The Continental Shelf Extension claims in East Asia

By now all countries have submitted their claim on UNCLOS, which states

• The continental shelf is defined as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin’s outer edge, or 200 nautical miles from the coastal state’s baseline, whichever is greater. State’s continental shelf may exceed 200 nautical miles until the natural prolongation ends. However, it may never exceed 350 nautical miles from the baseline; or it may never exceed 100 nautical miles beyond the 2,500 meter isobath (the line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters). Coastal states have the right to harvest mineral and non-living material in the subsoil of its continental shelf, to the exclusion of others. Coastal states also have exclusive control over living resources "attached" to the continental shelf, but not to creatures living in the water column beyond the exclusive economic zone.

The claims can be found here and here.

• Japan has submitted a 78-page long "executive summary", to which China and Korea challenged the legitimacy of Okinotori Rock, which USA (North Mariana Island, i.e. Saipan and Guam) and Palau reserved their rights on overlapping claims
• Korea and China each submitted their claims, both pushing the continental shelf to the Okinawa Trough
  
• (Note all 3 countries ratified UNCLOS, which DPRK did not)
  

Japan's continental extension claim focuses on the souther part of its EEZ claim (i.e. lower half of this map)

Consisting of 5 major areas:

• SKB Shikoku Basin, the large vertical strip south of Shikoku Island and north of the Okinotori 200 nm circle.
• The area between Ogasawara/Iwo Jima (OGP) and the Minami-tori Shima (island) 200 nm circle (MTS)
  
• KPR, the area between the Okinotori circle and Palau's 200 nm EEZ boundary (potential overlap)
• 2 smaller pieces ODR and MIT to the east and west of the Okinotori circle
  

A very nice map for Chinese and Korean claims can be found in the red firefly blog (a very nice map blog in Chinese)

• The orange area is the co-development zone (1st phase) reached by China and Japan a year ago
• The green area is the Joint Korea-Japan Fishing Zone
• Blues lines are the 200 nm lines for Korea and China
  
• KOR1-KOR5 are sample points (joined into a line) of Korean claim
• D1-D4 are sample points of Chinese claim
• Both the KOR and D points are where the continental shelf end at the Okinawa Trough
  

Here is the technical definition of China's calim

• A -- the base-point (land territory) where the claim distance starts to count (usually an island close to the continent)
  
• B -- 200 nm line
  
• C -- continental shelf slope start to fall (FOS), point of maximum change in gradient
  
• D -- deepest point when continent shelf falls to the trough (lowest sea level)
  

Note that China's "preliminary example point" has carefully avoided to overlap with Korea claim points, apparently for a few reason (that I can think of)

1. To avoid controversy with Korea
2. To have Korea on its side over a potential rebuff from Japan (Japan's argument may be quite weak given the fact that it also submitted similar claim to the other side of its ocean)
3. The example points are only "examples" to establish the Okinawa trough as the boudary, China can then negotiate with Korea (if the trough is established) regarding how to divide the trough between them, most likely it would be the equidistant principle which is not far from D1/KOR1

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Related:

• The East China Sea deal - details
• The funny shape of the East China Sea "co-development" zone
• Japanese Air-Defence Identification Zone (Map)
• Greedy Asians?
• Tsugaru Strait: Japanese territorial claim is not always "greedy"

How credible is DPRK's nuclear stockpile?

In 2006 North Korea claimed it conducted a "nuclear test". But many analyst suspected it was a faked test mimic by traditional explosive, for 2 reasons:

1. the energy was only bout 1/3 of the Hiroshima bomb, showing that the explosion is likely really from a nuclear bomb. Because for a chain reaction to happen, there need to be at least certain critical mass of Uranium (or Plutonium), as demonstrated first by physicists Rudolph Pierls. And the Hiroshima bomb is just over the critical mass
2. There had not really been confirmed radioactive trace from the surrounding international observation. (The US said the signal is "consistent" with a nuclear test, but radioactively of this small amount (for underground test) is easy fake. Note also the choice of word, "consistent" is a much weaker word that "confirm", which will mean consistency in both strengh, spectrum, and also spatial distribution. "consistency" only means that there is some radiation detected and that no obvious contradiction)

The most recent claim has a magnitude of 4.7 (vs 4.2 in the previous test). The energy is about 3 times larger ( 10^(4.7-4.2) = 3.1 ), making the total energy similar to that of the Hiroshima bomb.

For a nuclear test it still seems to be very minor. Two possibilities

1. It is a real nuclear blast, but DPRK has barely enough Pu/U, so they used all the 'available' material for this "test"
2. It is another fake test, they figured the previous test was 2/3 short in magnitude, and got the right amount to make a more credible fake (it would to too expensive to use more)

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p.s. it is hard to accurately measure the energy with seimological measure, as the rock/water of the surrounding is complex and differ from the calibration references (for both seimic calibration and also underground nuclear test energy calibration). the most reliable data is perhaps the 'relative scale' (i.e. the difference) in energy for data taken by the same probe(s).

e.g., from one source (NEIC National Earthquake Info Center, which i think is the USGS) the numbers read 4.7 (2009) and 4.3 (2006) so the difference is 10^0.4<3.>

National geographic on North Korea

Related: The book " the real North Korea" by Chinese writer Ye Yonglie 真实的朝鲜 叶永烈

National geographic 45 minute documentary:


Ye offered some interesting interpretation of some well known DPRK observations, e.g.,

• 平壤的一道特色风景线，是漂亮的女交警在十字路口持棒指挥，据说这样可以让男司机在通过路口的时候减慢车速，而且也可以因此关闭红绿灯，以求节电 I thought they used the traffic police girls to say electricity (and cost of building the traffic lights), there isn't much traffic anyway. But Ye added that they attracts the attention of the drivers :)
  
• 平壤市民的上班时间从上午7时到9时错开，以减少对于公共交通的压力 Working hours are spread between 7 and 9 am, to ease the pressure on public transport. No traffic congestion, but public transport is limited
  
• 朝鲜的交通规则跟中国一样，汽车是靠马路右侧行驶，而这辆从日本进口的大巴士的司机座位在车头右侧，旅客上下的车门反而在车头左侧。这样，旅客在上下车时非常危险，很容易被从旁边驶过的汽车撞倒。   显然，这样的巴士只适合车辆靠左侧行驶的国家与地区，如日本、英国、爱尔兰、泰国、澳大利亚、巴基斯坦、南非以及中国香港——在这些国家与地区之中，除了日本之外，大多数是英联邦国家或者曾经是英国殖民地。因为在1756年伦敦桥扩建时，规定所有驾车者都必须靠左侧行驶，以免在桥上发生碰撞，此后逐渐形成英国汽车靠左侧行驶的交通规则。     世界上大多数国家是实行汽车靠马路右侧行驶的，如中国、美国、俄罗斯、印度、印度尼西亚、加拿大、德国、希腊、古巴、巴西、墨西哥、摩洛哥等。朝鲜也是实行汽车靠马路右侧行驶。显然，朝鲜旅行社在从日本进口大巴士的时候，买错了车型。日本也为汽车靠右行驶的国家生产车门在右侧的大巴士，朝鲜应该进口那种车型的大巴士。A treatise on why traffics are on the left on UK, etc
• 平壤是朝鲜公共交通最好的城市，有公共汽车、电车和地铁。不论乘公共汽车、有轨电车还是地铁，不论坐几站，实行统一票价，全部是5朝元。按照1元人民币相当于17朝元折算，大约相当于3角人民币。朝鲜的物价在不断上涨，在2002年，统一的票价还只有2朝元。Inflation in DPRK, pubic transport ticket fare from 2 Won in 2002 to 5 won in 2008
  
• 在平壤即便是有自行车，也只是允许男士们骑。这是因为平壤汽车速度太快，曾经撞死好几个骑自行车的女士，从此，平壤政府下达禁令，不许女同胞们在平壤骑自行车。 Only man are allowed to right bicycles! (For safety - as the cars drive too fast!)
  
• 如今，朝鲜方面在专供外宾居住的特级宾馆开通了卫星电视频道，这样我在羊角岛宾馆不仅可以看到中国中央电视台各频道，而且还能看到英国BBC、日本NHK以及俄罗斯电视台和中国香港凤凰卫视。我注意到，没有韩国台。这是因为韩国台的韩语与朝鲜语完全一样，就连打扫房间的宾馆服务员也听得懂，势必会造成诸多“麻烦”。-- Now you know why more Chinese websites and TV Channels are censored/blocked in China, while those BBC/CNN/WSJ are less regulated. .. and why I had been puzzled before they unblocked wiki/en
• 也有例外：在古巴，开国领袖菲德尔·卡斯特罗享有崇高的威望。然而，在哈瓦那街头找不到一张卡斯特罗画像，找不到一尊卡斯特罗铜像。有的只是卡斯特罗的战友、已故古巴革命先驱格瓦拉的塑像和画像。在古巴，没有一条以卡斯特罗命名的街道，没有一座以卡斯特罗命名的建筑物。古巴人不分男女老少，都亲切地喊卡斯特罗：“菲德尔！菲德尔！” DPRK has many statue for its founder Kim Il-sung, like many other countries...except Cuba

The funny shape of the East China Sea "co-development" zone

Source: FYJS , Yomiuri

The funny shape of the co-development zone in East China Sea recently nogotiated between China and Japan has puzzled many. I have speculated some reason in the choice of location (e.g. as far from Diaoyu / Senkaku as possible, largely on the disputed zone but includes a bit of the area west of Japan claim line to show goodwill, etc.) But the shape is still mysterious.

One theory (according Yomiuri - in its report also said explicitly now that Longjing Asunaro is not within the area) is that this area is chosen so that it satisfies two conditions
1) as far north as possible (as I speculated)
2) but avoid any potential dispute with Korea (!!!)

One may ask, what does Korea have anything to do with this. The map above shows (in white outline) the area stipulated by the February 1974 agreement between (South) Korea and Japan, as their codevelopment zone. Coordiantes of the polygon corners are:

• Point 1 32°57.0'N 127°41.1'E
• Point 2 32°53.4'N 127°36.3'E
• Point 3 32°46.2'N 127°27.8'E
• Point 4 32°33.6'N 127°13.1'E
• Point 5 32°10.5'N 126°51.5'E
• Point 6 30°46.2'N 125°55.5'E
• Point 7 30°33.3'N 126°00.8'E
• Point 8 30°18.2'N 126°05.5'E
• Point 9 28°36.0'N 127°38.0'E
• Point 10 29°19.0'N 128°00.0'E
• Point 11 29°43.0'N 128°38.0'E
• Point 12 30°19.0'N 129°09.0'E
• Point 13 30°54.0'N 129°04.0'E
• Point 14 31°13.0'N 128°50.0'E
• Point 15 31°47.0'N 128°50.0'E
• Point 16 31°47.0'N 128°14.0'E
• Point 17 32°12.0'N 127°50.0'E
• Point 18 32°27.0'N 127°56.0'E
• Point 19 32°27.0'N 128°18.0'E
• Point 20 32°57.0'N 128°18.0'E
• Point 1 32°57.0'N 127°41.1'E

The problem is, in 1974, China was still a closed country, far behind the bamboo curtain. This area overlaps with the Chinese claimed line (based on the Ocean trough, and 200 nautical miles -- shown in the map above). To make real progress and not complicate the problem it thus makes sense to defer any discussion that may involve another new interest party (which is also highly nationalistic).

• update: according to Mark Valencia's study, China had protested loudly in 1974.
• "On February 4, 1974, China protested loudly:
• 
  The Chinese Government holds that, according to the principle
  that the continental shelf is the natural extension of the continent,
  it stands to reason that the question of how to divide the continental
  shelf in the East China Sea should be decided by China and the
  other countries concerned through consultations. But now the
  Japanese Government and the South Korean authorities have
  marked off a so-called . . . “joint development zone” . . . behind
  China’s back. This is an infringement on China’s sovereignty"

p.s. It is a bit puzzling for me to understand why Japan had agreed to such a zone, as the south portion of the polygon extends far south of Cheju Island (or even Huang yan reef, which is the weaker version of 'okinotori' for Korea). It actually extended south of Kyushu and as far south as the latitude of Okinawa.

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传中日顾虑韩国因素 放弃开发龙井油田

【星岛网讯】中日双方日前正式就共同开发东海油气田问题达成共识，有消息称，由于顾虑韩国的关系，双方未把龙井（日本取名翌桧）油田列为共同开发的对象。只就龙井油田南侧海域的达成共识。　　

日本《读卖新闻》报道，中日双方在东海油田开发谈判中，把龙井油田排除在共同开发的对象之外，双方也将不单独开发，事实上是暂时放弃对这个油田的开发。　

报道指，中日两国由于分别顾虑到龙井靠近中国和韩国的中线海域以及接近日韩大陆架共同开发区，若进行开发有可能和韩国发生冲突而避开对这个海上油田的开发。　　

日本政府18日发表和中国达成的协议，只对龙井油田的南侧海域进行共同开发。日本在当天并未明示理由，只表示和中国的谈判结果是如此。　　

日本和中国的谈判中曾要求在跨越日本主张的日中东海中线一带的龙井（翌桧）、春晓（日本名白桦）、断桥（楠）和天外天（木坚）四个油田共同开发，结果只就共同开发龙井南侧海域以及日方出资参加中国已着手开发的春晓达成协议。　　

日本主张以日中两国海岸等距离的中线为两国的东海分界线，中国则坚持大陆架所及的琉球海沟是双方的分界线，成为谈判的最大争议点。这次以将争议点搁置方式达成共同开发的协议，中国并重申未承认日本主张的中线。---

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日中、東シナ海ガス田「翌檜」の開発断念…韓国に配慮し

Note Yumiuri had a strange (and wrong) label of Sino-Korea median line。 (1) a China-Korea line would run North-South wise instead of East-West wise, (2) there is no median line agreed at between China and Korea. what is relevant is the 200 nautical line as indicated in the first map of this post.

　日中の東シナ海ガス田協議で、翌檜(あすなろ)（中国名・龍井）を共同開発の対象としないことで合意していたことが２０日、分かった。
　日中ともに単独開発も行わず、翌檜は事実上放棄される。翌檜は〈１〉中国と韓国の境界の基準となる「中間線」〈２〉日韓大陸棚共同開発区域――に近接しており、開発すれば韓国と摩擦を生じかねないと判断、韓国に配慮した。
　日中交渉筋によると、両政府は翌檜の共同開発を一時検討。しかし、ガスを含む地層が、中韓の「中間線」をまたぎ日韓大陸棚共同開発区域に広がっている可能性があることがわかった。開発すれば、韓国が「資源を吸い取られる」と主張する懸念があった。一連の協議には韓国は加わっておらず、日中両政府は、翌檜の開発断念で一致した。
　政府が１８日に正式発表した東シナ海ガス田開発に関する日中合意では、翌檜は共同開発の対象から外され、翌檜南側の海域が共同開発の対象となった。理由について、政府は「交渉の結果としか言えない」と説明していた。
　東シナ海で日本が中国に共同開発を求めた４ガス田のうち、白樺（中国名・春暁）は日本が出資する形の共同開発で合意した。
（2008年6月20日14時43分 読売新聞）

Related:
Another Yomiuri East China Sea Map for Martin J. Frid… Wait, It Gets Better

Engagement in Korea

A very interesting discussion in NKZone, a blog on North Korea (DPRK), on the recent visit of New York Philharmonic.

It quoted Andrei Lankov's view

• Hardline critics may be right that North Korean officials will portray these visits as a foreigners' tribute to their "Dear Leader". However, one should not overestimate the efficiency of this propaganda. I grew up in the Soviet Union in the 1970s and officially approved cultural and academic exchanges were a critical source of information about life overseas and helped arouse serious doubts about the communist system.

Professor Lankov's comment is consistent and supported by everything I heard from the Chinese in the 1970s. e.g., the visit of Nixon, Ping-pong diplomacy, opened their eyes to the west, and paved way for Deng's reform which followed. Even though, as Lankov correctly pointed out, Mao was still in power and Deng in the village at the time.

North Korean Mass Game (long version)

The clip in 5 parts, it is from the "TV Broadcast of the entire "Ever-victorious Workers' Party of Korea" held at the May Day Stadium in Pyongyang, North Korea on September 4, 2001."

Part 1


Part 2


Part 3


Part 4


Part 5


Part 6

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1) For how this works see State of the Mind clip here
2) Older clips here

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Military band performance 9/9/2003 (55th DPRK anniversary)


Military band performance 4/25/2002 (70th People's Army anniversary - the army was founded 19 years before the government?)

Categories:

• north
• korea
• dprk
• ent

Kuril earthquake informations

The Kuril quake is 8.3 in Richter scale according to USGS, i.e., 10^(-0.8)=1/6 the energy of the 9.1 quake in Sumatra 2 years ago that caused the monster tsunami, and 10^(8.3-4)=10^4.3=20000 times the North Korea (alleged) "nuclear" test last month.

Magnitude	8.3 (Great)
Date-Time	Wednesday, November 15, 2006 at 11:14:16 (UTC) = Coordinated Universal Time Wednesday, November 15, 2006 at 10:14:16 PM = local time at epicenter Time of Earthquake in other Time Zones
Location	46.616°N, 153.224°E
Depth	28.5 km (17.7 miles)
Region	KURIL ISLANDS
Distances	440 km (275 miles) ENE of Kuril'sk, Kuril Islands 500 km (310 miles) SSW of Severo-Kuril'sk, Kuril Islands, Russia 1650 km (1030 miles) NE of TOKYO, Japan 7185 km (4460 miles) NE of MOSCOW, Russia
Location Uncertainty	horizontal +/- 7.1 km (4.4 miles); depth +/- 8.2 km (5.1 miles)
Parameters	Nst=213, Nph=213, Dmin=812.9 km, Rmss=1.05 sec, Gp= 65°, M-type=moment magnitude (Mw), Version=9
Source	USGS NEIC (WDCS-D)
Event ID	usvcam

Many strong after-quakes were detected around 153-155E, 46-48N.


There are many reasons that the tsunami is much weaker this time.

1. Weaker quake (of 1/6 the strength)
2. Deeper epicenter (28.5km below surface)
3. Direction of the quake was not as vertical as that in Sumatra
   

The location of the quake is right on the rim of on the Pacific Techtonic Plate, and in the middle of Kuril Island Chain, between the south tip of Kamchatka and NE Hokkaido. in (also November) 1952 a 9.0 quake struck the SE tip of Kamchatka, about 600km NE of the epicenter of today's quake. If there is a simple trend, then 54 years later, people in Hokkaido should be very vigilant.

Categories:

• geo

North Korea Karaoke

Enjoy! (too bad I don't read Korean - appreciate if anyone translate the titles)

Don't ask my name


A Whistle






Air Koryo


Unification Rainbow

October 2006 Reading list

China

• 余英时:上海新世界史教科书
• (V)總統府就是你家-小泉首相やめて
• 一份公然為貪腐加以掩飾與開脫的起訴書
• 何必如此恐韩
• Democratic lesson in Taiwan
• 中国的GDP究竟有几个"版本"?
• The "Positive non-intervention" Discourse (1) and (2)
• 岳飞之死
• 全民大悶鍋 總統府就是你家 李熬
• 断章取义
• Income disparity of Shanghai physicians
• Maybe there really isn't conspiracy in Shanghai
• 台灣-楊甦棣風波

Rest of Asia

• What should we do to N Korea
• 229 pictures deep in N Korea
• Zakaria on N Korea
• "Reunifying the Koreas" [but how?]
• NK Nuke not irrational at all
• This is all very postmodern
• Technical analysis of Nork test
• Vietnam haulage
• (V) Cross strait laughter - CNN

World

• (V) internet 1993
• A medicine for African leaders

Kim Jong-il: second test or bluff again?

There has been report that N Korea is going to conduct its "second" nuclear test soon, right after the "first" (alleged) test and today again, apparently the evidence was that some trucks were spotted around the Punggye site.

I maintain my skepticism on the technological capability of KJI's highly isolated team. Unlike the Indian and the Pakistani in 1998, or even the Chinese in 1964, N Korea scientists were isolated for more than half a decade from the rest of the world (except for a Soviet aided small facility in Yangban since mide 1960s, which is mainly for preaceful use). The Chinese team, when the research started in late 1950s, was only isolated for less than 10 years, with a few top scientists educated and worked in top US facilities. The Chinese also has a much larger talent pool, given its population then of 600M vs 22M of DPRK today.

My skepticism was confirmed when the test on October 9 turned out to be either a fizzle or fake. Even with the recent detection of radioactive sources by US reconnaissance, NK could have faked the radioactive elements as well, if it chose to do so. A small amount of waste from power plant would generate a large enough sample to fake the radioactive traces if it was indeed a chemical explosion. Although my personal opinion is that to fake a 500 ton equivalent blast is a non-trivial task which involves the simultaneous detonation of many tonnes of explosives (may be much smaller than 500 as it could be non-TNT, but should be near the 100 nevertheless), and I think it is probably more challenge for KJI to fake the blast.

I am more skeptical of the speculation of a second test, for the following reasons

1. NK only has limited amount of Plutonium. Of the amount (US estimated by US intelligence) equivalent of 4-10 bombs (I tend to believe the low side limit), one is already gone (even if it is a fizzle, NK should have used the amount for one full bomb and the rest of the Plutonium are forever wasted and buried under Mantapsan). NK cannot afford to waste another 2 kilo's of Pu on a second test.
   Although NK has uranium mines, the alleged bomb is believed to be Plutonium based. Suffice it to say that the Plutonium enrichment and explosion technology is significantly different from that of Uranium and that it is non-trivial to enrich the required material even if NK has natural uranium mines -- (update) Experts said the use of plutonium to make the bomb was important because it suggested that North Korea probably had only one nuclear program mature enough to produce weapons."This is good news because we have a reasonably good idea of how much plutonium they have made," said Siegfried Hecker, the former head of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and now a visiting professor at Stanford University.
2. Whether the blast on October 9 was a fizzle or a success (if not fake), a sensible approach would be to thoroughly analyze the data before conducting the second test. With the dated computational technological in NK, it is unlikely for it to gain new knowledge by testing a second bomb until at least 0.5-1 year later
3. As many have suspected, the October 9 blast serves more as a political statement (and diplomatic gesture), in KJI's weird mind, than a technological demonstration. I do not see any incremental impact a second test could have served him. Instead, if the second test fails again, it would be immense embarrassment for Kim. (the first test could still be called a success since the chain reaction did started, even though it did not sustain. But if the second test turns out to be a fizzle again, then it certainly covers no new ground)

I was, of course, trying to reason with KJI. As we know, rationality does not necessarily go with his mind. If I am wrong, do not blame me, it just proves KJI is more insane than we have thought.

North Korea Test not really a success

Many scientists now believe that the infamous Kim Jong-il fart may not be such a success as claimed. It is more likely a weaker version of the ad hoc test conducted by Pakistan as a response to India's test in 1998.

There are a few possible reasons for coming to such deduction

• DPRK does not have a lot of purified Plutonium or Uranium, to conserve nuke material it had to conduct a mini-test
  
• The technology may be immature -- e.g. the fuel (purity) grade is barely good for an explosion, but far from the optimum energy of a successful test (the consequence of this case would be dreadful for environmentalist, as a lot of unreacted nuke materials might have been left in the tunnel)
  
• The detonation process, though quite simple, still requires certain engineering precision, which the outdated NK technology may not have mastered
• The failure to seek attention might have prompted KJI to force a pre-mature test -- as happened for Taepodong-2 in July

So far this is consistent with technical data

• "Gary Gibson, senior seismologist at Australia's Seismology Research Center, said a 4.2 magnitude quake would be the result of a one kiloton explosion"
• This is small even if one allows for the margin of error, because "The nuclear weapon the United States exploded over Hiroshima in 1945 produced a 12.5-kiloton yield.
• A successful test would be one like what India did, with an average of 12 kilton/test. "In 1998, India carried out five underground nuclear tests at Pokharan in the western desert state of Rajasthan and declared itself a nuclear weapons state. The total yield of the first round of blasts measured near 60 kilotons...."Our biggest one was in the vicinity of 45 kilotons. That was thermo-nuclear," said S.K. Malhotra, head of the public awareness division of the Department of Atomic Energy.."
• Nuclear analyst Andrew Davies, from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said if the North Korean test yield was only a kiloton, Pyongyang may be disappointed..."A kiloton is a very low yield and would tend to suggest, I would have thought, that the device was not all they hoped it would be," Davies told Reuters. "If a nuclear, plutonium bomb fizzles, you can still get one or two kilotons quite easily. You still get a significant energy release. But an efficient device will give you more like 20 (kilotons)."
• Even the less successful (conducted without proper preparation) test by Pakistan, was believed to have generated at least 9-12 kilotons in strength. "Pakistan said two nuclear tests had a total yield of between 34-48 kilotons, while three others were sub-kiloton. It said a sixth test yielded 10-15 kilotons. The Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory said the two major tests yielded 9-12 kilotons, while the sixth yielded only 4-6 kilotons."

Jane's defence has a more concise summary that supported this analysis

• "Although details are tentative, initial and unconfirmed South Korean reports indicate that the test was a fission device with a yield of .55 kT. By comparison the nuclear bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima yielded approximately 12.5 kT. The figure of .55 kT, however, seems too low given the 4.2 register on the Richter scale. This could suggest - depending upon the geological make-up of the test site - a yield of 2-12 kT. If, however, the lower yield is correct, it would suggest that the test had been a "pre- or post-detonation" event (ie a failure), as it had been anticipated that North Korea's first nuclear test would have a significantly higher yield."

Though quite unlikely for the test yesterday, it is indeed possible to fake a nuke test with conventional chemical reaction, as verified by Lawrence Livermore National Lab with a 1.3 kiloton simulation in the desert of Nevada (though their objective was to find a way to detect real nuke tests with a simulation). The report also mentioned that if the explosion is more than 400m below surface, we may not see a collapsed crater -- as this might be the case for the NK test yesterday.

UPDATE (Oct10): Armscontrol Wonk is more adamant that it was a clear failure. I think he is right. More discussion on the likelihood of a failed test/hoax here.

North Korea nuclear test information

Update (10/10):

Global security has a few satellite pictures showing the entrance of the Punggye-yok tunnel
(update 10/12, H-T commentator luistxo for google location tags, and from there a previous post by armscontrolwonk)





north-korea tagged map by user - Tagzania

I am not sure exactly where it is located, but I found a couple suspicious buildings a few hundred meters east of the epicenter, at 41.309438E,129.19365N



north-korea tagged map by user - Tagzania

---

Google map links here. DPRK map here, the site is north of Chunhyung-ri (春兴里), or 17 km NNW of the train station Punggye-yok (豐溪驿）　and just a few km south of the source of the river called Ŏrang-ch’ŏn. (渔郎川)

Thee seismological information for the suspected DPRK nuke test is available on USGS's website.

• Earthquake Details

  Magnitude	4.2 (Light)
  Date-Time	Monday, October 9, 2006 at 01:35:27 (UTC) = Coordinated Universal Time Monday, October 9, 2006 at 10:35:27 AM = local time at epicenter Time of Earthquake in other Time Zones
  Location	41.294°N, 129.134°E
  Depth	0 km (~0 mile) set by location program
  Region	NORTH KOREA
  Distances	70 km (40 miles) N of Kimchaek, North Korea 90 km (55 miles) SW of Chongjin, North Korea 180 km (115 miles) S of Yanji, Jilin, China 385 km (240 miles) NE of PYONGYANG, North Korea
  Location Uncertainty	horizontal +/- 10.5 km (6.5 miles); depth fixed by location program
  Parameters	Nst= 17, Nph= 17, Dmin=371.1 km, Rmss=0.86 sec, Gp= 83°, M-type=body magnitude (Mb), Version=7
  Source	USGS NEIC (WDCS-D)
  Event ID	ustqab

It is awfully close to the China/Russia border (180km vs 250km). I hope this time China will not tolerate this bad boy any more.

About the location:

• 70 km (40 miles) N of Kimchaek, North Korea
  
• 90 km (55 miles) SW of Chongjin, North Korea
  
• 180 km (115 miles) S of Yanji, Jilin, China (aka Gando ),
  
• About 200km from the south tip of Russian Far East (Estuary of Tumen)
  

The site is also about 200km from Chosin Reservoir, where one of the bloodiest battle was fought between China and US in 1950, in which China scored a pyrrhic victory. There 25k of Chinese lives were lost (many thousand more by frostbite) for helping KJI's father.

P.S.
1) see Marmot's coverage for related reports. On the moral hazard that encouraged KJI down this path, a commentator there said, "if pakistan’s experience is any indication for the consequences of a nuke test, then north korea can count on being partners with the US in the war on terror within a few years. or they could follow india’s lead, and in that case they’ll receive american nuclear technology as a “punishment.”"
2) some reports say the location is around Hwadae Kun 花台. but it does not match the longitude and latitude information by USGS
3) USGS showed the depth of the quake is "0 km" below ground/sea level. It seems to confirm SK report that it is done through horizontal tunnel into a hill. NK's announcement that no radiation leak is likely a dubious claim. underground water will carry the radiation and it may be an environment disaster (which could affect NW part of the Sea of Japan and fishing industry of Russia)
4) Update: Globalsecurity puts the location at north of Kilchu Punggye-yok 吉州郡 豐溪驛（near 豐溪里), "the general proximate vicinity of the P'unggye-yok site"

• In late September 2006, a member of the intelligence committee of South Korea's National Assembly reported on the construction of a tunnel at Mount Mantap in North Hamkyong Province. According to South Korea's National Intelligence Service, the tunnel is approximately 700 meters deep beneath the surface of Mount Mantap and is situated near a horizontal tunnel.
  Mount Mantap is approximately 17 Km North-Northwest from P'unggye-yok, a rail-road station, Kilju County, North Hamgyeong Province.
  The named place that is most nearly proximate to the possible nuclear underground test site is Chik-tong, a small populated place located at 41°16'00"N 129°06'00"E. The suspect site is quite isolated, and is to be found several kilometers away from Chik-tong, and several kilometers removed from Mount Mantap.

5) Jane's Defence confirmed the location as "approximately 42 km northwest of Kilchu, in the province of North Hamgyong, on the remote slopes of Mant'ap-san Mountain."

• This coincides with reports that first appeared during 2005 of suspicious tunnelling and construction activities in the area. Subsequent reports during the past month indicate that the North Koreans had excavated a 700 m-long horizontal tunnel under Mant'ap-san.
  
  Although details are tentative, initial and unconfirmed South Korean reports indicate that the test was a fission device with a yield of .55 kT. By comparison the nuclear bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima yielded approximately 12.5 kT. The figure of .55 kT, however, seems too low given the 4.2 register on the Richter scale. This could suggest - depending upon the geological make-up of the test site - a yield of 2-12 kT. If, however, the lower yield is correct, it would suggest that the test had been a "pre- or post-detonation" event (ie a failure), as it had been anticipated that North Korea's first nuclear test would have a significantly higher yield.
  

Update: SK NIS claimed a different location about 50 km south, i.e. near Musudan-ri. Since the seimological data traces the strength and direction of seismic waves from different point to triangulate the epicenter. It is considered to be more accurate. Therefore, the USGS result of Kilchu Gun, Punggye-yok (吉州郡 豐溪驛), which agrees with a site where satellite surveillance revealed suspected activitities (see, e.g., Globalsecurity), is considered to be more reliable than the South Korean claim. I am of the opinion that SK intelligence failed again.

North Korean bluff

DPRK is talking about nuke again. We know what Kim JI wants - an assurance from US that it will not do what it did to Saddam to him. The man is scared.

Well, we know where that single missile fell into in July.

What about the alleged DPRK military "might"? I know the Google Earth community has a collection of coordinates on DPRK military devices. After seeing these pictures below, I do not know how many of those facilities are for real. So much for the "axis of whatever" threat to world peace.






Back on topic, IMO, KJI's nuke test (planned or bluffed) should be stopped, not for the potential threat, but for the potential environmental damage to one of the last pieces of unpolluted land in NE Asia. To accomplish this, an assurance of no-Iraqification may be needed. Not that we should give in to KJI's blackmail, but because there is really no reason (and totally unlikely) for anyone to make DPRK an Iraq.

Categories:

• korea
• pol

The lesson of Taiwan

Much has been said about how Taiwan' economy went into the doldrums since 2000, coincidentally after Chen Shui Bian took control of the government. While it is clear that the DPP government was initially inexperienced and has been bogged down by ideology, there are so many factors (both internal and external) that could influence the economic development, it is impossible to pinpoint conclusively that it is a result of government incompetence or its ostensible denial of the China factor.

To be sure, Lee Tenghui's KMT government in the 1990s also discouraged investment in the mainland. Therefore, one cannot simply blame CSB's interference for the deterioration since he took over. However, in 1990s Lee's regime needed to deal with the opposition inside KMT and the "anti-China" factions had not consolidated their power base yet. So the damage LTH's government could inflict was much smaller than CSB's.

The often cited defense for CSB were external factors such as the tech crash between 2000-2002. However, one only needs to compare Taiwan with Korea (which has a similar industry and economic profile and exposure to tech sector) to refute such apologies.

As a believer in free market economy, I think any interference from the goverment (whether retricting or forcing business to go to any market, China or SE Asia) is a bad thing. Decisions are better left to the business owners themselves. To further elaborate on this point, Associate Professor Hong Lung-tsai of Taiwan Economic Research Institute offered some great analysis in today's Apple Daily Taiwan (also cached below)

• Frequent change in leadership (i.e. Minister of Economy) paralyse long term policy, if there is any
  
• Political appeals lead to emphasis on redistribution of wealth [one should not blame DPP for this, as this is typical of any democracy]
• Vicious circle of outsourcing research of economic policies to under-funded external think tanks, resulting in decline in quality [the author noted this is also not entirely DPP's fault, as it merely followed KMT practice. But the author weighed in to say that the problem was obvious that DPP should have done something to change that]

Hong finally talked about the China investment issue. He wrote, "Large amount of overseas investment has its pros and cons, but if the profit cannot be repatriated to home, this is defintely a minus. Today 70% of Taiwan's investment outside the island concentrates in the mainland China market, the government has imposed various restrictions to these investment [and re-investment] and the result is that enterprises become reluctant and unwilling to repatriate profit back to Taiwan [scared by the restriction imposed upon them when re-investment is needed], this exacerbates the negative impact of Taiwan's external investment."

Hong is right. For every restriction a bureacracy impose, there is a trick to bypass invented by savy businessmen. Result: bureacratic objective fails, but cost of operation for businesses hikes. Taiwan's restriction in mainland investment (40% of net asset) has led to the effect diametrially opposite to its objective, i.e. profits will stay in the mainland. In addition, capital employment by Taiwanese companies become less efficient, as effort was spent on working against the restriction. This lesson has been learned many times by the CCP government in the mainland (上有政策,下有对策) and it seems now that CCP has finally got it. Unfortunately, as long as political ideology continues to overshadow pragmatism in Taiwan, CSB's government has no incentive to fix the economy. Nor will KMT (as it now seems very likely to win in 2008) care much when it takes rein in future.

-----
715觀點 民進黨政治經驗害了經濟

民進黨的經濟政策向來被認為是最薄弱與模糊的一環。原因固然多端，但絕對與該黨在取得政權的過程中，藉由「認同政治」與「解構黨國資本主義」兩項訴求即可輕易得分的經驗高度相關，導致更須耗時費力以求細膩的「政策研議與注意力」普遍不足。

而對經濟事務的不夠嫻熟，好的經濟政策每多訴諸長期才能奏效，以及經濟政策往往涉及財富重分配等，都是促使善打政治算盤的民進黨，在經濟領域著力不深與避重就輕的根本原因。
換句話說，民進黨經濟政策的薄弱與模糊，不僅有其客觀限制與歷史成因，部分因素也出自理性計算下的刻意忽略。

頻換部長抵銷優勢
然而，不重視經濟政策此一執政前不失分的特點，一旦當家執政後卻面臨嚴重考驗，而不曉得如何替自己的經濟政策與執政績效辯護，還只是所有後遺症裡面最輕微的一項。所以到現在還可以聽到執政大員的辯辭：外匯存底在民進黨執政之後有增加多少。其實過多的外匯存底正意味著該國的資源配置出現問題呢。
至於執政之後所獲得的行政體系支援優勢，卻也由於頻換內閣與財經部長而受到抵銷。
此外，由於政府各部會本身的政策研析能力有限，重大經濟政策分析與研擬多半委託國內「智庫」加以處理。這種大量將「公共政策商業化」的模式，不僅舉世罕見，也迫使自有財源嚴重不足的國內智庫必須承接更多研究案來維持營運，往往造成研究品質堪慮與政策形成過程缺乏嚴謹支撐。當然，民進黨並非此一原本不該有狀況的始作俑者，但在台灣面臨全球化與中國崛起等兩大力道分合夾擊時，民進黨政府卻仍放任國內政策研究環境持續惡化，不知或不思改善之道，可謂難辭其咎。
台灣經濟成長趨緩已是不爭事實，從2000至2005年以來，平均每年經濟成長率已降至3.57%，低於全球的每年平均3.88%。經濟成長遇到瓶頸乃事屬必然，但在四小龍當中也「系統性」的殿後，顯然已見警訊。而一旦經濟成長趨緩，不僅會降低國內投資意願，影響未來經濟成長，形成惡性循環，同時也將加速國內廠商產業外移。
而為全球化與中國經濟崛起所誘發、劇烈且近乎全面的產業外移，已然構成台灣經濟社會最嚴酷的挑戰，包括產業如何升級並填補，尤其是高品質與高生產力的服務業之出現。
台灣對外投資的金額累計已高達GDP（Gross Domestic Product，GDP）的4成（南韓只有6％），不僅高於世界平均的24％，也大過工業國家的30％，而和歐盟國家相當。唯須注意的是，工業國家的對外投資多半屬於購併行為，而台灣絕大部分都是新創設的對外投資。這也隱含著台灣的對外投資模式，對本國經濟所產生的衝擊必然相當深遠。
大量的海外投資利弊互見，但如果對外投資的利潤未能匯回母國，卻絕對不利。而目前台灣的對外投資7成以上集中在中國一地，加上由於政府的各種限制造成台商不願輕易將利潤回流台灣，此一局面也加深了台灣對外投資對於本地經濟的不利影響。民進黨的國家安全思維的確用心良苦，但管制政策務必符合經濟邏輯，否則說服不了別人，尤其是在當今，「對外投資」往往成為企業重要發展策略的全球化年代。

實質工資成長率低
最後，產業外移所引發的分配議題也不容等閒視之。近年來台灣實質工資的成長率比經濟成長率更低，也意味著所得分配惡化，部分原因即在於不具「跨國移動」優勢，特別是低階技術勞工，相當容易受到產業外移的負面影響，包括必須接受其他行業的較低工資甚至失業。
從這個角度來看，擴大內部照顧，藉由完善的社會安全制度來加大對外經貿開放空間，不失為一種兼具公平與效率的經濟政策。

作者為台灣經濟研究院副研究員 洪財隆

Categories:

• taiwan
• econ

Calculating Taepodong-2's range, charting its planned path

Commentator Bobby Fletcher sent me (via comment) this marvelous site of course material of MIT Political Science course "Technology and Policy". Many great lecture notes for the layman including Game Theory, Space Shuttle, Environment, Risk Assessment and Missile Defense, etc.

The relevant data for Taepodong-2 comes from the first lecture of Missile Defense of the Block 4 Materials, where typical missile trajectory (and other technical informations, which are all publicly available) were provided, illustrated by Titan-II missile of the USA, which is also a liquid-fuel rocket based on similar technology of TPD-2. After all, there are not many varieties in rocket technology, such that given certain size and weight, the property of the rocket is more or less determined. TPD-2's technical parameters may be different from that of Titan-II, but it should be within a factor of 2-3, or at worse that of 3-5. After all, it is the weight of the fuel (the type is already known), and the weight of the rockets (with vs without load).

An analogy would be comparing the gas mileage and time to accelerate to 60 mph for a car with known weight, type of engine, and size of fuel tank.

So here is an illustration of based on Titan-II trajectory.


It can be easily seen here how GS's Vick was able to deduce correctly the range of TPD-2 that Pentagon later disclosed. In fact, anyone who has taken that MIT course (or similar ones) should know that.

All one needs is the magic number 42 second (which is observed by US satellite). After the explosion, it is unlikely the rocket continues to fly since it is still under the attraction of gravity (and the velocity might have been lost due to the explosion). Even if the main chamber is undamaged, it can at best double the range based on inertia (gravity drags down the rocket a lot faster than 42 second because there is now no upward thrust). Vick probably made some adjustment based on the load and weight of fuel, but it turned out the results were almost the same, and only 0.1km different from analysis released later by the Pentagon and Japan's SDF.

Since the missile explodes so quickly after taking off, it is no wonder why Japan, Korea and China all failed to detect the event. In fact, Japan's state-of-the-art Aegis destroyer, Kongo (金剛), did not detect any trace of ballistic missiles with its radar. That Japan later disseminated various false information (it flew 640km) was either a desperate act to cover its embarassment or create excuse to re-arm. Given the simplicity of this calculation, the fact that Japanese SDF's announcement (640km) so obviously contradict US observation (35-42 seconds), and the delayed clarification by US (and finally indirectly released via Japanese SDF), is clearly showing US obliged to Japan's request.

---

Vick also correctly predicted TPD-2 ground trace (i.e. the shadow it would cast on the earth surface had there be a sun directly over) based on the launch angle (itself very hard to measure due to the short time span after took off). It is no where near Pearl Harbor which Japan alleged. Vick actually believed it is more likely it is a real satellite launch (which makes sense for NK, since it is the same technology anyway, but satellite launch has more peaceful element, as Japan tried it since about 20 years ago). If it would land, Vick said it could be " in the south Pacific relative to South America", as illustrated by the orange lines below, which is far from any path to reach any continental. Perhaps conincidentally, the ground tace passes through Tsugaru Strait, minimizing the possibility of falling onto any land mass, and avoid the Japanese main island Honshu, had the rocket failed in the middle of its trajectory.

Categories:

• korea
• science
• pol
• geo

The key to changing North Korea

Thomas Friedman compared Lybia, Iran and North Korea (cached if the link dies), quoting Robert Litwak, the director of international security studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Brilliant analysis. He provided the key to that "axis-of-something" problems.

• How so? Go back to the impressive deal that the Bush team did pull off in 2003 to get Libya’s leader, Muammar el-Qaddafi, to give up his crude nuclear weapons program. How did that happen?
• “What actually brought Qaddafi around was a tacit but clear U.S. security assurance that if he did give up his nuclear program the U.S. would not seek to oust him from power,” said Mr. Litwak. “That is what made the difference. ... If Libya gave up its unconventional weapons, the U.S. would give up its efforts at regime change.”
• What has been missing from the Bush approach to Iran and North Korea is that kind of clear choice. If the North Koreans want direct talks with the U.S. and bilateral relations, who cares? Give it to them — provided it is in return for a verifiable limit on their nuclear program. If Iran’s ayatollahs want a tacit security assurance from the U.S. — in return for a verifiable curb on their ability to produce nukes — give it to them.
• Iran and North Korea will also collapse from within — but it takes time. And in that time they could build lots of nukes. So we need to end their programs now, even if it means giving them tacit U.S. security guarantees, à la Libya.
• “This is not an endorsement of either regime,” added Mr. Litwak, author of the forthcoming “Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11.” “Rather, it is a pragmatic approach to deal with the fact that the nuclear weapons development timeline is not in sync with the time it takes for regime change to unfold.”
• Five decades of America’s isolating Cuba has produced five decades of Fidel Castro. As long as we maintain our ambiguity vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea — regime change or change in behavior — they will maintain their ambiguity about their nuclear programs. I have no idea if they would give up their weapons now, even if the Bush team gave them security guarantees. It may be that things are too far gone. But we need to test.
• If we do not test that proposition, we will never know if there is a peaceful solution to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear challenges — and we will never have allies for a tougher policy if there isn’t.

The only concern is, are there interest groups (e.g. defense industry) who would prefer a non-solution? Would the strong be willing to give up the ambiguity which provides it with more option (does it know that more option does not neccessarily lead to better strategy?) ?

Dr Barnett agrees in general but dissents on North Korea

• Where I part with Friedman is casually lumping North Korea in with Iran. Iran is a real country, the DPRK is not. Tehran sports a tired authoritarianism, amply susceptible to death-by-connectivity, while Pyongyang is true totalitarianism, not given to such taming techniques.
• Am I being realistic here? Two good examples: Iran appproached us back in 2001 on helping us with the Taliban takedown. China's military has very quietly approached the Pentagon on cooperating when Pyongyang falls (which means we're in the same zip code on discussing a more pro-active approach).

IMHO the argument for DPRK may deserve more debate, but i found the China-1978 analogy quite useful. Even for a totalitarian regime, it is not impossible to change. China in 1978 under Mao was not much different from NK today.

But before going into the analogy I would like to address Dr Barnett's concerns above.

1. "Pyongyang might not give in to the taming techniques" -- but as Friedman said, "We need to test"
2. "North Korea has a battered population that is literally shrinking from malnutrition (so a moral argument for regime change that's just not there with Iran)." -- But China 1978 was worse (see below)
   
3. "[KJI He has no desire to be Lee Kuan Yew..." -- Kim Jong-il approached Albright/Clinton is the past; had been asking to direct conversation with US all the time (though this continues to confuse the world, is it easier to blackmail on a one-one basis, i.e. without witnesses?); KJI also made multiple attempts on economic reform, first setting up a special economic zone in Sinujiu and then touring

However, Dr Barnett is right that the China-1978 analogy difference ends there.

• Mao had to die for Deng to arise. KJI is still very healthy and 'young'
• China also had a battered population suffering from malnutrition, plus a less educated population sitting on the ruins of the infamous Cultural Revolution.
• For PRC, the threat of admitting to failure vs Taiwan/HK is smaller since the sizes are incomparable, as Dr Barnett correctly pointed out, "[KJI] has no desire to be Lee Kuan Yew because once he stakes his regime legitimacy on economic development, the dangerous comparisons to the South ensue."

Can these differences be overcome?

• China and Vietnam both provided examples of success. So reformers in NK are at a much more favorable position (it is not venturing into the wild). With vast example of precedence and lessons, it does not take a genius like Deng to do a decent job in reformation
• Would KJI risk admit to a failure compared with SK? He toured China's Shenzhen last year, and had made some half-hearted attempt in setting up Sinujiu as a special economic zone in 2003. It is definitely possible that he is ready to face that challenge. What he needs is, re-assurance from SK and US, that they would not seek to topple him when his regime is the most vulnerable. Let me bring back the China-1978(79) analogy here. Even Deng Xiaoping the visionary needed to visit US and obtain assurance before he charged ahead with his reform
  

So the key to DPRK, (a softkill is always less costly than a hardkill if at all possible, per Sun Zi's "win without fighting"), lies with a concerted effort from US, China and S Korea. Russia's influence on NK has diminished. Japan's presence in 6-party talk only proved to be feet dragging.

1. SK (and US) needs to re-assure NK that SK is not going to threaten its 'legitimacy' or engage in subvertive activities, and profit from its vulnerability. So that NK will feel safe to take the China/Vietnam road of reform. Again, "this is not an endorsement to the DPRK regime" (as in Litwak's words), it is just a pragmatic lesser evil approach for solving a problem
2. China needs to be able to subdue Kim and force for reform (it is to China's own interests if NK takes the Vietnam path). NK is not really listening to China all these times. China needs to threaten NK with reducing aids (stick). Then promise to help by sending in advisers and investors (carrot)
3. Most importantly, US needs to have the courage to give up its regime change agenda. US also needs to persuade Japan that even though NK could provide it with a bogeyman for re-arm, the danger of a rogue nuke state at the neighborhood far exceeds any benefit of re-arming, or a few disappearing hostages. Finally, US also needs to assure China that China does not need the Korea card to be treated fairly (Fortunately this is already happening, US policy has already adapted to what Zoellick and Barnett advocated)
   

This requires a full strategy and coordinated effort from US, China and SK. Without the whole package, either SK, China, or DPRK will not buy this solution.

Finally, will more economic clout lead to a more dangerous NK?

• Following Dr Barnett's thought on PNM, when people are rich they have more to lose, they will be less erratic, and tend to integrate with the core
• Imagine we give KJI 10x the cash he has today, all he has is still WWII technology, and only marginally different from what he has today. So NK is not going to present a larger threat to the world

Nostalgic pictures DPRK

1) An older travelogue by Russian here -- more splendid photos, great explanation in English, with references and comparisons to pre-1990 Russia -- Must See.

• "At the end of the story I would like to say some things. The northern Koreans by their mentality are uncomparably closer to Russians, than Europeans (I'm not even talking about Americans!). Even the Czechs are more far from us.
  It's difficult to make examples (and they're not for public notes). But you must believe me: after a couple of days, when you stop pay attention to external and language differences, sometimes you get a strong feeling, that you talk to Russians.
  The same moments as: "it's impossible, but if very much desirable, then it's possible". The understanding of some ambiguous moments without the words. Very similar "everyday problems" (of course, I compare not with the "new Russians"). The same principles of high education."
  

... and Korea Map on plant!

2) (via The Marmot's Hole)

Put 1970s China in a time capsule, you get this magnificient Russia travelogue in North Korea today (full 7 pages of pictures).

Approximated translation with babelfish translator.

Rural Korea


SOE store shelf


The infamous casino built by HK tycoon Yeung Shao-Shing near Siniujiu


Click the link to see the rest.

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More
3) More Mass Game videos
Children section (note music from Small World and Chinese Songs in beginning)

Defense section


4) "Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il" March MTV


5) NK exporting labor to Russia now. These are tough low pay jobs, but better than at home.
6) Propaganda videos from Tadspot.
7) What about the DPRK that the government does not want you to see? here is a video of the NK street orphan, sad, but not unlike the underclass in other countries. Pay attention to the surrounding environment, that is real NK.

Categories:

• korea
• cul

Update: Taepodong-2's range, I was right and Vick was right.

I was right that TPD-2 did not go very far away from the launch site. GS's Vick agreed with more in depth analysis. An anonymous commentator confirmed by providing a set of typical rocket trajectory figures.

Now the main stream media followed, after pentagon confirmed with our analysis.

• The United States has told Japan that a long-range missile test-fired by North Korea this month exploded in mid-air just 1.5 kilometres from its launch site, much closer than previously estimated, news reports said today.
• Reuter: Sources quoted by Kyodo news agency said the missile exploded in mid-air within 1.5 km of the launch site, either in a northeastern region of North Korea or in its territorial waters on the edge of the Sea of Japan
• Japan Times: The United States has told Japan that the Taepodong-2 missile fired July 5 by North Korea exploded in midair within 1.5 km of the launchpad, not 400 to 600 km away as the Japanese government had initially estimated
• Yomiuri: The Japanese government initially reported that the missile fell into the Sea of Japan about 640 kilometers from the launch site. But the government will revise the report after officially announcing the analysis results in early August

The point here is not that I am better than Japanese intelligence. This is, after all, simple high school physics and maths, although more accurate estimate (1.5km range) requires some data on sophomore rocket science widely available publicly.

The question is, why did the information released by US (and indirectly, Japan) came more than 3 weeks late? I do have a hypothesis: it has to do with certain political agenda. 1) The matter needs to be misled before the UN resolution. 2) See another previous post for more hints. The outright lie and exaggeration (by more than 400 times) needed to stay for a while to save face and generate the impacts. It is very likely that someone (/country) probably delayed the release of the truth on purpose.

Categories:

• korea
• japan
• science
• pol

Joke of the day: paradise

A North Korean refugee has settled in Europe.

He visits a Museum with a few friends and see this picture.

The English said, "They are English. Look at the guy, how gentlemanly he is! He lets the lady eat the apple first."

The French said, "They are French. We are romantic people, we are proud to be nude and we are not afraid to eat forbidden apples."

The North Korean said, "You are all wrong. They are my compatriots. I am speaking on my own experiences. We have nothing to wear, nothing to eat, if we take an apple from the tree we will be punished. But we are all convinced that we live in paradise!"

Categories:

• ent
• korea

Guo Jia (iii) - Three-way statecraft around the Sea of Japan (aks East Sea)

Guo Jia's theory basically tells us if there is some fissure within two parties, applying external pressure will bind them together tighter. OTOH, leaving them alone the fissure will surface sooner or later.

David@jujuflop commented (in Guo Jia (ii))when this theory was applied to the Taiwan political situation today, that the parties at odd could also be PFP and KMT. Yes and no. There is certainly fissure between these 2 parties and the relationship is related to external pressure, as already reflected in the elections of 2000 and 2004. In 2000 there was no external pressure and they were defeated by DPP despite gathering almost 60% of the popular votes. In 2004 external pressure bound them together and they ran up very close to DPP.

However, Guo Jia's point is about strategic choice, that one has a genuine choice of doing something, usually counter-intuitive, to change the alliance status of others. The results can only be credibly attributed to the influence of such strategic choice if the fissure is a hidden one, because once the fissure has already surfaced it is just a matter of time rather than the result of your action/inaction. The Taiwan Civil Society letter quote in "Guo Jia (ii)" is to some extent triggered by Bian's irresponsible (and lame) self-defense in front of the TV (and more so by DPP's complacency toward corruption), which was in turn forced by pan-Blue's recall motion. In addition, the fissure had been well underground. So I do not see the analogy could be applied to PFP/KMT spat, which is already quite open, yet.

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Meanwhile, 3000 kilometers to the northeast of the beautiful island, Guo Jia (iii) is being played out.

• North and South Korea are at odd. S Korea were furious at NK's missile testing. But Japan's overhyping had left S Korea with no choice but prioritized its perceived threats. If Japan genuinely wants peace around the Sea of Japan, the best approach is, as many have pointed out, to totally ignore the attention-seeking baby Kim Jong-il. If it really feels threatened, develop TMD quietly with the US
  
• However, this may not be Japan's objective (for once, People's Daily is right!). Japanese strategists are the also experts in Sun Zi and ROTK (esp Cao Cao). They are well aware of these case studies. Their true objective is more likely, as I noted before, "Pyongyang and Tokyo find themselves unlikely partners in fueling this vicious circle, each to fulfill its own military ambition."
• In fact, one can also apply Guo Jia's theory to the 3-way satecraft between China, DPRK and Japan. China has been extremely annoyed by DPRK's openly ignoring its advice, and is probably planning on punitive measure of its own. Now Japan's continued belligerence may well push China back to its complacency with NK. This is not what the US would like to see. American diplomats need to judge the situation and make their decision very carefully, for their own interests.
  

Categories:

• korea
• japan
• china