Showing posts with label business. Show all posts
Showing posts with label business. Show all posts

Saturday, October 16, 2010

香港的集體失焦: 刻舟求劍 (之二) 發水樓陰招 房價繼續漲

Update: See also: C觀點 - 施永青 限制「發水」沒對症下藥

要簡化一個複雜的問題,需要找出一些容易量度的變量。

在香港房價的問題上,無論怎麼分析,供求還是最基本(fundamental)的變量。就是要看,整個市場裡一共有多少錢在追逐多少房子

政府最新公佈的政策,基本上還是與地產商狼狽為奸。而所謂的“發水樓”措施,只會使得樓價=漲得越快。因為
  1. 新土地供應根本沒有增加。甚至長期空置的啟德機場還是空置,只拿出2000個單位來做樓換樓,而且還是最快2017年後才能完成的事。這等於是向地產商和炒家保證,其餘的地將繼續空置!土地供應不會增加!
  2. 置屋計劃(資助置業也是,要2014年開始供應也就算,一共也就5000個單位,每年可能1000個(還不一定)。這些土地也不一定是增加供應,因為可能是從原來要拍賣的地轉換而來,沒人知道。
  3. 置屋計劃,或任何政府資助/貸款的購房方案,都是增加投入市場的現金,令到市面有更多的金錢去追逐同樣數量的房子。總的結果,就是進一步推高樓價。
  4. 要打擊欺騙消費者的發水建築面積,莫過於規定必須公佈實用面積。即使不能立即立法,也可由於消委會制定規則,而且因為目前的實用面積定義包括外牆,外牆數字需要列出。。可是政府根本無有確定的時間表,也沒有要求二手樓必須提供類似的數字作為比較,使得買樓花的消費者根本不知道買的房子其實有多大。市場資訊的不對稱,使得買家永遠處於劣勢。
  5. 不過,最奸狡的一招,莫過於發水樓的限制。所謂的限制窗台大小和把大堂面積計入樓積比率,結果是總的可使用面積的供應減少了。也就是同樣數量的金錢,去追逐更少的面積。根本就是暗推樓價的招數(分析見下)。假如政府真的有誠意,應該是不要去限制如何建房子,而是去要求這些地方不能作為樓面去賣。
要解決樓市泡沫的方法只須兩招
  1. 增加供應,並明確列出今後幾年的土地供應量。可以有一定(如10%)的調整空間,也可以逐步增加以降低衝擊。
  2. 規定所有成交必須列出實用面積,地產經紀也必須透露二手樓的實用面積(包括不實用的外牆所佔面積),使其成為市場標準。建築面積可以並列以資比較,不過應該把不同種類的建築面積(比如窗台、會所、樓梯、牆壁、其他公用空間等)列出。只要不許把不該算的地方算入“面積”定義,所謂發水樓的微觀管理(micromanagement)根本莫須有。
明明是在壓縮市民居住的空間,居然有臉說要提供優質生活 。這一刻,真懷念老懵懂。他做的唯一一件好事就是八萬五,卻因此得罪了香港的既得利益者。

大家放心炒樓吧,曾蔭權和李+X罩住你。 不過假如世界經濟戳破泡沫,則請別像1998-2003年間般抱怨。

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附:發水樓假限制陰招分析。

這是昨天政府官員林鄭出示的發水樓實用與建築面積比較


現在“實用”面積還是785平方呎(應該已包括了室內的間隔牆),建築呎價賣8000元,該單位賣824萬。平均“實用”呎價高達10497元。若不算外牆,則是8240000/(785-132=653)=12618元,若出去窗台工作平台等,則“真正”實用呎價=8240000/(653-38=615)=13398元。
比較合理的算法,可以把 22+16+34=72平方呎三台的一半36平方呎算,估計實用呎價=824000/651=12657元


規管後的建築面積呢,可能不再是1030平方呎了,而是900或950(除外牆之外發水面積為233平方呎,估計減去100平方呎)。

仔細一點所,按文匯報報導
  • 為免「發水」項目令單位越見「縮水」,發展局決定收緊現行政策,包括降低停車場、露台、工作平台和會所的寬免比率,以及收緊窗台的可建面積,令窗台的「發 水」上限由以往平均15%降至10%;非結構預製外牆的寬免從300毫米減至150毫米、延伸窗台的深度從目前建築規格的500毫米減至100毫米。除了 強制性設施可獲得樓面寬免,當局決定撤銷郵件室、小型後勤服務室、尊貴式大堂的寬免。
窗台見1/3就是從34變成22。工作台則減80%就是剩下3平方呎!外牆及公共分攤相應減少,假設減30%好了。假設如下


絕對實用 露台 工作台 外牆 “實用面積” 窗台 公共 “建築面積”


















目前                   615            22            16          132                   785            34          211               1,030








76%









將來                   615            15              3            92                   725            23          148                   896








81%


由於追逐房子的金錢總額基本沒變(甚至由於置業計劃而增加了),買家間競爭(這就是這些年樓價一直漲的原因)的結果,你還是用824萬買這個單位(應該不會低於800萬,吧?),實用面積(按政府定義現在降到732平方呎,如工作台台等“半實用”地方不見了。分母基本不變,分子小了,平均“可用呎價”其實不降反升。

實用率是高了,81%。不過這是因為政府的所謂實用面積定義裡還有外牆所佔面積在內,實際遠低於此。呎價如何呢?假設房子賣800萬(讀者可以自己再做其他假設)


絕對實用 估計實用 “實用面積” “建築面積”
        8,240,000



平方呎                        615                        651                        785                     1,030
 呎價/元                   13,398                  12,657                  10,497                     8,000
        8,150,000



平方呎                        615                        635                        725                        896
 呎價/元                   13,252                  12,828                  11,235                     9,098

可見建築面積呎價肯定飆升,是不是有10%不得而知,不過這應該距離不遠。而“估計實用”面積呎價還是大同小異,幾乎沒變。 假如樓價是815萬的話,則‘估計實用’呎價已比之前增加,為12828元。這裡還有額外增加建築成本等因素

政府要是真的有誠意,就應該在禁止發水建築設計的同時,增加同樣比例的土地(樓面)供應,或在賣地時,增加樓積比率,增加總樓面供應量。否則,這一招其實就是在暗托樓價。

Friday, October 1, 2010

Clarifying Western Media Accounts of “China Rare Earth Metal Ban” - Lisa Reisman, Metalminer

(Update) One note: many local papers falsely claimed that "China mines all 17 types of rare earths", or even "China is the only country that mines all 17 types". This is WRONG. To start with, there are only 16 elements to be mined, the Promethium is radioactive and decays quickly (the most stable isotope of Promethium lose half of its atoms every 17.7 years). So, nobody, including China, mines Promethium.



Watch Lisa Reisman on the alleged RRE "ban".

In fact, even from the mother of all rumours, this NYT report, this was not really a ban,
  • Industry officials said that mainland China’s customs agency had notified companies that they were not allowed to ship to Japan any rare earth oxides, rare earth salts or pure rare earth metals, although the shipments are still allowed to go to Hong Kong, Singapore and other destinations. But no ban has been imposed on the export to Japan of semi-processed alloys that combine rare earths with other materials, the officials said. China has been trying to expand its alloy industry to create higher-paying jobs in mining areas, instead of exporting raw materials for initial processing.
So if anything, China was just trying to extract more value-added. Since semi-processed alloys were exported with no disruption even from the NYT source. The alleged "ban" was merely second-handed distortion of the original report. And Reisman was correct that it may well be a general slow down in anything send to Japan (till the end of September).

Having reviewed this, it makes one wonders, if not for the rare earths, what made Japan released the captain in such an abrupt change of stance? IMO, as I wrote in Chinese a couple days earlier, there are two plausible explanations. (1) that the local prosecutor did reached this decision on his own, based on the circumstantial evidence; (2) that what Kan perceived was the determination of the PRC government in even risking a lose-lose fight in this issue, as it directly challenged its legitimacy domestically.

失之交臂



我要收回之前一篇博文的结论,在此谨向我的读者致歉。

关于中海油二零零五年收购加州联合石油公司的商业决定和对价问题,我错了。

我当时不知道加州联合石油公司已在一九七七年八月全资收购了美国钼业公司。美国钼业拥有中国之外最大的稀土矿场之一,加州的山口矿。山口矿场的权益后来在2008年9月卖给了(私募基金投资的)钼企公司, 钼企公司的股价2010年7月IPO时是$14(上市筹了38000万美元,当时市值11亿),九月初$20,稀土禁运谣言传出以后,今天已达$28(公司市值超过23亿美元)。虽然,这谣言和对日出口控制,不排除是业界的炒作,特别是一间香港上市公司的主动“爆料”事情发生之后。

成功并购了加州联合石油的雪佛龙公司应该没有脱到鹿角,因为钼企公司的资产负债表上,列明购买矿产资产是花了2300万美元,总资产包括设备、土地和工厂(不知是否包括在内)共7000万,这应该是雪佛龙出售对价的上限(因为钼企公司后来也添置了1000多万的设备)。

假如当时中海油成功收购了加州联合石油,中国今天将控制了全世界百分之五十左右(中国36%,美国13%)的已知稀土存量。当时的估价可能没有人想到这一点。中海油当时是否有此考虑,美国保护主义者是否歪打正着,我们都不得而知。不过,中国对外投资的策略和方法,特别是如何绕过保护主义的壁垒,的确有重新考虑和调整的必要。

相关连接:
The rare earth element big squeeze - Salon
"Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain,"
"Rare Earth Materials in the Defense Supply Chain,"
China's Rare Earth Elements Industry: What Can the West Learn?"
Challenging China in Rare Earth Mining - NYT

Thursday, September 16, 2010

緣木求魚:再論回扣旅遊

續前文 (香港的集體失焦:背道而馳 與 刻舟求劍 (之一)

今天香港無線電視台新聞透視提供了很好的實驗數據,證明了強迫購物跟團費的零關聯。

該節目跟踪一個團,每人付了1800-2000不等的人民幣,結果還是一樣被強迫購物。還有一個旅客額外交了2500元的“年輕人低購物附加費”,另一個付了三百元的“非上海居民低消費力附加費”。結果來到香港還不是一視同仁,一個宰法。

人的本性是貪得無厭的。把問題推在 “零團費”上,使得遊客以為團費跟服務有關聯,其實等同旅遊黑店的同謀。結果是遊客付了高額團費,受到的還是零團費的服務,還是被迫在指定的店花一整天購物。

因為,強迫購物的問題,不是團費多少,而是商戶與旅行社還有導遊的回扣問題。 必須取締,或至少限制回扣百分比的上限,才能杜絕強迫購物的問題。政府立法慢,TIC旅遊業協會樹準則,給標籤總可以吧?

標籤不該跟團費有關。簡單一點,所有團都有標籤,就是(1)零回扣,(2)低回扣(<5%),(3)高回扣(>5%)。然後看那第三類的怎麼做生意。然後,必須發給每個旅客一份協會說明,列出什麼是允許的,什麼是不允許的,被強迫購物該打那個電話,還有旅客錄音錄像的權利。

拜託各媒體,以後不要再說什麼“零團費”,“低團費”了。這樣只會誤導遊客消費者,你們也不知不覺中變成了黑店的同謀。 要叫,就叫“強迫購物團”,或“購物回扣團”

那10%市佔率辦“ 優質旅遊”的旅行社,也請你們改一改稱呼。叫“零回扣團”,這樣你們才能在市場銷售上DIFFERENTIATE。必須要有一個可以客觀描述不是模棱兩可的指標,才可以把你們從那些害群之馬區別開來。否則,你收4000元一位,人家收3800元照樣強迫購物!

Sunday, August 8, 2010

香港的集體失焦:背道而馳 與 刻舟求劍 (之一)

一)背道而馳

惡珍事件

主流意見如闾丘露薇的"恶阿珍怎麽来"無非是說

  • 零团费以及负团费是引发问题的根源
  • 还是依靠行业管理,提升经营模式,而不是停留在这种低层次的销售阶段
更有接受惡珍那似是而非的辯解("一个巴掌拍不响,阿珍之所以变凶妇,用她的话来说,那些游客不但购物不多,还对她语言尖锐,最终使她失控"),或是惡珍老闆(竊以為其責任肯定比惡珍大)的“你應該知道沒有免費午餐”論,好像貪小便宜的遊客們才是問題的根源。

結論自然就是好像大家不自律這問題就解決不了似的。

可是,為什麼會有零團費?這根本原因在哪裡?一直都沒有人點出真正的原因。因此一切的討論都在緣木求魚。得出的結論也自然都是背道而馳了。

零團費的根源,是不合比例的回扣率。這些惡珍們的回扣率為什麼到目前都沒有媒體去調查報導呢?有以前當過導遊的人告訴我,不少店給的回扣往往高於銷售額的50%!為什麼工程入標拿回扣就是貪污,遊客購物拿回扣就不是呢?同樣是因為拿了回扣所以才使手段讓遊客(工程招標者)買了貴價貨啊。世上大部分公司的採購員拿了回扣都要坐牢的,在香港也如此,廉政公署之責任也。

解決惡珍問題,沒錯是要取締零團費或超低團費,也就是回扣補貼團費的問題。而要解決零團費問題,唯一的方法就是處理“不合理”回扣的問題。

建議方法
1)立法禁止導遊收取回扣,或限制回扣上限(比如5%),甚至可以考慮由遊客按購買額來付購物導遊小費。
2)若不完全取締回扣,必須(在報團時)向遊客公開購物回扣率
3)旅遊發展局可以像發“優質服務章”一樣,發“不付回扣章”給正當經營的商戶。

只有這樣,才能確保導遊的利益不是站在顧客的對立面。以後旅行社的宣傳標榜的將會是“不收商戶回扣”或“回扣率 < 5%”。只有這樣,才能保得香港旅遊業的聲譽。只有這樣,導遊才能回歸為一項正當職業。

Saturday, July 31, 2010

Li Lu's Value Investment lecture at Columbia

Streetcapitalist has a few posts which showed Li Lu's approach to investment.

If you have gone through the transcript, and understand how well Li Lu has grasped Buffett's approach, it would not surprise you that he emerged as one of the top candidates as Buffett's protege.

No, it is not about China play. China does provide Li Lu an opportunity to showcase Buffett with he BYD case study. But it is what he said in the lecture that Buffett liked.

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Now, regarding BYD, perhaps people are more interested in whether it is a BUY now.

Here is the Question raised to Li in the lecture

  • So when Buffett looked at the stock maybe it was a better deal but today it is this dream of vehicles that is really priced in. It does not feel like a good value investor stock. So why would you own it today?
Li sort of dodged the question. But I can try to answer for him. One of the key Buffett principles he mentioned was "You need a margin of safety so if you are wrong you don’t lose much." When Li and Buffet got into BYD, there were significant margin of safety (translation: price was cheap). Now that price has been 8-10x, the margin is clearly much smaller. But is there still a conformtable margin? That will be your own judgment. However, if you look at Buffet's past investment, or that of MSFT (about 250x since IPO), 10x is not that big a multiple for a "margin of safety".

Sunday, July 18, 2010

“为了中国的未来”,必须扼杀一切未来的唐骏于襁褓中

本来关于唐骏的事情我没什么好说的。大概四五年前第一次听说这人就觉得他的加州理工博士有问题(后记:还出了不少丑)。因为我也直接和间接认识不少同期在加州理工的研究生。那种漏洞百出的履历,行内的人一看就知道了,只有对国外不了解的盛大和新华都才会被忽悠(微软开始只要一个不需博士学位的程序员)。加州理工只有约800-1000本科生,2000研究生。唐骏造假选错了学校。因为加州理工里几乎谁都知道谁,这就是为什么早晚会有一位Albert向方舟子举报了。

之所以有标题里的话不说不快,是因为看了凤凰卫视一虎节目里有人责备方舟子打假 “扼杀了许多'未来的唐骏'们",更有的说是"扼杀了'中国未来的希望' "。

国内目前最常听到的辩论是道德与功利的辩论。改革开放30年的纯功利资本主义挂帅使得功利派得到了不少的支持,不管白猫黑猫。可惜这些功利主义的支持者的本身思维并不清晰。个人认为,功利主义没什么错的,道德也不是绝对的。其实功利和道德(或比较确切的说,是诚信)不一定是对立的。恰恰是为了"功利主义"的原因,非扼杀所有未来的“唐骏”不可。

唐骏的丑闻不是一个道德问题。假如不扼杀“未来的唐骏”,中国的企业的平均竞争力将永远无法达到国际水平,中国的企业也永远无法走出国际市场。因为,假如我们的企业界因为有一个人歪打正着的在职场成功了(注:关于唐骏对他服务的公司是否有那么大的贡献暂还存疑,这里先假设他是有贡献的),而从此去让弄虚作假的人来获得不该获得的机会,那就意味着同时有一个更有资格(虽然不一定更有能力,可是我们在做这样一个决定的时候无从知道)的人因为唐骏的作假失去了这个机会。这一个不公平的环境,长期来说(也就是统计上的平均值来说),会使得能力较低的人获得领导的机会,而抹杀了能力更强(以为无需作假或不屑作假)的人成为领导的机会,因而降低中国企业管理人员的平均能力,也因此降低这个社会(或市场)的平均竞争力。

反对贪污和反对作假的原因和意义是一样的。因为贪污和作假都会剥夺更有竞争力的人或企业该有的机会。这对于这个社会的成本是极其高昂的。这不是一种理论,而是有统计数据支持的,比如一个国家的廉洁指数和人均GDP的相关性数据

大家可能听过关于进化论一个有名的黑蛾白蛾的故事。假如工业污染只是人类工业化过程一个短暂的过渡期,在这过渡期之前和之后由于空气没有煤灰所以都是白蛾更有竞争力。那为什么我们国家非要培养只靠煤灰掩护来逃过鸟类猎食的黑蛾呢?

诚信和功利在这个命题里的要求是一致的。鼓励诚信是为了制造一个公平的人才竞争环境。假如认为文凭不重要(需要指出的是,高盛和麦肯锡可都是只聘名牌毕业生,文凭崇拜不是中国特色的东东),可以去更改企业聘任的标准,而不是去做假。作为一个猫论的忠诚支持者,窃以为,“为了中国的未来”,必须扼杀一切“未来的唐骏”于襁褓中。

Monday, July 5, 2010

Red Army "Beat It" as an example of how RIAA is destroying its revenue opportunities



This video is a "hybrid" MTV with MJ's original sountrack on an edited video of PLA Orchestra performing something else (most likely the Long March Suite) in the People's Great Hall in Beijing.

Unfortunately, the audio is disabled on youtube due to "copyright issue". They basically used software to screen all audios uploaded on youtube and disable any music that they think belongs to their copyright.
There are many problems with this. This example shows how an opportunity to promote the music (hence creating more publicity and hype, and that in turn converts into Sales) is denied by this process. Apparently some artists such as Lady Gaga knows a lot better than the RIAA executives. Lady Gaga spent a great deal in creating her Music Videos on songs over a year old to renew hype, meanwhile allowing almost all user-generated videos (e.g. on youtube) to use her musics.

(another example I encountered a while ago is that some obscure company seems to be claiming copyrights of many unclaimed non-English ("foreiegn") music, which I doubt they really own)

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More are listed in Tudou.

Friday, July 10, 2009

Most American airlines break guitars



Story here.

He is probably right that United has designed a system to discourage claim, but also likely to be a result of an incompetent process system. More likely, both of the above.

Would this hurt United? In the short term, yes. But in reality, we know that all US-based airlines are the same. I had my lugguage broken and compensation/repair refused by American Airline a few times, flying F class as an Executive Platinum member.

Asian and European Airlines tend to deal with these situations a lot better. SQ was the best in my experience. This is a direct effect of American protectionism. Not just the lugguage handling, but general indifference and lack of accountability as happened when he first complained to the crew member.

This musician may trigger some short term response from the industry, but there is likely to be no long term impact for domestic US routes, because that is the industry norm -- unless foreign competition is allowed into this space.

p.s. some follow up and comments here.

Saturday, March 21, 2009

再谈汇源案

续前文,有关商务部对汇源案的裁决的评论

“商务部依据《反垄断法》的相关规定,从市场份额及市场控制力、市场集中度、集中对市场进入和技术进步的影响、集中对消费者和其他有关经营者的影响及品牌对果汁饮料市场竞争产生的影响等几个方面对此项集中进行了审查。审查工作严格遵循相关法律法规的规定。审查过程中,充分听取了有关方面的意见。
商务部认定:此项集中将对竞争产生不利影响。集中完成后可口可乐公司可能利用其在碳酸软饮料市场的支配地位,搭售、捆绑销售果汁饮料,或者设定其他排他性的交易条件,集中限制果汁饮料市场竞争,导致消费者被迫接受更高价格、更少种类的产品;同时,由于既有品牌对市场进入的限制作用,潜在竞争难以消除该等限制竞争效果;此外,集中还挤压了国内中小型果汁企业生存空间,给中国果汁饮料市场竞争格局造成不良影响。 ”

1)关于“市场份额及市场控制力、市场集中度,进入壁垒”
b)最新数据是汇源在“百分百果汁”的市场占有率已降到32.6%。而汇源的中国软饮市场总占有率则从10.3%降到了8.5%
(另有资料显示:可乐+汇源的所有果汁类市场占有率为20%,总软饮市场则为12%--应该是市场定义的分歧。不过都支持下述结论。)
这证明了两点。一是场份额转变之快和进入壁垒之低,二是汇源市场价值相对于去年9月已有显著的下降。

2)关于"集中完成后可口可乐公司可能利用其在碳酸软饮料市场的支配地位,搭售、捆绑销售果汁饮料,或者设定其他排他性的交易条件,集中限制果汁饮料市场竞争,导致消费者被迫接受更高价格、更少种类的产品"
a)  茶饮料领域。。。统一、康师傅仍然占据龙头地位,连同麒麟、三得利、雀巢等品牌,控制了国内茶饮料市场的很大份额
b) 瓶装饮用水市场。。。娃哈哈居首、农夫山泉、怡宝分别位居第二、第三,乐百氏第四
事实是,各种软饮在国内市场由不同公司主导,显示的所谓捆绑销售并没有商务部或一些天真的MBA们认为的那么简单。当然,不同饮料在销售渠道、品牌宣传等都有一定的规模(和synergy),可是要谈到捆绑和垄断,趋势另一回事

3)有关“垄断”
a)可乐在美国市场(所有软饮)的市场占有率为44%,百事31%,cadbury schweppe(玉泉)15% (2002年数据,美国市场变化不大)。在美国这可算“垄断”或“寡头”。中国的市场占有率分别为达能 16.3%,可乐15.5%,可乐+汇源可能有23-24%左右。与美国(或其他市场)相比,并不算集中。
b)然而,在美国这么高度集中的市场,新的进入者仍然不断制造了成功的神话。POM Wonderful 在 2002-2008的6年间,作为一家独立的公司开辟了石榴汁的市场,销售达到1.65亿美元。EnergyBrand(itaminwater)则在8年间(1998年开始vitaminwater)达到3.5亿美元销售。
c) 中国市场无论是从结构上(销售渠道、品牌认同)等都比美国分散(fragmented),因此进入壁垒只可能比美国低。

4)国内同业的反对
我是国内的同业竞争者的话,我也当然会反对这项并购。毕竟可乐是主要的竞争者。可是,商务部诸公应该知道所有潜在竞争者都是会反对这些并购行为的,因为竞争会趋于激烈。假如可乐并购汇源是(如一些网评所说)为了消灭这一品牌(如天府可乐)那竞争对手们应该是乐观其成才对。

5) 保护主义(?)
汇源是“民主企业”吗?
汇源股东包括(1)朱+管理层42%,(2)法资达能(danone) 23%,(3)美资华平基金(warburg pincus)7%,(4)其他香港市场股东(包括外资基金)35%

市场资料来源:

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p.s. 如前文(及众多网友)疑,可乐可能“做了商务部工作”。最可圈可点的是商务部猪公之一姚坚似乎露了馅“可口可乐继续并购的意愿还是有的”,什么叫“还是有的”?就是“只有一点”吧?
明明知道可乐的意愿已经不大,还要去否决,不是摆明在帮可乐吗?看来商务部诸公其实不笨,只是比较容易被做工作而已。

  • 汇源集团内部人士给《中国经营报》记者发来短信:“我上次不是给你说过:结果会以商务部按《反垄断法》不批。”他坚定地指称,“这是可口可乐操作的结果。可口可乐一早就不打算买了,汇源早就做好了准备。”
  • 在上海的会面上,朱新礼捺着性子追问可口可乐公司总裁及首席执行官穆泰康,可口可乐大举投资,是否意味着在并购问题上产生了动摇?而穆泰康则回应,希望汇源能够同意降低收购价格。记者未能了解当时情况,或许是因为可口可乐方面压价太多,朱新礼并未让步。
  • “(并购案被否)是可口可乐操作的结果。一颗红心、两手准备,(并购案被否)我们早都有准备的。”汇源集团内部人士直言不讳。“可口可乐早已不打算买了,可口可乐董事会反对的声音越来越多,这是事实。商务部裁决中说‘商务部与可口可乐公司就附加限制性条件进行了商谈,要求申报方提出可行的解决方案’,那只是程序问题,可口可乐有意提出更为严苛的方案以让审批无法获批。”
  • 商务部新闻发言人姚坚则强调,“据我所知,可口可乐继续并购的意愿还是有的,不存在可口可乐公关商务部的情况。”
  • 汇源集团内部人士指称:商务部禁止收购的理由,经不起考问。关于集中之后对市场进入的限制问题。目前果汁行业不存在进入限制,果汁行业的准入门槛很低,只要企业有资金、设备,就可以做。目前国内果汁消费量人均不足1公斤,与欧美发达国家年人均50-70公斤的消费量相差很远,市场空间非常大。另外,可口可乐与汇源远达不到行业垄断,汇源的强项是高浓度果汁与中浓度果汁,这两者总和远不及低浓度果汁的销量。
  • “以《反垄断法》为依据,没有理由否决这起并购案,担心什么呢?”一直以来,商务部研究院外资研究部主任马宇研究员通过写博文的方式支持并购,为此还遭受了网民的攻击与漫骂。“并购案为什么被否决?因为品牌问题?反垄断审查只涉及竞争,不涉及品牌。担心可能造成垄断?果汁是一个完全竞争的行业,果汁不是那种不可替代的生活必需品,消费者拥有自主的选择权,即使可口可乐并购汇源之后在果汁领域也不构成事实上的垄断。”

Wednesday, March 18, 2009

中国商务部的一班白痴

商务部就可口可乐公司收购中国汇源公司案反垄断审查做出裁决。

我基本上同意量子博客在“出乎意料的判決”文的观点。

商务部的裁决完全没有理由,而且不符合国家利益。因为
  1. 软饮的进入壁垒很低,汇源管理层卖了盘后过了“不竞争期后”要重新建立一个新品牌并不难。
  2. 垄断只在市场集中度高的产品有作用。国内外的软饮市场集中(垄断)度并不高。国内已有品牌包括娃哈哈、康师傅和旺旺等都有足够能力可以与之抗衡。在美国,包装果汁的市场领导者是tropicana(占橙汁市场60-65%),属于百事集团,不是可口可乐集团。
  3. 捆绑销售在果汁和碳酸饮料之间作用比不明显。基本上没有人知道tropicana和pepsi间的关系。比如说,美国的麦当劳卖可口可乐(不卖百事,因为以前麦当劳的对手是burger king属于百事集团),可是麦当劳的果汁是tropicana,而不是可乐集团的minute maid。
  4. 可口可乐拥有minute maid品牌,真的要进入中国果汁市场也不一定需要汇源。
商务部的裁决其实正中可乐公司下怀,因为这交易是金融海啸前达成。也就是说可乐花了比目前市场价格高2倍多的代价,正愁着没有借口把交易取消。现在商务部帮了外国公司省钱,损害了汇源股东了利益,还落了人家口实。(外间甚至有人认为可乐公司对商务部进行了游说!至少可乐公司应该是故意不去解决商务部提出的问题的 - 商务部否决并购的其中一个理由是可乐公司没有对其关于垄断问题给出令人满意的解决方法,假如我本来就对这项交易后悔了,为什么还要去尽心回答你的问题?)

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可乐公司并购价格:US$2.4bn=HK$18.6bn
汇源市值:HK$12.2bn (股价 HK$8.3)
商务部宣布后汇源股价掉了23%停牌 (昨天股价HK$10.3
-- 估计还会再下。交易宣布前(2008年9月)股价为HK$4. 市值约HK$6bn !我们可以用国内其他饮料公司去年9月和今天的股价做benchmark。例如,青岛啤酒(0168.hk) 掉了15% (从 HK$17.8 到 HK$15)汇源股价(假如没有可乐的交易)大概会在HK$4和3.4  之间。

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related:

2) 狗拿耗子 : "商務部有一位研究員出來講話,說這次審批是從法規操作層面的角度來考慮。真的有這麽白癡嗎?彙源的股東首先就不見了25億美元,這些可是中國人好不容易從美國人手上騙來的錢。那中國在海外的收購怎麽辦?現在是中國在海外大肆收購的最好時機,商務部那幫蠢才,把什麽都搞亂了"

Monday, February 23, 2009

ZT: 李泽楷绝技考

The HK media hasn't really been fair with Richard Li. Although I do not think he is a likeable person, he really does not deserve all the criticism he has attracted.

1) selling STAR to Murdoch - HK did not lose much, it is a satellite license which has no real cost and he made billion by selling to an Australian/American
2) Acquiring HKT - it was a very smart and responsible deal for the original PCCW shareholders (like what Steve Case did for the original AOL shareholders). Yes the original HKT shareholders suffered, but they had the choice to take cash when the deal was sealed
3) Privatisation of PCCW this year - as Cheung argued, $4.5 was a good price and well over the market value.

Yes, his wealth came from government favour such as the satellite license (how was it granted?) and the Cyber Port real estate project which became Bel Air, but more fault was with the AOs and Tung Cheehwa (or ICAC for that matter).

李泽楷绝技考

那天跟一位朋友进午餐,见他手上持着《壹周刊》,封面又是李泽楷,标题大字云:《$306万买起$280亿电盈》。心想:李察真的那么厉害吗?为什么曾荫权不委任他作财政司长了?禁不住问朋友取得该期《壹周》,回家后翻了几次,才知道三百六十万不是买起电讯盈科(简称电盈),而是以该数「种票」,成功地种成电盈私有化。后来才知道《壹周刊》可能计错数,或种票者生得蠢。原来支持私有化的股份足够之后(当日赞成的总市值逾五十亿元),成功「种票」的费用只需三千元。另一方面,要成功地「种票」而毁灭了李泽楷(简称李察)的私有化大计,不需要论股份多少,不怕麻烦三千元足够!后者是反种,不怕麻烦易过借火,奇怪没有人处理好反种票后去敲诈李察一笔。古怪法例会导致古怪现象,反种「敲诈」是否非法我赌法庭判不出来(一笑)!

电盈私有化的舆论真的热闹了。报道多,不易懂,李察虽被赌王誉为「叻仔」,但传媒皆仿效杜甫写李白:众人皆欲杀也。为了好奇我挂个电话给一位知情的朋友,问他可否解画一下。他说可以,谈了好一阵,跟着送来好些文件及资料,都是可以公开的。从这些资料及读到的传媒报道中,我提出了四个问题,浅的,得到的答案也浅。

我提出的四个问题如下:一、为什么要用而又可以用借钱派息的方法来收购外股作私有化?二、股份投票怎么会用人头算的?三、每股四元五毫的收购价是偏低了吗?四、李察为何要搞私有化?这四点应该是读者需要知道的,没有其它。整件事,牵涉到的公司或机构有好几家,股权与数字的分布变化多,说起来相当复杂,但基本上无关宏旨,引进容易产生混淆,这里一概不管。读者要知道的是李察的一家公司与另一家公司组合,以四元五毫一股作价,收购外间所有的电盈股份,实行电盈私有化。

第一题问:据我所知,派息一定要有钱赚才能派,可以借钱派,但没有钱赚不能派,李察的公司何来赚百多亿那么多钱了?找到的答案是:好些年前李察的公司重组,在会计上积累了一些可分配的储备,称distributive reserve,所以今天没有赚那么多钱还可以借钱派息。这样的处理是经过会计师及律师的工作,没有理由怀疑,何况证监会不可能不监察着。再问:派息收购,外间的股东也有息派吗?答案是没有,因为派息是处理为股票成交后的事。这是股市的一种正常运作。又再问:为什么李察不私人借钱而要用公司去借呢?这里的答案要猜测一下:私人不容易借那么多钱。结论于是明确:收购电盈的公司多了电盈的股票,但同时增加了负债,打个平手。大家知道,任何公司,只要负债够高,免费送出去也没有人要。

第二题,关于种票。我问:是香港哪项发神经的法例,使私有化的决定用人头算而不是用股份多少算的?答案是香港的公司法例说的:不是完全发神经,因为有四关要过。其一是与收购有关的持股人不能投票;其二是有权投票而又投了票的,以股份算,赞成票不能低于百分之七十五;其三是以有权投票的总股份算,投反对票的不能超过该总股份的百分之十;其四是以人头算,不管股份多少,不投不计,投反对票的要低于一半。

这解释了为什么容易有种票这回事。李察种票应该是刑事的,因为他属有关人士,在法庭做了誓章。无关的外间人士种票却不是犯法(在澳洲是合法的)。如果无关人士种票是非法或刑事,香港的法庭与监房会忙得不可开交也。

一手盈科一千股,分开下注一千手有一千个人头,拆细分头一手可以有一千个人头。进行电盈私有化决议时,一千个人头的总股价成本(不算手续费)只三千多元(每股约可赚一元)。困难是怎样去找一千个人头呢?你不易,我不易,李察也不易,但可以办到。关键是你和我到处找一千个人头,找不到那么多,有数十个也不错。李察呢?每找一个人头都需要该仁兄或仁姊收口,否则坐牢去也。收口可以敲诈,李察钱虽多,不会多得那么厉害吧。他的智商用不着达到「叻仔」那个层面才懂得是要听天由命的。

第三题,关于电盈股票所值。这里的答案必然是武断的。有三项资料读者可参考。其一是去年七月李察在国际上放盘招标,出售他公司持有的电盈股份,九月初收到的高标,算出来是每股在三元五毫五仙与三元八毫五仙之间,李察嫌少,不沽,害得盈科股价大跌。其二是去年十二月底出价四元二毫收购搞私有化,收到风声一些外间的基金大股东会反对。于是收回私有化决议,加三毫以四元五毫作价,二月初再推出,过了关。读者须知,基金的君子们一般精打细算,不是什么善男信女,他们接受四元五角,不可能是盲毛或仁慈之举。其三是以四元五毫算电盈的市盈率,超过二十倍。从有线电讯的前景看,这市盈率算是很高的。

这里我要加进自己的武断:综观目前的经济情况与前景,电盈四元五毫我不会问津。不是空口说白话。母亲当年储存了不少「香港电话」的股票,一箩一箩地放在床下底(西湾河曾经传为佳话)。虽然母亲授权我处理,我知道她只买不卖数十年,对「电话」有感情,不敢轻举妄动。但当我在报章读到香港政府会用钱收回当时电话的专利权,立刻替母亲沽清,一股不留。从来不教人买或卖什么股票,但昔日的「电话」经验使我在文章中提及:除非消息灵通,不要下注靠政府保护而有专利的股票。目前这类股票在中国不少,还算安全,因为政府本身是大股东。待得政府成为局外人,走得快必定好世界!

第四题:李察为什么要把电盈私有化呢?这一题,连武断的答案也没有,只能猜测。不离谱的猜测,是去年五月九日恒生公布决定把电盈剔出恒生指数的成分股,六月十日执行,跟着电盈的股票成交量萎缩,李察可能因而感到意兴阑珊。股票上市的额外经费不菲,舆论麻烦,如果集资的用场不大,私有化一般是正着。资料显示,电盈被剔出成分股后不久,李察于七月初在国际放盘招标。

上述可解李察目前的舆论之困乎?应该可以,因为虽然涉及的公司有好几家,文件、法例、数字等错综复杂,但拨开了这些,核心的问题与答案皆浅。李泽楷绝技考,我找不到绝技,也看不到有商业道德问题。话得说回来,李察这个人的确有招惹舆论的奇异功能,不知下一趟会是哪方面的题材了。个性若此,狗仔如斯,夫复何言哉?诚哥龙生两种,大可仰天一笑!


Thursday, December 4, 2008

Stephen Ng-sheung Cheung: On the current crisis in China《多难登临录》,三之一

Professor has another post discussing how the Chinese government should cope with the current economic problems. There aren't many innovative ideas compared with what has been said, he just went in to explain it with more explicit examples and illutrations.

In light of the need of further elaboration, I will try to paraphrase in my own words (which, I believe, are essentially consistent with what Professor Cheung advocates)
  • Government spending is okay, especially since it was stated they are for infrastructures that will have to be built sooner or later (now they all moved into the category of "sooner")
  • The key is "capacity utilization", as long as there is extra capacity and the new projects are needed in future, these projects should move ahead, because the incremental cost (for the whole economy in total) is less than what it seems -- as the idle capacity (labor, machine) are utilized
  • However, Cheung stressed that one must not forget private enterprises are the customers of these infrastructure, without private businesses the assumption of infrastructure needs become fallible. Therefore, the government needs to a) avoid competing for resources with private business, b) support the growth of private business even more strongly than before
  • (a) how to avoid taking resources away from private sector? remember the objective of these 4Tr RMB projects are to leverage cheap idle capacity, so one should not spend for the sake fo spending. Instead one should only spend when there is extra capacity. How could this be done? A price cap for these projects, which should be a bit lower than the historic price. This is to (1) allow private enterprise who could bid higher the resource they needed and not overbid the price away from the private sector, (2) minimize corruption in the process of these projects
  • (b) support private enterprise by simplifying tax/VAT structure, like what the government did for corporate profit tax (equalize policy for domestic enterprises and FIE, to all policies). i.e. reduce/waive tariff for raw material import instead of VAT rebate (so that the cost for domestic and export are the same). The objective is to enhance efficiency (meanwhile reduce the exposure to corruption) and make the environment more business friendly in general. This is what really contribute to "domestic demand"

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p.s. Cheung seems to be happy with people crossposting his writings. His objective to to get his ideas seen and heard, so I will not worry about copyright issues now :)

鼓励内供远胜鼓励内需——《多难登临录》,三之一

By 张五常作品 on 经济评论

万方多难此登临——杜工部说的。中国的文化传统,是有所感慨时总要「登临」一下。可不是吗?北宋王荆公写《桂枝香》,起笔是「登临送目,正故国晚秋」;清人孙髯翁为大观楼写联,其中有「骚人韵士,何妨选胜登临」之句。是悲是喜,登临远眺,一舒胸怀,让脑子清醒一下,是好文化。这传统历久不衰,反映着炎黄子孙的确有点能耐。

今天神州多难,也让我来「登临」一下吧。评论经济政策,无可避免地要表达自己的建议。这是头痛问题。人家不接受,无所谓,跟读者过瘾一下算了。人家接受,没有谁知道出自何方,建议得对,沾沾自喜。麻烦是人家接受,天下皆知出处,建议出错,害人无数,不知要躲到哪里才对。

这解释了为什么这些日子经济专栏那么难写。招牌挂了出去,偶一失手,金漆岂不是变为黑漆了?招牌事小,民生事大,尤其是神州大地还有无数穷人,看不到明天有什么希望的。任何政策建议不可能一起顾及各个阶层。只顾穷人,只顾增加他们自力更生的机会,可不是要做一个互联网上的侠盗罗宾汉,而是因为我熟知神州,把我掌握的所有经济理论放进去,结论是只要能改善穷人的前景,其它一切大致上可以不管。

世界经济大乱,花钱救市的言论五花八门,一般是凯恩斯学派(多年前由哈佛创立,与凯氏之见有别)的言论了。北京推出两年四万亿投资抢救,我不反对,认为不是该学派的发明:提早及加速政府预定的基建及其它项目,在目前的情况下是不应该反对的。然而,当我读到北京要鼓励「内需」的言论——四万亿也是鼓励内需——凯恩斯学派的味道明显。四万亿的推出看来没有错,但想法却是错了。

我要再说分析《四万亿》时提到的「第八点」,因为太重要了。经济学的第一课永远是说,如果一个国家要多产出武器,就要少产出面包;多种苹果,少种橙是代价。两年四万亿投资政府项目,私营工业不可能不付出代价。争用同样的资源,用同样的生产要素,此长彼落是无可避免的。这就是问题:不反对政府项目四万亿,但又认为私营的工业发展是中国的经济命脉,怎可以自圆其说呢?绝对是难题,为之我想了多天了。

想出来的解决办法与理由有四点。一、四万亿的推出可以接受,但只能限于提早及加速项目。二、鼓励私营工业的发展有鼓励内供之能,更重要,要大手推出,希望可以抵消部分鼓励内需的四万亿的竞争压力。三、中国目前有多项压制内供的法例或政策。要一起废除——这是要废除所有妨碍私营工业发展的法例,希望私营工业因而增加的产出效率,足以可观地弥补部分四万亿竞争带来的私营损失。

第四点。北京的朋友说过,中国是大国,人口多,可以单靠自己而发展。这看法大致上不错,但要从内供而不是从内需这方面看。今天内需之说盛行,是看错了问题的重心,不可取。是的,像四万亿那类投资,是鼓励内需,大国小国、人多人少没有分别,但鼓励内供人多势众有大着数。

记得八十年代回港工作后不久,一家国际大机构请我作座上客,听他们的一位研究员讲解他的研究所获。该研究员先说结论:一个国家愈小,对外贸易在国民收入的百分比愈高。我立刻回应:「如果整个地球只有一个国家,对外贸易一定是零!」该研究员不容易多说下去,草草收场。

北京的朋友今天认为,地球的金融灾难对中国的出口为害不小,中国要发展自己国内的可以是很庞大的市场。这想法没有错,但从鼓励内需的角度入手却是错了。要鼓励内供才对。

我说的内供,是鼓励私营的工业转向为供给国内的市场而产出。不是说对外贸易不重要,而是面对出口大减,向国内市场打主意绝对是正着。困难是北京的政策历来鼓励出口,不鼓励内销,是麻烦,也是蠢政策,面对目前的国际形势,这政策是更蠢了。

先说鼓励内供的好处吧。有三点。一、凡是鼓励私营内供就是鼓励私营工业,而内供有看头必然增加内需,用不着政府操心。二、鼓励内供,让私营者作决策,有市价的指引,出错的机会大减,而就是出错,私营的错失一般比政府的庞大项目小。三、鼓励内供是鼓励每个人主动地积极参与产出,是中国经改有成的要点,但从鼓励内需的角度出发,是由政府花钱鼓励,人民产出的性质是被动的——无可奈何地用作过渡协助可以,长此下去中国的改革前功尽废矣。

理由充分,目前要怎样鼓励内供才对呢?有八项,全部做足大有可为。三项容易做,两项难度中性,三项难度比较高,要多费思量了。

先谈容易的三项吧。一、立刻撤销所有原料进口税,就是由政府补贴一点原料进口,在目前的情况下我不会反对。过渡可以考虑。这里要补充的,是出口退税,就是不久前提升了,也退不足,何况手续麻烦,地方政府往往拖欠一年半载。一律撤销原料进口税清楚了当,是正着。二、撤销「来料加工」这项工业安排。当年为鼓励出口而设,有点说不通,而今天出口兵败如山倒,还搞这一套蠢到死也。与其让「来料加工」的倒闭失踪,倒不如让他们产出自由内销,为增加内供而卖力,增加就业,因而增加内需。厂房、机械,及更重要的生产知识,可以因为有内销之机而保存下来。目前的情况,是工厂转性质要先关门清数。三、任何人在中国投资设厂,或经营企业,只要正当合法,皆拍手欢迎,可以内外皆销,不需要再论国籍了。外资的优惠大可取缔,取而代之的是所有投资产出的人都受到同样的优惠。多年以来,说是优惠外资,其实内资门路多,较为着数。是内外不分、一视同仁的时候了。

转谈两项难度中性的。一、说过了,三十年代的大萧条,国际贸易暴跌是一个主要原因。今天是大手推广国际贸易的时候。我从来不反对中国单方面取消关税,但目前的情况,北京不妨拿出自己的本钱来要胁一下:选择某国取消中国货的进口税,中国就取消某国货的进口税。其它我不敢说,但北京处理这种外交历来了得。吴仪、薄熙来躲到哪里去了?

二、也是难度中性的。因为目今的工厂倒闭潮,懂得做厂的人材散失严重。做厂是难度非常高的一门专业。我见过不少无能的经济学家,见过无能的律师,也见过无能的医生──但从来没有见过一个做厂生存三几年而是不能干的人。假设一间工厂平均有三几个这样的人材,因倒闭而散失的可能近百万大军了。我认为北京要不论既往,不管是否欠债逃亡,要出些优惠鼓励这些专材再做厂。我恨不得那些口口声声说剥削工人的官员或政客或学者,去做厂表演一下剥削给我看。

谈了五项,还有三项难度比较高的,重要。篇幅所限,这里先谈其一。只能略谈,因为我懂得不多。这就是要大手地简化税制。鼓励内需,长远地看要加税。鼓励内供是倒过来,要减税。我认为在目前的情况下,鼓励内供,简化税制比减税更重要。曾经找中国的税务专家求教过,考虑到多方面,我想到单抽营业税,不累进,不同行业或可采用不同的营业税率,可能是适用于目前的中国的最简单税制。这是因为单抽营业税,工厂或企业容易算成本,左避右瞒的法门不多,税局比较容易运作,而没有所得税是对私营拼搏的大鼓励了。说过,我不是税务专家,只提出这有点新意的简单税制给北京的朋友考虑。不管怎样说,税制要简化。

还有两项难度比较高的。是什么呢?不用说,读者一猜就中。

Sunday, November 30, 2008

Price elasticity in HK Taxi industry

The issue of HK taxi pricing is one of the most interesting cases in microeconomic problems. It is one of those that would deserve a Cheung Ng-sheung style analysis like he did for the theatre pricing.

The HK government, more than 2 years after my proposal of tiering pricing, finally implemented the price rationalization. However, the timing is very bad, amidst the economic recession. Bureaucracy has made poorly timed policy inevitably in many goverments, HK is of no exception.

The new pricing involves a 7% rise in short distance (i.e.about 10km), which represents probably 65-70% of the incomes for taxi drivers. So the net effect is a 5% hike in average price.

Early reports claimed that total revenue decreased by about 20%, which I think is exxagerated (and partial data plus overshoot/overreact by passengers), more likely though it would be a 10% decrease, if I can extrapolate from the very limited data points in my previous post -- which is bad enough for the taxi drivers, epecially this incremental 10% are mostly net incomes as the fixed costs such as rent and time are constant.

In short, the pricing change, if implemented a year ago while the economic was robust, would have been welcomed. The new scheme, unsatisfactory as it is, is stil way more "rational" than the old one, although I would still prefer a more continuous change in price per km.


Tuesday, May 20, 2008

Managing the risk of earthquake

1) the PRC government is far from doing a good job in quake prevention, or in safety monitoring, or anti-corruption -- for the past 40 years
2) even if we have Lee Kuan Yew managing Sichuan for the past 40 years, this disaster cannot be avoided (but damage should certainly be reduced, though the amount is unclear)
3) the art of earthquake prediction is still in its infancy. Even the 'warning' of Densmore et al. (pdf of the original article here) only managed to highlight that Longmen Mountain is a high risk area.

What should the government do? issue warning? enforce evacuation?

The best solution is perhaps to rely on the market. Let the insurance (to be precise, re-insurance) companies take the risk. The governement may require the builders and owners to pay for insurance premium. The insurance companies will then choose to fund which team of scientist, for how much, and what to act upon receiving a warning. Before we find a reliable (i.e. repeatable) earthquake prediction methodology/algorithm, we will have to rely on fuzzy logic and statistics/probability. Re-insurance companies will compete with each other, and only the fittest (i.e. those which could avoid loss of lives/properties at less cost) will have the competitive advantage.

The insurance companies are perhaps the best (more appropriate) people (at this moment) to do this, as they have done for HMO -- which allows them to reimburse preventitative medicine so that they could minimize the total medical bill in the long run.

Friday, March 14, 2008

Stephen Cheung on the new "labour laws"

What he objects most is the "automatic iron bowl" when one works for over 10 years.

This is the 9th on his long series. You can read the other 8 at his blog. But this one illustrated more initial impacts with real data. For details see below. Here I would like to illustrate the 2 key principles of the "market" in his last paragraph, with the eBay business model (or internet in general)

"这里我不能不重提我对市场研究得到的两点贡献,否决了传 统之见的。一、市场的存在是为了减低交易费用,没有交易费用不会有市场,而市场的合约自由选择是减低交易费用的重点。二、严格而又广泛地看,一个经济只有 一个市场,没有什么劳动市场与产品市场之分。后二者的分别只是合约的性质不同——在同一市场内合约的安排有别。新劳动合同法是全面地干预市场的一种重要合 约,牵一发而动全身,整个市场会受到严重的损害。"

1) The purpose of a 'market' is that it will lower transaction cost. Without transaction cost there will not be a market. The free choice of contracts in a market is the key to lower transaction cost.

2) To be more rigorous, there is only one market for one economy. There is no so-called difference between 'product market' and 'labour market'. the difference between them is just the difference in the nature of contract, i.e. the different arrangement in the very SAME market. the new 'labout law' intervenes a very important contract in the market, and this will hurt the function of this whole market.

Take ebay as an example. it lowers transaction cost (it will cost 1000s of dollar to find the right buyer for your Priesley Candy collectibles, ebays lowers that into just a 'ebay commission' plus some credit card and shipping costs. But there is still cost (commision) otherwise there won't be ebay, and the market won't exist. ebay performs an economic function (like a head hunter or a real estate agent), it gets rewarded for the market price of this activity.
Because we have free choice, we will choose the agent/buyer/seller which offers the highest value in return for what we sell (be it the collectible or the job as a match-maker). Because we have the choice of going to craiglist, trandition newspaer classified and ebay, the total cost in our society is lowered (i.e. people can spare the time effort for something more contructive and produce more (other stuff) for our society. Also, since ebay allows us more choice (i.e. collectible buyers across the world, vs those who happens to drive by your yard sales), we have more choice in terms of contracts.

The contract between an employer and an employee is a buy and sell contract, no different from any other purchase contract of physical products (eg collectibles).

The new labour law basically takes out a large category of choice for both the buyer and the seller, i.e. the employer and employee.

Now, imagine if China thrives on ebay and the migrant workers are the Presley
collectible sellers. And all of a sudden the government said eBay needs to protect the Presley collectible sellers and pay all the damage if there is fraud in the buying side, or it forces all the buyers to pay 10 more dollars for each collectible it buys. Will the sellers be better off?

---

发表了九篇反对新劳动合同法的文章,不打算再写。作为一个经济学者,我已尽所能,北京要怎样处理是他们的选择,书生之见只不过是书生之见而已。然而,最近听到的关于该新法的初步效应,好些是媒体没有报导的,恐怕北京的朋友不知道,应该提出来让他们考虑。

(一)广州在新春后举办的招聘会,找工作的精英特 别多。所谓「精英」,是指那些工作了相当时日,履历有可观的中年职业人士。两个原因,皆起于新法第十四条——在一个机构工作了十年可获终生雇用。其一是工 作近十年或去年底逾十年的精英被炒;其二是见十年将届,精英先找新工,有可取的就炒老板而另谋高就。后者类同美国昔日的大学教师,工作六年后校方要决定是 炒还是给予终生雇用合约,引起教师抢先找新职的行为。读者要知道,到了限期员工被炒不容易找到新工作,因为在履历上被炒是个污点。因此,与其被炒,倒不如 自己算一下,认为没有把握可获终生雇用,先觅新工炒老板为上也。

(二)珠三角一带,今年春假后,工厂聘请新工人特别容易——好些年没有见过那么容易了。另一方面,因为旧员工一般知道新劳动法的广泛性,纷纷要求加薪。效果是某些员工可略得小甜头,但整体来说,这几年低下阶层的收入急升走势,显然应验了我推断过的,被新劳动法一棍打折。

(三)工厂老板面对的最大困难,是提供食宿不能再 在工资扣除,而超时及假日工资从加半倍升至加一倍。如果没有超时及假日工作,员工一般不干,但他们乐于接受不加工资而干,所以一般的工厂,在旧法下是不依 法定的超时及假日工资的。如今推出新法,工厂老板还是忙顾左右,提供超时及假日工作但不支付加倍工资,工人也是得过且过地干下去。然而,有了新法但不依新 法,工人罢工或投诉或上街的机会急升,使老板们不知怎样处理才对。按新法支薪要关门,员工同意不依新法,但老板的意识,是早晚会闯祸,非关门不可。

(四)不少老板正在越南等廉价劳力地区建造厂房, 打算一年半载后在中国关门他往。尤其是成衣制造行业,走得七零八落是肯定的了。北京当局似乎没有重视我说过无数次的,主要是为反对人民币升值而说。那就是 中国工业发展的一个主要困难,是越南、印度等地区的工资比中国的低得多,是中国的主要竞争对手。新劳动法的推出,是火上加油,未富先骄的让赛,是让得太多 太多了。

今天我可以肯定——绝对肯定——是需要廉价劳力的外资工业,不会再到中国来。开始下了注的或会继续,但新的需要廉价劳动力的外资,不会在有新劳动法下再问津中国。

好些人认为,中国要走高科技的路,廉价劳力的工业 是箩底桔,我们不要。这想法是大错特错。走向高科技的发展已经起步,不用担心,但这发展需要后浪推前浪,要让贫苦的劳动力在下面把上头的科技推上去。换言 之,中国发展的重点,是要顾及对工商业知识低下的农民。农民的生活改进得好,改进得快,中国的所有经济问题都解决了,科技的发展更不用担心。农转工出现了 问题,农民不能继续改进生活,上帝也帮不到忙。我反复计算,依照二○○○年起的生活改进速度,中国农民的收入会在十年后达到城市中等人家的水平,这推断给 新劳动法化为乌有。

(五)如果新劳动法严厉执行,加上封杀所有漏洞, 中国的经济改革进境会止于二十九年!目前的情况,是地区政府只眼开只眼闭,得过且过地忙顾左右,或视漏洞如无物。这样的做法不成体统,更重要的是新劳动法 有九十八条,写得那样全面,若有若无的执行劳方早晚会吵起来。资方的左避右避,这里出术那里出术,无疑会大幅增加交易费用,而轮到劳方坚持依新法而上街或 罢工,北京要怎样处理才对呢?

有人说,如果取缔由国家主席批准的新劳动法,国家 体面何在?我的回应,是体面换不到饭吃。做错了就改,有什么不对?可能我过于乐观:新劳动法的杀伤力那么广及,没有多少劳工的支持,取缔不会引起大动乱。 另一方面,北京当局可以考虑我建议过的,让机构选择依新法或劳动合约绝对自由。再另一方面,北京可以考虑另一些协助劳工的安排,安抚一下。

中国今天有钱,他们的钱要怎样花,尤其是花在穷人 身上,只要不是重复性的,我们不容易反对。我反对的重点,非常重要的,是北京不要干预市场的合约自由选择。这样看,最低工资的安排也是违反了合约的选择自 由,要取缔。说过无数次,我永远站在穷人那一边。任何人相信最低工资可以帮助穷人,是不懂经济的运作。在西方,劳工是给工会及利益团体的压力误导了。

据说中国的新劳动法主要是从德、法抄过来的。最近 与一位瑞典的经济老教授谈及中国的新劳动法。他说瑞典搞福利经济,是大麻烦,但今天的发展是胜于德国及法国的。主要原因,是德、法左右劳动合约,使失业率 多年高企,但瑞典则在上世纪三十年代起,执行的原则是政府不干预劳动合约的选择自由。

这里我不能不重提我对市场研究得到的两点贡献,否 决了传统之见的。一、市场的存在是为了减低交易费用,没有交易费用不会有市场,而市场的合约自由选择是减低交易费用的重点。二、严格而又广泛地看,一个经 济只有一个市场,没有什么劳动市场与产品市场之分。后二者的分别只是合约的性质不同——在同一市场内合约的安排有别。新劳动合同法是全面地干预市场的一种 重要合约,牵一发而动全身,整个市场会受到严重的损害。

Wednesday, February 27, 2008

Boom times for Chinese film?

Danwei / Sanlian Life Week : Boom times for Chinese film, but what comes next?

  • 3,527 screens worth 5.1 billion RMB
  • Of the 5.1bn: 1.801bn from box office of domestic made movies, 1.379bn on movie channel shown on TV (i.e. older movies), and 2.02bn export (revenue from overseas) -- in the calculation there is no derivative product income such as DVD (though small due to piracy, should still be something)
  • For box office: 2007 total was 3.327bn (compared with 2.62bn in 2006 and 2.046bn in 2005 -- a growth of over 20% p.a.), for 5 consecutive years domestic films have surpassed import in box office - i.e. over 50% (1.801/3.327), but I don't know whether "Lust, Caution" is counted as domestic or 'foreign/HK/Taiwan" in the above stats
  • 18.01亿元,这是2007年国产电影全年票房收入。如果加上国产电影海外收入20.2亿元以及电影频道播出收入13.79亿元,2007年国产电影的总产值应该是51.82亿元(不含音像制品)。去年,电影总票房是33.27亿元,国产电影已经连续5年在总票房上超过进口大片。2006年电影票房 26.2亿元,2005年是20.46亿元,电影票房平均每年以20%的速度递增。
  • 目前城市主流院线一共有34条,2006年只有“上海联”这一条院线年票房达到3亿元,2007年有5条院线年票房超过了3亿元,过亿元的院线一共8条。去年影院建设方面,新增银幕493块,新增影院102家,目前一共有 1527家影院,3527块银幕。去年国产电影的产量是402部(全部是故事片),这还不包括专门为电影频道拍摄的100多部数字电影,如果加在一起,一共有500多部故事片。从这几年国产电影的增长趋势和占有的市场份额可以得出一个结论:国产电影市场形势一片大好,这些数字无疑让从事电影的业内人士感到踏实。由于国产电影市场化起步晚、底子薄,它的上升空间巨大。中国电影发行放映协会副秘书长耿西林女士预计,未来5年内,中国的电影票房将突破100亿元,成为继电视剧之后又一个获得市场成功的娱乐产业。

What does this mean?

3.327bn/3527 = 943k/screen = 2584 /screen/night

In Beijing, e.g., the movie ticket cost 50-70 Yuan (!!! yes, that is right, almost as much as that in HK). But it is cheaper in other cities and other cinemas (eg, 20-30 for Kunming). Therefore 2584/day means 100 people/screen per day (assuming 25/ticket), which is very small considering there are more than one show per day on average.

My personal experience:
1) Had been to a 1030pm movie on Sunday night in Oriental Mall in Beijing, we are the only audience there and had the whole screen for ourselves. The movie title was "CJ-7"
2) It seems the cinema was only clos to sold out during prime hours (600-830) on Tuesdays (when there is 50% discount promo)

Therefore, my observation and inference has been that something is wrong in the pricing. When you price a goods so high that the mass market cannot afford, there will be significant growth at income rises. Therefore, the 20%+ growth in the past 3 years, I venture to speculate, is largely due to more people crossed the income thresold and the ticket begin to become affordable to them, rather than "the movies were better made", as the reporter suggested.

I also dare to speculate, if the price has been cut by, e.g. 30%, the box office could have a growth much faster than the 20%+ p.a. However, price elasticity is a very tricky game. One really needs to try it out to find out the answer. The Tuesday sales boost could mean the inflexion point if somewhere under 50% but this may not be true, because the Tuesday audience could come from those who would otherwise go on Monday/Wednesday.

What the movie industry in China could do is to experiment a 'promotion' in a medium size city, to test the impact of different discount rates to the total box office income. (Here I assume that (non-pirate) DVD income is minimal such that there is no significant impact due to larger box office audience). An alternative is to experience with an "auction" to certain movie, but this is hard to implement technically.

Tuesday, January 22, 2008

Professor Cheung on China's New Labor Law

Professor has been a big fan of China's reform policy, because it is pragmatic and cautious; more importantly, it is the freeest of all free economy, and more 'capitalistic' than the US.

So it is worth our attention when he rings the bell.
  • 很不幸,因为新劳动法的推出,我不能不在该文补加一个脚注。九十七岁的高斯不会高兴:他坚持该文要以中国大凯旋的姿态收笔。
  • Very unfortunately, because of the launch of this New Labour Law, I had no choice but to add a footnote/caveat to my essay. Professor Coarse, at the age of 97, will not be happy about this caveat, he wanted me to end my essay with the full success of China's economic progress.
Cheung suggested a face-saving remedy for Beijing
  • 前思后想,我认为如下的治方值得北京考虑。那是新法不改,但容许工商业机构选择(甲)、采用新劳动法,或(乙)、劳工合约完全自由。劳动市场于是有甲、乙两种机构或公司的选择存在。如果员工认为新法对他们有利,可选执行新法的机构,否则会选合约自由的。倒过来,如果老板采用自由合约的公司,不同意的员工可以另谋高就。这样分两种合约性质不同的机构或公司处理,员工的自由选择可以说清楚很多有争议性的问题。适者生存,不适者淘汰,哪种公司胜出是市场竞争的结果。如果两种公司一起存在,我敢赌身家,自由合约公司的员工的收入一定比选择新法的上升得快!
  • I think Beijing needs to consider the following option. i.e., keep the New Law [to save face], while allowing the companies [in fact the employee] two options: the New Law and a "free contract"....... I am willing to place my bet, when there are two types of companies, the worker will choose to work for the second type.
IMO, to go one step further, Beijing can even let different provinces choose different laws (and perhaps force a few provinces to choose the new law), after a couple years, it will know which provinces win. This is fully consistent with the great helmsman Deng's Feeling the Stone to Cross the River doctrine.

Links below. Please use babelfish/google translator for a rough translation.

(2007.12.11)新劳动法的困扰

(2008.01.08)再谈新劳动法

(2008.01.15)灾难的先兆——三论新劳动法

(2008.01.22)新劳动法的启示

Tuesday, January 8, 2008

China Eastern Airline Deal (ii) - 東航之戰

This blog switches between languages from time to time, depending on the audience group I anticipate. The google translation tool is not getting better these days, if you click this or paste the link under "translate webpage" to read an approximate translation, you will see how ridiculous it is -- let's stick to babelfish (see the right column link).

中環博客認為東航之戰是一場鬧劇。我不這麼認為。東航的問題,正正表現了國資委正在朝市場化的方向走。可惜的是,一些歷史的包袱阻礙了這市場化的進程。因為,假如航空業市場改革是完善的,本來就不應該有國航持有大量東航股票的問題。因此,我也有同意中環博客的地方。不過,中航既然是股東之一,站在競爭立場上攪局,和站在股東回報立場,都是合情合理的。而且,即使中航不來搞,David Webb也會來。

A few pieces of facts (some of which I listed in a previous post)
  • CA will not merge with MU (CEA), it will lead to monopoly and is against the objectives of de-regulation (and making Chinese business more competitive post-WTO)
  • SIA's price is way too low. Even if SIA walks away right now, the market price for MU is still way over RMB3.8
  • CA, as a shareholder, will want a higher price, as discussed above
  • CA, as a competitor, will try everything to delay SIA entering, as SIA will definitely make MU much more competitive. The proposed SIA price gives CA a perfect excuse to execute its hideous plan.
  • The State Asset Committee, from the perspective of shareholder, should support CA. It therefore gave CA a free hand and let the markt decide. It did its best job in keeping silent in this deal (Note the SAC's interests is not necessarily the same as that of the Anti-trust Commmittee, or that of the "nation"). In this I see a much more mature management of China's SOEs
  • If anyone is to be blamed for the delayed SIA entry. It would be SIA and CEA. They did not proactively raise the price to prevent this from happening. If they did, they would not have to lose a few month. My bet is SIA/Temasek will raise their bid in the next 2 weeks, to around 4.5-5.0
  • When SIA raise its bid, CA will be forced (by the state) to back out and perhaps (better) sell all its holding. The subsequent issue is that CNAC will no longer be in absolute control of CEA. However, the solution is to let some Private Equity, either the State Fund, or a JV of State Fund with international PE Crocodiles (e.g. Blackstone), to enter with SIA/Temasek to counter-balance, with some legal structure to make sure that the foreign ownership percentage is not exceeded
  • Finally, yes, CA is no way as good as SIA in terms of management. But CA is partnered with CX, which is arguably stronger than SIA (A close friend had a disastrous experience with SIA's ground staff recently, holding F class ticket between SIN and HKG). More importantly, CA management is much stronger now. MU used to be better run and more profitable than CA, until the last 3 years. The whole thing was reversed, so was the stock price. The only reason was the change in management in these two companies. But this does not change what I discussed above. (IMO MU's management should have been fired long ago, replace them with a team of 5-8 managers from KA/CX/SQ will achieve the same result as )