了完整的制約機制，官僚集團也有了相當充分的能力，既不允許再出現酷吏式的黨內清洗，也不允許再有文化大革命那類群眾運動，甚至不再允許黨內出現可能導致分裂的路線鬥爭。今天，中共黨內的高層權鬥比歷史任何時期都弱，權力交接也有了一定程序化，其深層原因，就是這種“官僚集團的民主性”在起作用。
這是一種本質性的轉變。在意識形態至上的時代以訴諸路線鬥爭進行的高層爭權中，官僚們只能處於被動狀態，選擇跟隨不同路線的代表人物，然後隨代表人物的沉浮而沉浮。而當維護執政和獲得利益成為中共的主要目標時，執政的具體操作者和利益的主要承載者——官僚集團就變成了黨的主體。失去了意識形態背景的黨內鬥爭變得名不正言不順，從而不再有合法舞台。隨著“官僚集團的民主性”進一步加強，不利於集團整體的黨內鬥爭將在相當程度上被聯合起來的官僚所遏制。這時的中共將變得比以往更少分裂，更為務實。高端當權者不再是以往那種凌駕於官僚集團的獨裁者，而是變成了官僚集團利益的協調人與代言人。這時的高端當權者只有通過為官僚集團爭取利益最大化，才能交換官僚集團的支持，坐穩自己位置。
官僚集團熟悉政權機器，善於經營，一旦建立了制約高端當權者的機制，便一定會將其盡運用到極致。他們可以在無形中決定高端權位的起伏、人事更替、政策導向等。而只要他們具有了這種能力，就不會僅限於避免發生黨內清洗或文革，而是擴展到避免對自身的任何不利，以及盡可能地用於為自身謀取更多利益。因此，把所謂的“黨內民主”看做是中國民主的步驟，完全是看走了眼。“黨內民主”只是古已有之的“官僚集團民主性”的別稱，同中國民主與人民民主毫無關系。
3. 西藏問題何以無解
明白了“官僚集團的民主性”及其在中共黨內的作用，就可以看出中國現行的西藏政策為何不會改觀。它牽扯十三個省部級以上的涉藏部門，或者說二十四個省部級以上的“反分裂”部門。了解中國情況的人都知道，采取“瞞上欺下”、“上有政策下有對策”、“一個拖字定乾坤”等手段，哪怕只有一個省部級單位不執行中央決策，中央無可奈何的情況都不鮮見，何況二十四個部門結成聯盟。
相對於毛澤東和鄧小平，今日中共領導人的權威性無法相比，既缺少資歷和功績，也沒有卡裡斯瑪人格（依靠特殊魅力和超凡品質吸引追隨者的能力）。他們皆為官僚出身，在官僚體系浸淫多年，熟知官場規則，從逆向淘汰的官僚階梯循序爬到高位，何嘗不知道官僚集團的手段厲害？他們是否想走不同路線且不論，即使想，很可能也得知難而退。他們本質上不是領袖，只是到達了頂峰的官僚，幾乎不會有超越性，全部目標就是掌權，不越雷池一步。因此，在毛、鄧那類獨裁者身上可能發生的決斷與自我轉變，對他們難以指望。這次西藏事件發生後很長時間看不到中共高端的動作，全憑“反分裂”部門自行處理，成為此次事件的特殊之處。二十四個 “反分裂”部門涵蓋權力的各個方面，印把子、槍杆子、筆杆子一應俱全，相互構成決策、執行和協作的完整鏈條，即使沒有高端領導人主持，也能自我協調，自行運轉。
除此之外，今日中共還落進了一個自設的陷阱。從革命黨蛻變成權力集團，作為權力核心的主權以及維護主權的民族主義成為唯一具有實質性的意識形態，舉國體制進行的灌輸與不厭其煩的改寫歷史，使中國人普遍確信當年中國以帝國方式占領的領土“自古屬於中國”。這種狀況使得“反分裂”官僚們占據了“政治正確”的位置，擁有民意支持，形成尾大不掉之勢。“反分裂”既可以被他們當作盾牌，又可以被他們當作武器——無人敢對他們表示異議，他們卻隨時可以發動進攻。二十四個“反分裂”部門的聯盟，加上占據了唯一具有實質性的意識形態高地，使他們能量十分巨大，甚至有能力啟動“黨內民主程序”進行政變，以捍衛國家主權不力的名義罷免跟他們不一致的高端領導人，而且很容易贏得黨內黨外的民意支持。因此，把權力視為一切的中共領導人在這種威脅面前，為了不被政敵抓住把柄，避免民眾輿論的攻擊，總是會寧左勿右，而不會采納可能使自己地位受威脅的新思維。即使他們心裡清楚如此下去會有更大危機，能做的也只是把危機發生時間盡可能後推。中共領導人從終生制改為輪流坐莊制，表面是一種進步，實際卻導致在台上者寧願“擊鼓傳花”，只保自己任內平安無事。至於把危機推到後任爆發，那就與己無關了。
因此，國際社會敦促中國領導人與達賴喇嘛會面，達賴喇嘛希望繞過中間層次直接與中共領袖交流，藏人精英給中共高層寫信懇勸，在我看都是沒有認清真正的決定因素。西藏問題如何解決，並非中共高端可以獨斷。雖然在特殊情況下，中共高端可能對西藏問題進行某些特殊處置，但那只會停留在策略層面，不會觸動實質。知道了“反分裂”勢力在中國權力結構中占有多麼重要和廣泛的位置，就可以清楚，指望靠中共領袖個人（即使是再開明的領袖）解決西藏問題，是不切實際的幻想。
三、 西藏如何走向Du-立
1. 流血與Du-立
“反分裂”官僚集團堵塞了在中國內部解決西藏問題的出路，持續產生的矛盾只能不斷積累和發酵，最終把西藏推到爭取Du-立的方向。不過，很多人會認為西藏與中國實力相差太過懸殊，即使西藏全民族都為Du-立而戰，也不可能達到目標。如果孤立地看西藏和中國，並且靜止在目前的力量對比上，的確是這樣。然而在全球化時代，西藏和中國都要很大程度受國際影響，中國的強大也非永遠不變。近年Du-立的東帝汶和科索沃在力量對比上都處於相當弱勢，卻都實現了Du-立目標。與他們相比，西藏Du-立的可能性不會更小。
東帝汶和科索沃之所以能夠實現Du-立，決定因素是國際社會——尤其是西方國家——的支持。之所以兩地Du-立得到這種支持，很大原因在於兩地人民遭受的人道災難（至少桌面上的理由如此）。在人權高於主權成為國際社會共識時，種族矛盾導致的仇殺會成為民族Du-立被認可的主要根據。西方社會早就認為西藏發生過大規模人道災難——藏人非正常死亡人數被認為接近百萬，西藏寺廟曾遭盡數摧毀……在這種基礎上，未來西藏發生的人道災難即使沒有東帝汶、科索沃那樣慘烈，也足夠讓西方支持西藏Du-立。
西藏未來會不會再發生人道災難？可能性是很大的。這次西藏事件被鎮壓下去，卻不等於就此了結，反而成為下一次更大爆發的起因。如同這次事件比一九八零年代的拉薩事件規模更大，下次爆發會比這次規模還大。這並非是無根據的猜測，我甚至能預言下次爆發：把其他可能的爆發撇開，至少在達賴喇嘛去世時，如果西藏問題仍未進展，達賴喇嘛也沒能回到西藏，大爆發是一定躲不過去的，境內藏人會全面起事。中國鎮壓機器根本無法防範，因為信息時代已無法封鎖達賴喇嘛去世的消息，而藏人起事也無需其他串聯，消息本身就足以讓各地藏人不約而同揭竿而起。
領袖去世引發大規模民眾抗議，中國有過一九七六年周恩來去世導致的四五運動，有過一九八九年胡耀邦去世導致的六四事件，其震蕩都導致中國歷史發生改變。設想達賴喇嘛去世引發西藏大動蕩決不是危言聳聽。稍微了解西藏就會知道，達賴喇嘛的命運是每個藏人心頭的傷口。作為西藏宗教至高無上的領袖，活在現實的菩薩，達賴喇嘛放棄了西藏Du-立，只求以高度自治保存西藏文化和宗教，如此謙卑換得的卻是羞辱，至死不能回到家鄉，不能和終生等待他的人民與信徒見面，就此永別，這種痛是無可比擬的。達賴喇嘛在世時，不論有什麼挫折，藏人總還有希望，一旦他去世，希望變成絕望，仇恨壓過恐懼，爆發一定非常激烈，“西藏Du-立 ”也將從目前的口號成為切實的運動。
當然，僅靠示威不能實現西藏Du-立，畢竟中國軍警總數接近藏人的總人口，而且是以毀滅性武器對付赤手空拳。但是悲憤的藏人絕非輕易可以鎮壓。所謂“一人拼命，十人難敵；萬人必死，橫行天下”，何況藏人有六百萬。那時中國當局將不得不再次乞靈於種族主義（信仰崩潰的中國再無其他意識形態），煽動以漢人為主的中國軍警大開殺戒，同時鼓惑中國民眾支持“反分裂”的屠殺。
很多藏人會在那個過程失去生命，但是民族Du-立之路往往正是鮮血衝刷出來的。鎮壓不一定會使藏人退縮，他們甚至可能主動迎接暴力。一方面西藏傳統宗教的苦行觀念會提供這種動力，一方面非暴力抗爭也有這種內涵。流亡藏人居住的印度是非暴力抗爭的發源地。被譽為聖賢的甘地正是號召他的追隨者要“學習死亡的藝術”。按照一些分析者的解讀，甘地主張的並非是對施加於己的暴力不反抗的“消極非暴力”，而是要去主動挑起對方的暴力施加於己，才能“通過自己承受苦難達到改革的目的”（甘地）。對持有這種理念的西藏Du-立者而言，中國對藏人的屠殺正是能夠獲得國際社會支持西藏Du-立的歷史機會，因此不是要力圖避免，反而應該有意加以運用，甚至會期望中國的屠殺夠得上種族清洗的規模，才會調動起國際社會最大的同情與支持。從西藏Du-立者角度，這並非是無視藏人的生命，而是在實踐甘地所述的非暴力抗爭之核心 ——“把生命奉獻給自己認為是正當的事情”。藏人的血流得越多，國際社會對西藏Du-立的支持就會越強。由此來看，中國的武力鎮壓不但將是失效的，而且起到的是完全相反的作用——是在幫助西藏實現Du-立。
發生種族流血衝突和出現種族清洗的災難，是種族間無法共存的證明，是促使國際社會出面對受迫害民族進行庇護，繼而支持受迫害民族建立Du-立國家的主要理由。而按照中國“反分裂”官僚集團推動的邏輯發展下去，未來西藏難以避免發生這種災難。那時，西藏實現Du-立所差的就只剩最後兩項條件，一是西方國家出面推動西藏Du-立，並且承認西藏的國家地位；二是中國自身陷入動蕩，不再有對抗西方和鎮壓西藏的能力。
2. 西藏是西方的政治正確
至今，西方政府對中國繼承帝國遺產並未表達異議，也沒有公開支持西藏Du-立。在西藏問題上與中國對立的，主要是西方民眾與媒體。西方社會是多元的，幾乎在每個問題上都存在爭議，然而在西藏問題上卻是空前一致。對中國人來講，這可以算一種奇觀——很多西方媒體完全不了解西藏，卻總是黑白分明地下結論；更多的西方人完全沒見過西藏，卻要充當西藏的代言人和捍衛者。中國人的質問是：即使中國繼承了帝國遺產，曾經欺侮過中國的西方列國繼承的帝國遺產更多，甚至今日世界很多國家都是當年西方殖民者的後裔所建，西方人有什麼資格在西藏問題上裝成正義化身指責中國呢？
時間是一種解釋。殖民時代已經過去，西方當年的錯誤不能作為中國今天的理由。的確，時間需要成為一個因素，否則任何根據都會在無限追溯中無從立身。中國和西方幾乎在每一步上都有時間錯位：中華帝國腐朽的年代，正是西方列強最為凶悍之時；西方殖民行為獲得合法性，主要靠有效統治，中華帝國時間雖長，卻只求萬方來朝的心理滿足，放任“諸藩”自成一體；當與西方的相遇使中國明白“朝貢體系”只是虛榮，必須實現有效統治才能符合主權體系，保住疆土，一連串的國難和戰爭又阻礙了這種進程；而當世界進入非殖民化時代，民族Du-立建國成為主流，西方國家紛紛從殖民地撤出時，中國卻以前所未有的強勢進軍西藏，導致達賴喇嘛帶領數萬藏民流亡他國；隨後當民主、信仰自由和文化多元在西方成為文明進步的原則時，中國卻在西藏開展了砸毀寺廟、禁絕宗教的文化革命；今天，當人權高於主權在西方世界成為普世價值觀，中國仍然以主權為至高無上，為此肆無忌憚地侵害人權。
不難理解，首先是這種時間錯位，使得每一步都與潮流相逆的中國在西藏問題上飽受西方指責。不過中國人仍然可以反問，憑什麼由西方確定時間標准？憑什麼要把西方當作原點判斷中國的錯位？即使從中共執政算起，至今中國已有效統治西藏半個多世紀。而今天西方的法國、英國、加拿大、西班牙等都存在民族問題，為什麼只有中國的西藏問題被指責？
這就涉及到西方與中國的另一個不同——西方國家是用民主方式賦予了保留帝國遺產的合法性。如科西嘉島百分之八十居民表決留在法國，比法國本土居民希望保留科西嘉島的比例還高百分之二十（不少法國人認為科西嘉島是負擔，不如讓它Du-立）；而英國當年允許北愛爾蘭自主決定去留，結果是多數北愛爾蘭人選擇留在英國。西班牙的巴斯克、加拿大的魁北克都是經過民眾公決否定了Du-立。因此，那裡的民族問題只是少數人進行Du-立活動。然而對西藏卻不能這樣說，因為至少中國從未給過西藏人民選擇的機會。
今日，在摒棄了殖民主義的西方社會，自由、人權、反殖民成為社會共識，而民主制度則使西方民眾對中國擁有居高臨下的優越感。普通的西方人不像政客或商人受到中國的利益或政治制約，他們判斷遠離日常生活的西藏問題，主要是用價值標准。西藏在他們眼中一直是被中國占領的Du-立國家，而西藏問題幾乎能綜合所有西方與中國的價值分歧，因此順理成章地成為炮轟中國的最好靶子。不管中國人對此如何不解與憤怒，這已經成為中國未來必須面對的一種現實。
對此，西方媒體起的作用也很大。一方面，市場化的媒體必須跟隨大眾感情在西藏問題上追隨大眾一面倒毫不奇怪。另一方面，當大眾與媒體高度一致地相互作用時，會產生一種趨於極端的性質，我稱為“廣場效應”。如同希腊城邦在廣場上進行的民主，競爭者把煽起群眾狂熱視為成功，群眾則以鼓掌或喝倒彩方式表達支持或反對那樣，今天的公眾被媒體和當代通訊技術聯系在一起，等於制造了一個可以無限放大的廣場。媒體與大眾的相互激勵，彙聚出比古代廣場大得多的群眾效果，且導致情緒在整個社會快速地傳染。
大規模人群彼此無法充分溝通，也無法進行深入思考，只能用簡單概念獲取共識，以明確結論斷定是非。西藏Du-立在西方本來就有很強的民意支持，這次西藏事件中形成的中西陣營對立，中國民眾的反西方姿態和對西方媒體的圍攻，進一步加強了西方社會在西藏問題上的“廣場效應 ”。市場競爭促使西方媒體緊盯大眾關注熱點，因此今後會始終把西藏當作對像，不懈地捕捉任何蛛絲馬跡，特別是藏人的抗爭和中國的鎮壓，並且把所有的迫害和流血都以放大方式展示給西方民眾。那種效果反過來又會給“廣場效應”不斷加碼，促使西方民意更加支持西藏爭取Du-立。在當今世界所有民族問題中，最能得到西方社會支持的就是西藏。可以說，西藏自由已經成為西方社會的一種政治正確，同時也成為各種勢力爭搶和利用的制高點。
3. 西方政府的考量
如果與中國對立的僅是西方民眾與媒體，只在乎權勢的中國當局盡可以當作“雜音”不予理會。然而中國當局所在乎的西方當權者，卻是要靠民眾的選票才能上台。他們只要追求選票，首先就得追隨民意，因此最終一定會被民間的“廣場效應”裹挾。這是西方民主制度的基本狀態，本質上是不可更改的。面對西方，中國政府無法要求西方公眾改變態度，也無法要求西方媒體轉移立場，那只能得到反感和反彈，自取其辱。中國政府能做的，頂多是用貿易大單引誘或威脅西方政府，迫使西方政客們接受中國的立場。但是即使西方政客一時順從中國，卻不能像中國政府那樣管束本國民眾與媒體。相反，他們歸根結底要被本國民眾和媒體所決定，一俟時機成熟，就會爭相站到支持西藏Du-立一邊。
雖然今天沒有哪個政府承認西藏Du-立，然而政府態度從來是可以變化的。民間“廣場效應”的推動只是因素之一，西方政府對西藏Du-立還會有另一面考量。六四時西方國家雖有過對中國的聯合制裁，但那時針對的只是中國政府，對中國民眾的民主追求卻抱有希望。隨後的蘇東變化給了西方信心和耐心。鄧小平推動中國經濟走上資本主義之路，更使西方相信中國會隨著經濟變化出現政治變化。然而這次西藏事件證實了這種希望的虛幻。中國沒有隨資本主義進程融入西方陣營，反而隨經濟崛起有了更多威脅性；中國當局這次放棄了鄧小平的“韜光養晦”方針，極力顯示強大、強硬、以及操控民眾的一面；中國民眾（至少是西方眼中看到的）並沒有成為民主力量，反而是和專制政府結成了同盟，對內欺壓弱小民族，對外敵視民主社會。這樣的中國完全是一個新法西斯帝國的形態，令西方政治家感到驚恐，未來若任憑中國崛起下去，會不會有一天威脅世界和平？
在民主、自由、和平等表面文章之下，西方對中國的不滿還與切身利益有關。譬如中國以低人權和破壞環境為代價吸引國際資本，制造出大量廉價產品衝擊國際市場，損害了西方國家上百年才得以形成的勞資關系、福利制度和市場秩序；中國經濟對資源的巨大飢渴給全球生態危機雪上加霜；中國日益活躍地參與爭搶資源的行列，在全球與西方進行角逐，加劇了資源緊缺，導致價格飛漲；此外，更深層還有不會擺上桌面卻絕非不重要的擔憂——假如中國達到與西方相近的消費水平，瀕於生態極限的世界會不會因此崩潰？西方政治制度決定了無法以降低本國消費解決生態極限的危機，只能去抑制其他國家——尤其是中國這種人口大國——的消費提升。這其中當然存在顯而易見的霸權主義和不平等人權，卻不是沒有可能成為西方政府制定中國政策的潛在依據。
為了上述桌面上和桌面下的考量，削弱中國、抑制中國繼續發展也許有一天會成為西方國家的共同願景。而達到這個目的，肢解中國，讓中國陷於肢解後的內部衝突和相互牽制不能自拔，也讓中國喪失支撐崛起的資源與空間，是釜底抽薪的方式。只要找得到名正言順的口實，也許就會成為西方國家樂於接受的集體安排。而什麼口實會比以反帝反殖民名義促成西藏Du-立更為名正言順呢？西藏Du-立會連鎖地帶動新疆甚至更多中國民族地區Du-立。要知道，僅西藏和新疆兩地，就將使中國失去百分之四十領土，也會把中國更遠地隔離在歐亞大陸一隅。這種對中國的肢解不但不會遭受譴責，還會戴上解放者的桂冠。因此，目前看似小心翼翼不忤逆中國的西方各國政府，只要歷史發展提供最後一個條件——中國陷入內亂，就可能在很短時間轉移到支持西藏Du-立的軌道上。
4. 中國難以避免陷入內亂
那麼，今日看似日益強大、不斷崛起的中國，會不會有陷入內亂的一天呢？一種對目前中國狀況的評價是：從來沒有過這麼好，也從來沒有過這麼糟。不過多數人看到的中國僅是從未有過的好，沒有看到從未有過的糟。而被看到的好和看不到的糟之間，其實只有一線之隔。很可能在人們毫無意識之時，從未有過的糟就會突然浮出水面，在措手不及中釀成大禍。此次西藏事件的爆發，原因之一正是在於以往只看到了“好”。
其實，今日中國的好，說穿了只是經濟發展速度快。且不說這種發展速度快的代價須在明日加倍償還，僅以常識也可知世上沒有任何經濟能夠永遠高速發展。中國經濟已埋伏種種隱患，面對重重困境，危機遲早會不期而至。那時，原本被經濟高速發展掩蓋的社會危機和政治危機必將隨之而來。三重危機疊加，政權垮台、管治真空和社會動亂等一系列後果都可能出現。
眼下，因為看不到挑戰中共政權的力量，人們往往以為中共就會一直統治下去。然而大變化不是一定非得出自大力量或者大事件，細微的積累同樣可以導致崩潰結果。有一種研究讓沙子一粒粒落下，形成逐漸增高的沙堆，同時精確地計算每落一粒沙會連帶多少沙粒移動。初始階段，落下的沙粒對沙堆整體影響很小。但是當沙堆增高到一定程度，達到“臨界”後，沙堆就具有了“一體性”。那時每粒新落下的沙都會產生一種“力波”，盡管微細，卻能通過沙堆的“一體性”貫穿沙堆整體，將新落沙粒的碰撞傳給所有沙粒。沙堆結構將隨每粒沙的落下逐漸變得脆弱。說不定哪一粒落下的沙（注意：只是一粒沙），就會導致沙堆整體發生坍塌，也就是所說的崩潰。
有一個西方諺語，說的是斷了一個馬蹄釘，絆倒了馬，摔傷了將軍，輸掉了戰爭，亡了國家。那國家當然不是因為馬蹄釘亡的。用沙堆理論解釋，就是那國家的內部危機已經超過臨界狀態，馬蹄釘斷只是引起坍塌的最後一粒沙而已。中國也如同一個沙堆，各種變化和衝擊不斷落在上面，積累的結果遲早會使沙堆超過臨界狀態。而到了連馬蹄釘都成為“不穩定因素”時，專制政權控制再嚴密也是無法防止垮台的，因為它不可能給每個馬蹄釘都派上看守的兵。
按照中共目前這種拒絕政治改革，不斷積累各種矛盾的道路走下去，中國遲早會爆發全面危機。專制政權的特點之一就是無法預測，既無規律，也缺乏資訊，因此其變化總是“突變”。試問有幾個人事先看到龐然大物的蘇聯帝國會垮台呢？它卻一夜之間就分崩離析。鎮壓可以把崩潰往後拖，如同不斷拍打沙堆周邊可以使沙堆繼續增高一樣。但是那種增高不會無限，最終還是要垮，而且堆得越高，垮得越烈。經驗告訴我們，大系統雖有很強的自我維護能力，卻總是一垮就兵敗如山倒。
真正穩定的社會需要具有多重整合機制。除了政權，還有道德倫理、法治，完善的市場，國家化軍隊，以及宗教組織、民間社會、多個政黨等。這種多元並存的機制對保持社會長期穩定不可缺少。就像多黨制中執政黨下台，反對黨馬上可以頂替那樣防止出現權力真空造成的社會失序。然而步入多事之秋的今日中國恰恰只剩依靠行政體系和警察手段的一黨政權進行整合，其他整合因素都被政權吞食，不是變成政權的依附，就是被視為異己力量而“消滅於萌芽”，或是在重重壓制下無法生長，因此都無力擔負整體的整合。這樣的社會一方面似乎沒有挑戰，異常穩定，一方面卻存在巨大的風險——一旦有一天政權垮了，整個中國就會出現整合真空，由此陷入內亂，長期無法恢復秩序。
可想而之，當那一天到來，目前靠武力壓制的民族矛盾會立刻爆發，民族Du-立運動也將風起雲湧。而專制中國的鎮壓能力卻會隨內亂瓦解，或是消耗於內鬥。那些堅持大一統的中國民主人士所說的，未來中國的民主政府照樣不會允許西藏Du-立，只會是一句空話。因為陷入了內亂的中國哪裡會有民主政府？民主政府如何能從被中共消滅了其他整合機制的空白中產生？那時就可以看出中共把中國綁為人質（要亡一起亡）的後果——當中共失去了控制中國從而也失去控制西藏的能力時，中國也將不會有任何其他力量可以控制西藏。
5. 決戰在西藏
達賴喇嘛的放棄Du-立，誰都知道是一種面對現實的犧牲。未來如果有一天西藏可以實現Du-立，他真會拒絕嗎？中共執政者不抓住時機把他的放棄Du-立盡快變成法律事實，而是置之不理，何其不智。對中共的政客謀士而言，中共垮台的前景是思維大忌，因此會閉眼不看，也不會去想達賴喇嘛作為西藏問題的鑰匙，可以開門，也可以鎖門的可能——如果有一天中國陷入內亂，西藏問題仍無進展，達賴喇嘛就有充分理由號召西藏重新爭取Du-立，並呼吁國際社會給予支持。既然他允諾的放棄Du-立不被中國理睬，也就沒人能指責這種轉變是食言。那時，以達賴喇嘛對藏人的號召力和對西方的影響力，將對西藏Du-立發揮無可比擬的作用。他一人威力抵得上百萬之師。
中國和西方兩種本質不容的政治制度，交叉在全球化時代，從根本上只能漸行漸遠。價值觀和利益的雙重衝突致使雙方不可避免要進行最後決戰。而在浩蕩的世界民主大潮中，失敗一方只能是專制中國。西藏將成為全球最後一個專制大國的克星。人權高於主權的觀念，已經給西方鑄就了切入中國的刀劍，而西藏正好提供了發起決戰的戰場。現在誰也無法預見具體進程，那會受很多歷史因素的影響。但是所謂決戰很可能沒有兩軍對壘，在經濟和外交領域就見分曉。中國國門已經洞開幾十年，實用主義的經濟發展對外來資金、技術和市場的無度追求，把中國的生存命脈很大程度上交到了西方手中。這使得中國在面臨存亡危機時，除了接受西方安排，很少有其他選擇。
這裡只作為舉例進行設想：比如中國內亂與經濟危機同步，既然中國經濟已和世界融為一體，要度過難關就得靠掌管世界經濟的西方國家援手。而西方國家若是要求以承認西藏Du-立作為交換，急於從崩潰邊緣和更大災難中被挽救的中國政府（如果那時還有政府）即使再不情願，可能也不得不答應。另一種可能是，那時的中國陷入類似民國初年的分裂，一方面根本無暇西顧，無力鎮壓西藏的Du-立運動，一方面力圖成為中國主人的各方勢力爭相得到西方國家承認—— 那樣才能在國際上合法地代表中國，並得到西方輸入的資源。西方則可以合縱連橫，進行交換——哪一方願意在承認西藏Du-立的文本上簽字，就會承認和援助哪一方。當年蒙古Du-立只得到蘇聯的支持，無論是國民黨政府還是共產黨政府都無法抗拒，只能接受。將來的中國面對的將是西方列強聯盟，何以抵擋？平時高喊統一的各方勢力為了成為中國主人，很可能會以各種動聽理由（如拯救億萬百姓生命等）搶著在同意西藏Du-立的文本上簽字。類似情景在民國初年曾多次上演。中共也一直對列寧以“給新生政權爭得喘息機會”為由簽訂的不列斯特和約給予很高贊譽。而那和約讓蘇俄向德國割讓了上百萬平方公裡領土，賠款60億馬克，絲毫不亞於中國失掉西藏。這種實用主義精神某種程度上正是中共的本質。
中國的百姓則會更務實。這次西藏事件中與西方抗衡的只是一批居住城市，善於使用互聯網，與媒體接近，在中國現狀中得利的人。他們的聲音被放大，占人口的比例卻很小。對中國的普通民眾（底層百姓，工人、農民、農民工、上訪人等）而言，切身的公正、人權、自由和民主遠比西藏歸屬更重要。只是他們沒有發聲管道，不被媒體關注，在專制高壓下也最缺乏抵抗能力。不過，在中國首先發出“不要奧運要人權”呼喊的，正是黑龍江的失地農民。雖然立刻就被鎮壓，卻足以提醒那才是觀察中國的真實角度。一旦整個中國落入危機，人人生存受到威脅，起哄的民族主義立刻會煙消雲散。如同當年的河南飢民歡迎帶來了糧食的日本侵略軍那樣，遙遠西藏的去留不是問題，重要的是盡快擺脫切身困境。因此只要未來中國的危機足夠嚴重，同意西藏Du-立便不會受到太大反對。
一旦被國際社會認可的中國政府簽署了同意西藏Du-立的協議，就具有了國際法保證的效力，以後即便政府更換，再想重新占領西藏，除非那時中國有了與整個國際秩序和西方陣營對抗的實力，否則便沒有希望。當代世界在各地反復演練過的國際監管形式——聯合國介入、維和部隊進駐、劃分隔離區、進行國際援助等—— 將穩妥地保證Du-立西藏的安全。而只要西藏作為一個國家堅持數年，就會成為不可更改的既成事實，長存永續。
路線圖到此結束時，在終點回首展望，可以清楚地看到，如果有一天中國失去西藏，原因不是民主，恰是專制。中國那些把專制政權視為中國統一保證的“愛國者”們，號稱寧要專制不要分裂，而這個路線圖所展現的，卻是截然相反的結論——正是專制，導致分裂。
2008年 北京
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Roadmap of Tibetan Independence: Wang Lixiong
By Email[Tuesday, November 18, 2008 14:41]
By Lixiong, Wang
Translated by Lingxi Kong
Chapter One
March Incident in Tibet is the Watershed
1. Bureaucratic Institutions Became the Driving Force
This roadmap derives from the watershed. I had not taken the possibility of Tibetan independence into serious consideration before the incident in Tibet in 2008. It serves as the watershed that compels me to realize that Tibetan independence, for a long time being a fantasy, has turned into an emerging issue and reached the eyesight of the public. This change is brought by none other than the “anti-secession” institutions in China’s bureaucratic system.
The Party ideology sees China, during the mid 19th to mid 20th Century, as a victim of Western imperialism. The Chinese consequently have remembered the humiliations, but have rarely considered China itself as an imperial power. The vast territorial expansion from 17th to 18th Century, though beaten and humiliated by other world powers, rendered itself to modern China as a territorial heritage that includes Tibet.
Today, Tibet geographically accounts for one fourth of imperial China’s territory, and assumes a high level of importance in the politics of the empire. A considerable number of institutions in the power structure deals with Tibet, among which there are thirteen provincial/ministerial level institutions listed as following:
1. Tibet Autonomous Region
2. Qinghai Province
3. Gansu Province
4. Sichuan Province
5. Yunnan Province
6. CPC Tibet Work Co-ordination Group
7. The United Front Work Department
8. Ministry of Public Safety
9. Ministry of State Security
10. The Army
11. The Armed Police Force
12. The State Council Information Office
13. The State Council's Religious Affairs Bureau
Each of these institutions has a division that deals with Tibet, and fosters a large number of bureaucrats who have based their entire career on such issue. Besides, the following eleven institutions, not directly dealing with Tibet but assuming “anti-secession” responsibilities, have “anti-secession” divisions and personnel (listing only provincial or ministerial level or above):
1. The Central Commission of Politics and Law
2. CPC Xinjiang Work Co-ordination Group
3. Xinjiang Autonomous Region
4. Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
5. The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region
6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
7. The State Ethnic Affairs Commission
8. The State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office
9. Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office
10. The Liaison Office in Hong Kong
11. The Liaison Office in Macao
Adding together, there are twenty four provincial/ministerial level institutions that assume “anti-secession” roles in China’s bureaucratic system, which is a huge group with considerable amount of power, personnel and resources. These institutions acting like a league led the decision-making process in the March incident. This is unlike what would happen in Mao and Deng’s reign, during which the highest level of authority made decisions, to be executed by the bureaucracy, regardless of what the task is: to “unite the front”, to “suppress insurgence” or to “enforce the martial laws”. Yet in the Tibet incident, the highest authority took no actions; all executed alone by the ever growing bureaucracy.
This pattern of decision-making should not be simply regarded as devolution of power from the above. In fact, in the same month when the incident happened, Premier Wen Jiabao, attending the Greater Mekong Subregion Summit Meeting in Laos, called that the Dalai Lama should use his influence to calm down the Tibet incident. This was unheard of and aroused international attention seeing it as the highest authorities’ new pattern of thinking. However, nothing followed, and no change on the handling was made by the “anti-secession” institutions. From there, we may see that the decision-making process on the issue of Tibet requires no role played by the highest authority. Even if the highest authorities made any decision, it would not come into effect if it was not in accordance with the purpose or intent of the bureaucracy. This pattern would probably have constituted an inexplicit rule for future decision-making process. The causes that contributed to this situation will be elaborated later.
Decision-making at the highest level produce brutality and absurdity on the one hand, on the other hand, possibility remains that it may produce decisions with prudence and vision for change and breakthroughs. The two extremes are not too far away, often residing in the transient thinking of the ruler’s mind. However, when highly bureaucratic institutions dominate decision-making process, it is far less likely to see dramatic breakthrough in a given situation. Bureaucracy is inherently rigid, inflexible and hard-lined. Most importantly, it is expanding and interest-driven in that all decisions produced have to be in accordance with its self-interests. When its self-interests are in conflict with public interests, bureaucracy invariably becomes destructive. It is not only deserting the public interests, but also deserting the highest authorities it should be faithfully serving. Bureaucratic “anti-secession” institutions are acting in such a way that when they generate “anti-secession” actions, the outcomes are invariably pushing China towards the abyss of split. In light of this perspective, let’s analyze the veins of the March incident in Tibet.
Street protests with violence similar to the “3.14” Incident repeatedly occur in Mainland China. The tactics used to handle these incidents have already been very obtusely unskillful. But if the same tactics—news blockade, passively cooling down, not stimulating further conflicts, cracking down the hardcore while providing comfort to others, and finding scapegoats in lower level bureaucracy to calm down the anger—were used to deal with the March incident, the chain reactions throughout the Tibetan area that we had seen would not have been forthcoming.
However, the bureaucrats dealing with Tibet do not wish to have such impassive perspectives. First of all, the international community pays good intention on Tibet, and any incidents not well-handled would raise heavy discussions and criticism. Second, turmoil in Tibet would embarrass President Hu Jintao who had been in charge of Tibet, and each level of bureaucracy fears to bear this kind of culpability. Third, since the authority has announced in various occasions that “Tibet nowadays enjoys the best time in history”, any incident, therefore, would make the government unable to explain itself.
The dynamics of Chinese politics determine that if a few individual or one department hold responsibility for any serious incident, it is acceptable to find scapegoats to calm down the event; therefore tensions among different bureaucratic institutions would not be escalated and forthcoming. However, no single administration can take responsibility for the turmoil in Tibet, since after decades of huge spending and efforts, large-scale protests had openly announced China’s policy failure in Tibet. Yet China’s Tibet policy was co-designed and executed by various institutions and agencies, and admitting its failure is tantamount to announcing failure of the collective efforts of all the aforementioned institutions and “anti-secession” agencies: No one can be excused, and career prospects of many bureaucrats would be affected. Therefore, “anti-secession” bureaucrats must organize themselves as an interest group, to act together and help the bureaucrats in Tibet to shake off responsibility of policy failure.
The most convenient way to get excused is to translate the burden of failure as a result of the “sedition and secession” efforts organized and carefully planned by the “Dalai clique”. Because no matter what excuse is readily available, if it came from within, the bureaucrats have to bear responsibility for the failure; only by throwing the burden off the country can the bureaucrats be totally excused. The administration in Tibet Autonomous Region announced to Xinhua News on the very day of incident that “sufficient evidence demonstrates that [the incident] was ‘organized, premeditated, and carefully planned’ by the Dalai clique”. This announcement immediately became the official statement by all institutions and “anti-secession” agencies dealing with Tibet. They are unable to present “sufficient evidence” up till now, and they do not care if they could. Their goal is to guide the public opinion at the very beginning, which was successfully achieved: The lying statement became a model of language, with unquestionable certainty that guided and forced the society (including the highest authorities) to follow suit.
The starting point determines the course. This official statement, throwing the burden off the bureaucrats, modeled the framework of ensuing actions, as well as the course of the event. For example, on March 14th, there was a four-hour period when the armed force, occupying the peripheries, took no action in the commotion area, allowing the degree of violence to escalate. Many people were confused by this strange phenomenon. Among the various interpretations, I tend to believe that this non-interference was made deliberately for “breeding” purposes. On the one hand, it took time to set up video equipments in the commotion area; on the other hand, violence without necessary control would naturally grow, thereby contributing to the validity of the forthcoming crackdown and allowing journalists to record more poignant scenes of the violence. If the armed force had taken over the situation at the beginning, the scale of event would have been much limited. It would be better off for the general situation but unfavorable to the bureaucrats: suppressing violence, though at a small scale, would invite waves of international criticism, which might not please their bosses in Beijing. It would not allow the bureaucrats to wash off the smears and may irritate Beijing to charge them for improper handling. Therefore, they would rather take no action, allowing violence to increase until such a degree that it could be properly labeled as “organized, premeditated, and carefully planned”, so that when they actually began to suppress the turmoil, the outside world as well as Beijing would have nothing to hold against them.
This is the characteristics of autocracy—every agency in the system tends to place maximization of its personal benefit at the core of decision-making. Bureaucrats take no heed to the actual cause and would rather actively allow things to shift towards the extreme, in order to guard their own interests, no matter how serious the outcome could possibly be.
2. Ethnic Conflict Turned into Racial Opposition
After the 3.14 Incident, the bureaucrats had to prove its necessity and validity of the crackdown to the highest authorities in Beijing, to the people at home and to the international community. On the one hand, they took immediate actions, using all forms of media to repeat the official statement, and on the other hand, they blocked the commotion area, cutting off all forms of communication, so that no counter evidence could be obtained and public opinion could be well under control. When similar events took place in the Mainland, there was little or no media coverage, not to mention showing video recordings on TV. It was remarkably unusual that after several hours TV news reporting was sent through the whole country and even to the whole world, repeatedly showing Tibetan violence against the Chinese. It did not mention or analyze the causes, only showing the attacks launched by the Tibetans and attributing it to the efforts organized by outside separatists, thereby directing nationalistic hatred at the Tibetans.
Ethnic opposition/confrontation is the root cause that may ultimately lead to separation, and should be avoided by all means. Unfortunately, the “anti-secession” bureaucratic institutions are creating the split. They knew how serious the outcome could be, but knowingly utilized ethic opposition for their political gain: As long as nationalistic feelings of the Han Chinese are stirred up, forming bitter hatred towards the enemy, not only could they hide behind the curtain to avoid inquiries and investigation, but they could also use the nationalistic sentiments surging through the country to incorporate the highest authorities into their political trajectory. Any suspicions of the handling or suggestions to double check or soften the tension would receive no resonance under surging waves of extreme nationalism. The only thing exists is the absolutely unquestionable statement. It magnifies, amplifies, and wraps up all voices and actions in accordance with the lie of the “anti-secession” bureaucrats.
Pouring oil to the flames, propaganda efforts made in this way would not calm down the event. The protests in the 1980s were only limited in Lhasa, but now extended over the whole Tibetan area. TV is an important factor, a rare commodity in the 1980s, now available everywhere. Though showing the violent scenes may receive endorsement from the Han Chinese for the crackdown, it did just the opposite to the Tibetans. Graphic scenes on TV, acting as an order for mobilization, triggered the explosion of accumulated discontent all over Tibetan areas. Tibetans not only shared empathy towards what was happening in Lhasa, some would be misled by the scenes, thinking they should be acting in the same way to express discontent. In some Tibetan areas, violent actions that Tibetans made to other ethnic groups took place after they saw the violence scenes in Lhasa showing on TV. The bureaucrats deemed the protests as an evidence for being “organized, premeditated and carefully planned”. In fact, there was no need for organization, premeditation and careful planning: Allowing Tibetans to see the vivid actions that people in Lhasa were taking was tantamount to asking themselves going to the streets. This order of mobilization, marvelously, was sent out by the bureaucrats themselves.
On the other hand, due to prejudiced choice of materials and propaganda efforts that stirred up extreme sentiments, the incident was pictured as an event in which Tibetans slaughtered Han Chinese without a reason. It cut out a racial chasm between Han Chinese and Tibetans. The longing and intimate feelings towards Tibetan culture that Han Chinese people displayed in recent years were changed into fear and hatred towards Tibetans in general, seeing Tibetans as an ungrateful people. The Internet was inundated by extreme nationalists’ feverish and abusive words. Everywhere Tibetans experienced discrimination and unfairness, no matter it was in the airport, hotel or checkpoint. Tibetan children were also bullied by Han Chinese classmates. Out from sheer aversion to the official propaganda, Tibetans resist all forms of official language, and returned hatred to Han Chinese. It could be said that after March Incident, racial opposition was formed between Han Chinese and Tibetans, divided by blood. The most typical example is: During the Olympic Games in Beijing, Tibetan children, once cheering the Chinese term, cheered whenever China lost a gold medal. This change among children indicates the long-term trend of the Tibet issue.
Before the incident in Tibet, there were conditions sufficient for independence—single ethnicity, religion and culture, clarity of national boundaries and history, high recognition from the international community—except one condition carrying the greatest importance: the lack of driving force among Tibetans domestically to seek for independence. Although the issue of Tibet has existed for decades, it is concentrated on political, historical or cultural spheres. The people involved were mostly from the government, the upper-class, the intelligentsia and the international community. Even 1959 Uprising and the escape of the Dalai Lama were regarded by Mao as merely a result of class struggle, not at all ethnic opposition. Protests in the 1980s did not make a huge impact on Sino-Tibetan relationship in general, since the protests were exclusively in Lhasa, not reaching into other Tibetan areas. Common people of both ethnicities were more or less harmonious or even intimate. If there was no driving force among Tibetans to actively seek for independence, no matter how many outside conditions could be met, they would make little difference. Precisely because of this, I had not realized the prospect of Tibetan Independence.
But the March incident in Tibet has created a great chasm between Han Chinese and Tibetans. When ethnic relationship becomes racial opposition, the nature of the issue has changed. The conflict between upper-class and the elites were easy to resolve, as policy modification, institutional change or reversal of individual cases could all serve the purpose well. But ethnic conflicts treating people differently by blood and race made everyone involved, and made impact on every single detail of daily interaction between the two peoples. Any individuals in any form of interactions could become the cause of conflicts, and all conflicts would serve as a force propelling further conflicts, thereby accumulating racial hatred between the two peoples, eye for eye, teeth for teeth, making the two peoples going further and further apart, without a returning path. In that scenario, the weaker side, the suppressed and discriminated, would naturally yearn for independence. Once Tibetans in the Tibetan areas generally envision independence as their ultimate goal, all the conditions for independence that Tibet enjoys immediately become effective. Precisely because of this important change, Tibetan Independence becomes an emerging issue in reality. Though its actualization would depend on historical timing and external environment, at least for Tibetans themselves, the conditions are now all met. This is the turning point in the course of the Tibet issue. If people for a free Tibet would want to give out reward, the most deserved party is the “anti-secession” bureaucratic group that successfully turned Sino-Tibetan relationship into racial opposition.
3. Self-fulfilling Expectations
Since at the very beginning the nature of incident had been defined as “organized, premeditated, and carefully planned by the Dalai clique”, and since the authorities regard national unity as the paramount principle, the method of handling was to crackdown, determined and unconditional. This is the principle that government and bureaucrats would not violate, and is also the guiding ideology of the armed force executing crackdown operations. After the incident, all levels of authorities in Tibetan areas as well as the armed force had been over-reactive, with large-scale arrests, violent suppressions, cruel interrogations, temple blockades, persecutions on monks, which provoked widespread discontent, and got more common people involved, making the whole Tibetan people to become resistant. This is another major cause making the incident escalated to such a degree.
Under inculcation of Party ideology and propaganda, all Han Chinese soldiers brought to Tibet to execute crackdown operations regarded Tibetans as separatist enemies, with hatred and violence unleashed to Tibetans, further provoking unnecessary conflicts. For example, when Han Chinese soldiers saw the Dalai Lama’s pictures, the head of the separatist clique, they would destroy them violently, or would even force Tibetans to destroy. This is not acceptable by Tibetans who see the Dalai Lama as the supreme leader. If old Tibetans were beaten in order to protect the Dalai Lama’s pictures, their offspring was course very angry, and relatives and villagers were also very angry. So more and more people were involved, and the conflicts occurred, escalated, and become serious incidents, possibly leading to gun shooting and casualties. Thereafter, it would be ascribed to efforts being “organized, premeditated, and carefully planned”, and suppression followed. Similar events happened all over Tibetan areas, though often without any political content. They were but “resistance provoked by the government.”
After June 4th Student Movement in 1989, the Party concluded that “Destabilizing factors must be resolved at the grassroots and nipped in the bud", which become the basic thinking pattern of the bureaucracy, and is the highest guiding principle of the bureaucrats. According to their power-worship mentality, they believe, with power and might, anything can be done wantonly. The policy they were carrying out in areas with ethnic groups is to “take the initiative to attack, to hit the raised heads, and to take pre-emptive actions”. Later, the policy becomes “to attack and chase even if [the enemies] haven’t raised their heads”. This atrocity was well displayed in the March Incident. Many activities that have nothing to do with politics, such as holidays, horse-racing, religious ceremonies, etc, which are but traditional customs having existed since ancient times. However, for the bureaucrats, especially for the soldiers brought from outside, they know nothing of the culture and traditions, and believe that “all non-Han people must be rebellious”. They believe whatever gatherings might possibly lead to serious accidents. Since they need “to take pre-emptive actions” and “to attack even the heads yet to raise up”, the most reliable way is to forbid all forms of gatherings, and stop all non-governmental activities. Even if not to forbid entirely, they need to deploy a large number of troops, to surround and threat them by setting up heavy weapons. The reactions would be easy to imagine: “How come you can hold the Olympic Games but we cannot even hold horse-racing?!” Impatient Tibetans, facing insolent and atrocious soldiers who see them as potential enemies, might cause conflicts beginning at verbal engagement. To the authorities, it precisely validated their prediction that gatherings lead to incidents, thus putting more efforts limiting these activities but not knowing that their self-fulfilling expectations are exactly the cause of incidents.
In fact, even from the rulers’ perspectives, to “resolve everything by nipping in the bud” is by no means a good way, because the “bud” cannot display the nature of affairs. Some “buds” are not “destabilizing factors”, and their growth will help stability. To “resolve” atrociously would throw the bud to the opposite side, which is tantamount to having created new enemies. Even if the nipping created a situation that looked stable, destabilizing factors are becoming and accumulating. They are not finished, merely waiting for the next chance to explode in a larger scale.
The monks in Tibet are rational and peaceful. When they were using peaceful ways to express discontent, if the authorities could have listened carefully and interacted positively with an open-mind, it would in the long run contribute to the stability of Tibetan area. But the authorities see the monks as parasites, reaping without sowing, as the basis of the Dalai’s roots in Tibet, as the nursing soil of Tibetan independence, as the troublemaker and instigator—all very negative, so whenever being challenged by the monks, the authorities, as if pre-programmed, would act with atrocity. The violence in 3.14 Incident is directly resulted from the fact that soldiers had beaten the peaceful monks continuously for days. It was exactly the same with the cause that led to the Lhasa Incident in 1987. How surprising that the authorities learned no lessons from the past. A little knowledge about Tibetan culture would tell that, contrary to the disgust and contempt feelings that bureaucrats had towards the monks, they enjoy very high social status and respect among Tibetans: They are one of the Three Treasures of Tibetan Buddhism, traditional intellectuals of Tibetan culture, and are guiders and protectors in the spiritual world of Tibetans, being greatly respected by Tibetans. Therefore, the least thing that Tibetans could tolerate is to see monks being abused and humiliated. It was guaranteed that the abuse and violence that armed soldiers gave to the monks would lead to a commotion. Only the imperial bureaucrats being blinded by power could not foresee the outcome.
The authorities never reflected on what happened, but acted to worsen the situation. The monks in all areas became the main targets; many great temples were insultingly searched by the armed force. Besides those who participated in the protests were arrested, many were confined and lost freedom; some temples were being closed indefinitely; monks without registered residence were deported; all temples were ordered to engage in “patriotic education”, forcing the monks to openly denounce the Dalai Lama. Many monks fled from the temples in order to avoid such denunciations – it was required to be made by each individual. Some temples even became empty. Before the incident in Tibet, many monks were apathetic towards political issues, devoting themselves to spiritual practice. They did not object to China’s rule, with discontent only about policy issues. The incident, however, made the monks at large to think about Tibet’s political future, and the number of monks agreeing with Tibetan independence rapidly increased.
China’s authorities forced the monks to go to the opposite side, which is tantamount to having created the most difficult opponent to deal with. Traditional folk songs described the monks in this way: “Put him up, he is a piece of straight incense; put him down, he is still a piece of straight incense. Seize the head, you get only hairs; touch the butt you get only rags”. This explains the fact that monks have no family to worry about, and thus they are resolute, single-minded and uncompromising, not being afraid to challenge the authorities. This is the reason that the monks were always in the front during the past incidents. Meanwhile, given the highly respectable status that monks enjoy in Tibetan society and the far-reaching influence that monks exert, their discontent and appeals for independence would not be limited to themselves alone; it would have a broad impact on all the Tibetan people.
Another method that the bureaucrats often use— hurriedly hunting for evidence to demonstrate that incidents were “organized, premeditated and carefully planned by the Dalai clique”, created a large number of arrests, tortured confessions and wrong cases. These efforts also affected a large number of Tibetans and their relatives, creating a wide-spread discontent and disillusionment. After many persecutions, the bureaucrats still couldn’t justify themselves with convincing evidence. The charges that the media brought against the Dalai Lama, to Tibetans, were all lying. Even in those Tibetan areas without protest, these propaganda efforts provoked disgust and aversion, creating hatred and bringing further conflicts. This made more Tibetans to think if separation is better off. “Anti-secession” propaganda efforts are providing materials breeding consciousness for separation. “Tibetan Independence” in Tibetan --“博让赞” was a word and concept not very well known among Tibetans, but after long-term “anti-secession” educations, everyone, old and young, knows this word. In this Incident, “博让赞” became the slogan being cried out by monks, city dwellers, herdsmen and primary school students alike.
This is the so-called “self-fulfilling expectation”—treating Tibetans as enemies, they would eventually so become; everywhere preventing Tibetans from “secession”, Tibetans would eventually want to secede. Analysts have different views on the nature of protests in all Tibetan areas. The main disagreement is whether it was a political movement seeking independence, or just protests expressing discontent towards policy or economic disadvantage. To me, the course of this incident may not contain specific appeals for independence; many contributing factors exist, including the discrepancy of living standards, influence from the international community, “the effect of sheep flock”, discontent regarding economic issues, migration issues, etc, and official propaganda efforts and suppression had all been adding fuel to the flame. However, the outcome of the incident is that Tibetans in general widely planted in mind the consciousness of seeking independence. Therefore, when similar incidents happen, it will become a spontaneous movement, and Tibetan Independence will become the universal appeal of many Tibetans, serving as the driving force and guiding principle during the course.
4. Sore Conflicts between Chinese Society and Western Society
Chinese and Western societies in general in the past had little conflicts. Chinese people shared good feelings towards the Westerners, and relatively trusted Western media. Even during the time with most inflated nationalistic sentiments, the anger was directed at Western governments. Westerners also had little negative feelings towards the Chinese, criticizing the Chinese government but thinking the people are victims living under totalitarian regime. However, in regard to the Tibet Incident, common Chinese people launched a jihad against Western media, and treated Western people invectively. This change of attitude derives from the bureaucrats’ successful campaign over the media. Yet the condition on which successful opinion control was depended is the necessary condition to instigate Chinese people, but is the cause that will definitely raise suspicion and criticism from the international community.
In order to achieve information blockade, the authorities on March 14, the very day of Incident, restricted freedom of movement of foreigners, and soon after, drove out all foreigners out of Tibet. For a long time, foreigners were not allowed to visit Tibetan areas, and checkpoints were set up on the road. Graphical materials were treated as the most sensitive, and the armed force largely violated human rights. Besides preventing foreigners from getting pictures, some Tibetans who used cell phone cameras to take pictures were arrested and treated with cruel persecution. Even Han Chinese, if they were caught having taken sensitive pictures, were interrogated, equipments confiscated or pictures deleted. Western media could hardly get any first-hand material due to strict enforcement on information censorship, and could only use indirect sources for reporting purposes. Indirect sources were easily mixed with errors, which invited heavy criticism and damaged Western media’s image in Chinese people’s eyes. It was the first time China’s propaganda machine came out the bout fighting Western media victoriously; the bureaucrats were extremely pleased.
But this couldn’t convince Western media. Chinese people’s one-sided abuse and intimidation, along with Chinese government’s pressure and violation, could only push Western media, referred to as the Fourth Power, to the opposite side of long-term enemies. Although Chinese people’s enmity would make Western media to report with greater care, research and balance, it will also increase the media’s aversion, not only towards Chinese totalitarian regime, but also towards Chinese people’s fanaticism and violence. One can believe if any opportunity arises in the future, similar joint campaign against China will duly occur. Western people’s attitudes are by and large guided by the media. Once the media is insulted, pushing it to the opposite side, it is bounded that people in the West will think about China with more and more negative images.
In fact, it was due to China’s news control efforts that the people in the West could not get first-hand information from the media, and, without any trust in Chinese media, they began to hold suspicions towards every single word or statement that China provided in regard to the incident in Tibet, because it is commonsensical to the Westerners that only the act of lying needs information control and censorship. Even if such efforts of control could be so successful that people could not know the details of lying, a feasible way to thoroughly resist these efforts is to treat everything as lying. Many Westerners wanted and actually tried to boycott the Olympic Torch Relay. The reason behind it was due to the fact that they lacked other means to express their discontent towards China’s handling of Tibet and took it as an opportunity to direct their anger at China’s efforts to hide the truth.
The bureaucratic institutions do not really care about Westerners opinions. They need to use Chinese people’s hostility displayed towards the Western society in order to show the government’s popularity and support, and thereafter when individual Westerners tried to boycott the Olympic Torch Relay, the bureaucrats showed those scenes repeatedly, further stimulating Chinese people’s hostility towards the Western society. Mass movement and mobilizing the masses are a craft that totalitarian regimes are very adept in. When big issues occur, Chinese people lack sufficient information and knowledge to think critically and independently, and are easy to manipulate. Although people do not consent to the government on many issues, the majority, having accepted as a fundamental principle that national unity is inviolable, used “seeking secession or not” as a simple assessment in regard to Tibet, a place far away from their daily life. When all the media, controlled by the government, circulating the single voice and reprimanding Western society’s hostility towards China and its feverish support towards “Tibetan Independence”, it was not difficult to stimulate Chinese people’s enmity. The handling of the Incident not only turned the ethnic relationship between Han Chinese and Tibetans into ethnic opposition, but also pushed Chinese and Western societies into the course to become two opposing camps.
Indeed, it was unprecedented how much support that Chinese people gave to the government. On the internet, or on foreign streets, Chinese patriots and Westerners had close combat. Chinese people are not allowed to watch CNN, but can frenetically oppose CNN; back home there is no freedom to protest on streets, but abroad patriots gathered together to repeat the scenes as if back to the Cultural Revolution (though some of these performances were encouraged and organized by Chinese government and consulates abroad). One the one hand, it will make Westerners depreciate China in terms of cultural values; on the other hand, it will invite Westerns see China, a country with enmity towards the West, as a threat to the free world. They would not treat Chinese people and the government separately, as they did before.
No rationality can exist between two opposing camps. Both sides will use simple criteria for identification, as if soccer hooliganism humiliating the opposing side, without valid reasons and without right or wrong. Once Western people and media deemed that Chinese people in general possess colonizers’ mentality, they will believe that Tibet must be freed from Chinese rule, regardless of knowing what changes China’s political system will experience. The promise made by China’s dissidents holding that Tibet would be free once China becomes democratic will not be trustworthy, because institutional change is not the same with the change of people’s mentality. This will greatly increase the difficulties when future China handles the issue of Tibet.
Today, the CCP is no longer a revolutionary party that strictly sticks to founding ideologies; rather, it becomes a pragmatic and opportunistic interest group. Theoretically, out from preserving self-interests, it should avoid direct confrontation with the West. However, the course of development is always depended on its inner logic. One of the characteristics of autocracy is that, even if each part acts rationally, the general outcome could be far away from rationality, and would not serve the general interest of the group. The trend wherein rationality of parts evolves into irrationality of the whole, like Nash equilibrium, exerts vital importance in determining the course of affairs. In the following analysis, it will be evident that, it was due to the rational calculation of the “anti-secession” bureaucratic institutions that formed China’s whole logical fallacy in dealing with the Tibet Incident.
(To be continued…)
Chapter Two: Dilemma of the Imperial Regime
Chapter Three: Road to Tibetan Independence
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