What was Zhan Qixiong plan when he was intercepted by Yonakuni?

This is the video taken by Yonakuni on the collision when it tried to intecept Minjinyu 5179.


First, let's note a few facts (see previous post for background and screenshots)

1. Yonakuni has taken a long circle to come in front of Minjinyu, starting from about 8 O'clock direction (of Minjinyu 5179) to reach 2 O'clock in the begining of the video, and was at around 11:30 O'clock when its end collided with Minjinyu 5179
2. At around 8'30", you can see another JCG ship, probably Hateruma (Let call it H), behind Yonakuni and to the right of Minjinyu 5179. Since we did not see it before earlier while Yonakuni was circling in front of Minjinyu 5179, we can conclude that  H was probably either at 7-8 O'clock direction for Minjinyu 5179, or some distance from the 3 O'clock direction
3. The track thickened a lot right behind Yonakuni at the moment of the collision, most likely indicating it has slowed down and parked (confirmed by the relative motion of Yonakuni with the sea wave track in the video)
4. You can see an island right behind Minjinyu 5179 (wiki said it is Huangwei Yu, also called Kubashima by Japan), indicating that Minjinyu was trying to sail away from the island and halted when being cut in front by Yonakuni

The situation is illustrated in this diagram below (click to enlarge)

What would you do if you wre captain Zhan at this moment?

• Your boat is much slower than Yonakuni (10 knots vs 30-40 knots), so it is useless to go anywhere in front of it. 12-9 O'clock directions are ruled out. It takes some time for Yonakuni to make a u-turn so your best chance is go behind it.
• You cannot go backward. You probably arrived at this position and were planning to move forward. But you had to stop your engine because Yonakuni is cutting in front of you. Going backward will bring you closer to Huangwei Yu and bring you more trouble. You want to be as far away from Huangwei Yu as you can now.
• You should also see JCG H coming from behind and trying to round you up on the other side, so you should try to get as far away from Huangwei Yu as possible. You hope if you can get out of the 24 nm radius you would be free and avoid being caught and result in financial losses
• You options are anywhere from 3-12 O'Oclock. 12 O'clock (proceeding directly ahead) offer you the best chance to escape, because JCG H is behind you and may intercept you from behind on your right hand side Another reason to avoid your right hand side is that H probably is already at your 3 O'clock now.
• You see Yonakuni is moving, there are some 100-200m between you and Yonakuni, so by the time you reached its current position (Y0), it should have moved to Y1 already.

So you took the short path, charging directly ahead to break the trap. M0 to M1.

Yonakuni knew that and saw that. It braked/backpedaled and stayed at Y2 instead. You tried to avoid it but you still got to its tail.

Should you have taken 1 O'clock or 2 O'clock instead to be safe (even if H is at 3 O'clcok coming to you)? You probably should, and you probably had done all those earlier that morning. This is one of the many interceptions since early morning and the ordeal would take at least another 2-6 hours that day. Maybe they have videos for you trying hard to avoid collision as well. They are not going to show the public if all the other videos. If not for that over-zealous and over-confident sengoku38 san, no one in the public will be able to even see this video.

Maybe you should have made your own recording. But you cannot afford such gadgets, and were not prepared to bring a video-camera to this trip, After all, you are a poor fisherman trying to make some bugs. You are not coming here for eco-tour.

Which ship has made a change in direction before the collision of Mizuki and Minjinyu 5179 (UPDATED)

Update (Nov 17): upon a few more viewing, I have come to the conclusion that Minjinyu also made a turn of about 20-30 degree and at some point was not exactly facing left. I have updated my graph accordingly. Note also that I am not trying to prove that Minjinyu bears no responsibility at the collision. I believe both sides need to share the responsibility, since Mizuki also made a significant turn of some 240-270 degrees, and made its direction very unpredictable -- might have caused the seemingly erratic turn of Minjinyu. (But we really do not have solid evidence to say either way)

But before you go on I want you to first judge this picture, that if the boat has turned

Then you can find out the answer in this picture below (where the picture above is cropped from), taken from the end credit of the movie Suspect X (a great movie btw). I do not claim the situations are the same, but this just shows us how a partial picture is far from being a conclusive evidence. That is why I hope Japan would release all the 10 hours of videos it has taken.

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In my previous post an anomymous commentator suggested that Minjinyu 5179 made a change of direction and hence ram into Mizuki. What he saw was the video taken from on board Mizuki, all it shows is the relative velocity. Fortunately, we are able to see another video taken by Hateruma during the exact same moment from a different angle. Here it is.


This is a screenshot taken by Japanprobe, from the video taken by Hateruma, observing the collision between Mizuki and 5178. You can see the trace behind Mizuki, when it just completed a 300 degree turn right in front of 5179. It is quite clear that it is Mizuki which had made a large angle turn just before the collision, towards the area blocking the path of 5179

A path with time scale based on the video, and the speed indicated by the intervals between the 10 second gaps is shown approximately here. Looking at the time scale you can also see that Mizuki has more or less parked (stationary speed) for the 30 seconds before the collision, while Minjinyu had actually slowed down a bit. You can view the video again to verify my chart.

1A) Mizuki speeding towards 5179 (0:47)

1B) Mizuki turned 90 degrees (1:10). Note that Minjinyu 5179 has already made its turn of 20-30 degree by then. So Minjinyu's turn was made most likely while Mizuki formed a T in front of it. Perhaps it was expecting Mizuki to continue sailing towards its right, so that turning left would avoid the much faster Mizuki.

 1C) Mizuki completed the turn (1:08)

Since Mizuki is almost stationary while making the turn, we can estimate the speed of Minjinyu during the moments to be around its own length during 10 seconds. which is approximately 40m/10s or 4m/s=15km/hr.

If you compare the location of Mizuki between 0:26 and 0:29,  in less than 3 seconds it traveled the length of its own of 46 meters (type びざん型巡視船 (2代))(marked by the white wave). So its speed is about 50m/3s = 60km/hr, 4 times the speed of fishing boat 5170. So even adjusting for it slower speed right after the turn, it must be able to avoid the crash it wanted to.

If this is still not conclusive, in the Mizuki video we can see two other JCG staff were taking videos, they should release those videos as well as additional data points.

---
 Now back to the video taken from Mizuki.

A second JCG ship can be seen on the right of 5170, trying to encircle it from left behind

 In 15 seconds, the 2nd JCG ship has moved to the left side of 5179, leaving a long white trace behind it, this shows the significant difference in relative speed of JCG boats and Minjinyu 5179

The encircling tactic is not uncommon from JCG. This is an aerial photo from another act by JCG, probably taken in 1998 in the same area. This may be the plan of the JCG ships.

See also a different view in this NBR thread, there are some problem with the poster's observation though, e.g. he claimed there were 2 JCG ships, in fact there were at least 3, the Yonakuni, the Mizuki, and the Kateruma.

Accidental map of Honshu

A chart of US interest rate plotted against velocity of Monetary Base/GDP looks strikingly similar to that of the map of Hanshu island, Japan.

Not the Noto Peninsular in central north area of the island (north of Ishikawa), Shikoku/Seto Inland Sea area, Wakayam Peninsular are all well recognizable in the chart.

The Diaoyu Collision Videos

Update 3:
More analysis of the collisions
1) Which ship has made a change in direction before the collision of Mizuki and Minjinyu 5179
2) What was Zhan Qixiong plan when he was intercepted by Yonakuni?

Update 2:
Some discussion in the comment. I would recap here.

How the collision happened, and the routing of the JCG ships and the Chinese boat are pretty clear after viewing these videos.

This is actually quite similar to the case of the Hainan flight collision between a Chinese fighter and American spy plane in April 2001.

Now the issues (and comparison) really are:
1) From Japan's perspective, the JCG is 'enforcing' its law in its water. The question is comparable to whether a police boat should block the course of a civilian when it disobeyed order. And whether the enforcement should be as aggressive in certain disputed area with a foreign boat.

2) From Chinese perspective, Japan simply has no right to enforce its law in this area.

3) From a third party's view. The issues are
a) shall enforcement be this aggressive, assuming even if this area belong to Japan (as many Japanese would say, the Russian were much more aggressive, and opened fire in South Kuriles)?
b) shall the fishing boat change course (or is it possible for it to do so technically, given it is much slowed to control the speed and direction of a boat than a car)?
c) has the captain been avoiding such collision for the whole 4-5 hours of hide and chase game, and eventually lose either concentration or patience and gave up on steering control?
d) the area seems to be within 12 nm of the island (as you can see the islands in the background in Yonakuni video). so this is not the high sea. but again, it is disputed area and enforcement should be more scrupulous.

Related links
1) ESWN: Hong Kong Media Reaction To Diaoyuatai Collision Video
2)  日艦故意讓「閩晉漁」撞上 操弄錄影片段枉費心機
3) 釣島撞船片外洩 中日矛盾惡化
4) 故意不播周旋過程
5)  專家：日艦違慣例強攔漁船

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Update 1:
1) 282 DVDs discovered in JR Station, with leaflet of "This shows the truth about DPJ. Please help yourself for free"
2) Asahi's speculation of the rationale for the leak.

---

The two collision videos are finally viewable -- just as I suspected before, Kan government clearly has every reason to keep the videos to themselves, But LDP will not let go of this opportunity to discredit its political rival. I suspect the leak is from DPJ's political enemies. (The leak's youtube ID is Sengoku38. While Sankei tried to explain the connotation of 38 as gossip women in Chinese. 38 are also good fortune number is South China. So it might as well be Chinese hacker who leaked the video)

1) This is taken by crew on Yonakuni. You can see Yonakuni started from the right flank of Minjinyu 5179, cut in front of it (and obviously doing this very slowly or even 'parked' in order to intercept the fishing boat). Minjinyu's direction did not change much throughout the video and its velocity was not fast and didn't change much. When the boats collide you can see the white wave track left behind by Yonakuni, showing that it had just crossed in front of Minjinyu. From the track you can see Yonakuni's speed was much faster than Minjinyu. It makes one wonders why it slowed down (instead of sped up) while parked in front of Minjinyu.


See the white track behind Minjinyu. Yonakuni had came from behind Minjinyu and circled it from its left aft, right aft, right flank, then cross in front of it. See all that Minjinyu left no visible track, showing that its speed was much much slower than Yonakuni. The fact that Minjinyu did not crossed the white track behind also indicated that the amount of time Yonakuni has to circle Minjinyu was less than the amount of time Minjinyu has taken to go across the circle (for a perfect circle, the speed ratio will be at least pi/2=1.57 times)

1A) White track behind Minjinyu

 1B)White track to the right of Minjinyu

1C) Right before collision, white track behind Yonakuni. Yonakuni has just made an almost 90 degree turn in front of Minjinyu.

 1D) After collision, no more white track as Minjinyu broke out of the "white circle".

Compare this with earlier CGI released by Japan you will understand why CGI is preferred over the real thing for Japan.

2) This one was taken by another JCG ship, Hateruma. In the first second of the video, it shows that Mizuki has just sped past Minjinyu and turned around in front of Minjinyu (see the semi-circle white wave track). Mizuki then sailed toward the Chinese fishing boat, then did a quick turn around right in front of Minjinyu, slowed down and parked and got hit by the Chinese boat which apparently could not brake nor turn (or reluctant/slow to turn).(for English subtitle version see here)



2A) Mizuki Turn around in front of Minjinyu to intercept

 2B) Mizuki speed toward Minjinyu after first turn

2C) Mizuki, reach in front of Minjinyu, turned again to block Minjinyu from its front, the next video starts here, filming the left side of Minjinyu. You can see that Minjinyu did not change direction, while Mizuki turned into its way. It is not clear whether Minjinyu would have enough time to change course, or if it did, Mizuki would not move again to block it.

This is taken on Mizuki. It very clearly shows the JCG ship Mizuki sped up to intercept the Chinese Fishing Boat. In the beginning of the video, the two boats almost sailed side by side. Note also that a lot of black smoke came out from Mizuki a few seconds BEFORE the collision, similar to what you see when one pushes the pedal suddenly on a truck uphill.



This is taken a second before the collision, Note the thick black smoke from Mizuki.

The JCG boats seem determined to intercept the Chinese fishing boat. The Chinese fishing boat (Minjinyu 5179) seems determined to get out of the encirclement. The JCG boats are 3 times in length (translates into 27 times in size/volume/tonnage - Yonakuni is 89 meter long, 1300 ton displacement, vs Minjinyu 5179's 30 meter length and about 40 tons in displacement) and much faster than the fishing boat. As I had earlier speculated, it is extremely unlikely that any sane skipper will want to run into ships 27 times its size with much stronger steel body, nor that a much slower fishing boat would be fast enough to chase up the JCG ship. This looks like a replay of the 2008 Lien Ho Incident.

Relative size of A JCG ship and Minjinyu

• Hateruma: 89m, 1300 ton (speed about 60km/hr or 30-40 knots)
• Yonakuni: 89m, 1300 ton (speed about 60km/hr or 30-40 knots)
• Mizuki: 46m, 197 ton (speed about 45-45 knots)
• Minjinyu5179: 30m, 40 ton (speed about 15km/hr or 10-15knots)

In short, these videos do not help with JCG's case against skipper Zhan. It explain why Japan had to release the captain.

The Chinese MoFA spokesman Cui Tian Kai is now very adamant, "[Regarding what actually happened], The facts are very clear..."

Clarifying Western Media Accounts of “China Rare Earth Metal Ban” - Lisa Reisman, Metalminer

(Update) One note: many local papers falsely claimed that "China mines all 17 types of rare earths", or even "China is the only country that mines all 17 types". This is WRONG. To start with, there are only 16 elements to be mined, the Promethium is radioactive and decays quickly (the most stable isotope of Promethium lose half of its atoms every 17.7 years). So, nobody, including China, mines Promethium.

Watch Lisa Reisman on the alleged RRE "ban".

In fact, even from the mother of all rumours, this NYT report, this was not really a ban,

• Industry officials said that mainland China’s customs agency had notified companies that they were not allowed to ship to Japan any rare earth oxides, rare earth salts or pure rare earth metals, although the shipments are still allowed to go to Hong Kong, Singapore and other destinations. But no ban has been imposed on the export to Japan of semi-processed alloys that combine rare earths with other materials, the officials said. China has been trying to expand its alloy industry to create higher-paying jobs in mining areas, instead of exporting raw materials for initial processing.

So if anything, China was just trying to extract more value-added. Since semi-processed alloys were exported with no disruption even from the NYT source. The alleged "ban" was merely second-handed distortion of the original report. And Reisman was correct that it may well be a general slow down in anything send to Japan (till the end of September).

Having reviewed this, it makes one wonders, if not for the rare earths, what made Japan released the captain in such an abrupt change of stance? IMO, as I wrote in Chinese a couple days earlier, there are two plausible explanations. (1) that the local prosecutor did reached this decision on his own, based on the circumstantial evidence; (2) that what Kan perceived was the determination of the PRC government in even risking a lose-lose fight in this issue, as it directly challenged its legitimacy domestically.

A solution for the Diaoyu deadlock

China found a good "dodge" by suspending the East Sea talk as a response to the recent Diaoyu incident. However, even after the release of the boat and the 14 crew members the captain is still detained. It looks very unlikely either side could find itself a good reason to back off.

Still, there is one way for a face-saving solution for both China and Japan. But the window of opportunity is very narrow. They need to make such discussion and decision within the next 12 hours or so.

Japan needs an excuse to release the captain of the Chinese fishing boat. The excuse will be a humanitarian reason. The captain wants to attend the funeral of his grandmother tomorrow, September 15th. Japan should release him on a bail -- with a small amount commensurate to the income of a Chinese fisherman. Provided the amount of the bail is reasonably low, Japan will be in a position to shift the blame to the Chinese side if this is refused.

If the captain does not report back and forfeit the bail, Japan can continue to keep the file open and save face. This would provide China of what it wants, and Japan would also avoid escalating the dispute by having to proceed with the prosecution after the 10 day detention.

Now that the DPJ election is over and Kan emerged with a clean victory. He is in a position to act. As a good will, China should reciprocate by resuming the East Sea talk.

Let's watch if the 2 nations are mature enough to make such moves. Again, the window of opportunity is narrow. The funeral will be over by tomorrow though I believe the exact hour could be moved to the afternoon or even late evening. If, instead, Japan will release the captain on 17th (10 day detention) without a resolution from the court, she would need some rationale which is probably hard to find. On the other hand, it is not practical to keep on holding to the captain.

September 18th will be a sensitive date, it marks the anniversary of Mukden Incident in 1931, when Japan annexed Inner Manchuria. No one wants to see what happened in 2005 repeat. Japan is not applying for the permanent seat of UNSC this time, Kan is a much more China-friendly leader than Koizumi, and there is much more to lose economically for both than it was five years ago.

Nagasaki and Japan's condition for peace

While the issue of A-bomb ending the war, and also saving much more lives for both Japan and the world is more or less a consensus (except for a small minority and for the Japanese), there has always been debate that the second bomb in Nagasaki may not be necessary. The most heard argument is that Japan is already seeking "for peace".

For this wiki has a fairly detailed account of what happened on the days of August 8th and 9th in the Japanese cabinet.


These "twin shocks"—the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet entry—had immediate profound effects on Prime Minister Suzuki and Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori, who concurred that the government must end the war at once.^[81] However, the senior leadership of the Japanese Army took the news in stride, grossly underestimating the scale of the attack. They did start preparations to impose martial law on the nation, with the support of Minister of War Anami, to stop anyone attempting to make peace.^[82] Hirohito told Kido to "quickly control the situation" because "the Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us."^[83]
The Supreme Council met at 10:30. Suzuki, who had just come from a meeting with the Emperor, said it was impossible to continue the war. Tōgō Shigenori said that they could accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, but they needed a guarantee of the Emperor's position. Navy Minister Yonai said that they had to make some diplomatic proposal—they could no longer afford to wait for better circumstances.

• The full cabinet met on 14:30 on August 9, and spent most of the day debating surrender. As the Big Six had done, the cabinet split, with neither Tōgō's position nor Anami's attracting a majority.^[85] Anami told the other cabinet ministers that, under torture, a captured American B-29 pilot had told his interrogators that the Americans possessed 100 atom bombs and that Tokyo and Kyoto would be bombed "in the next few days". The pilot, Marcus McDilda, was lying. He knew nothing of the Manhattan Project, and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear to end the torture. The lie, which caused him to be classified as a high-priority prisoner, probably saved him from beheading.^[86] In reality, the United States would have had the third bomb ready for use around August 19, and a fourth in September 1945.^[87] The third bomb would probably have been used against Tokyo.^[88]
• The cabinet meeting adjourned at 17:30 with no consensus. A second meeting lasting from 18:00 to 22:00 also ended with no consensus. Following this second meeting, Suzuki and Tōgō met with the Emperor, and Suzuki proposed an impromptu Imperial conference, which started just before midnight on the night of August 9–10.^[89] Suzuki presented Anami's four-condition proposal as the consensus position of the Supreme Council. The other members of the Supreme Council spoke, as did Baron Hiranuma Kiichirō, the president of the Privy Council, who outlined Japan's inability to defend itself and also described the country's domestic problems, such as the shortage of food. The cabinet debated, but again no consensus emerged. Finally, around 02:00 (August 10), Suzuki then addressed Emperor Hirohito, asking him to decide between the two positions. ......

Also, the "condition" for Japan's "pursuit for peace"

• In the middle of the meeting, shortly after 11:00, news arrived that Nagasaki, on the west coast of Kyūshū, had been hit by a second atomic bomb (called "Fat Man" by the Americans). By the time the meeting ended, the Big Six had split 3–3. Suzuki, Tōgō, and Admiral Yonai favored Tōgō's one additional condition to Potsdam, while Generals Anami, Umezu, and Admiral Toyoda insisted on three further terms that modified Potsdam: that Japan handle her own disarmament, that Japan deal with any Japanese war criminals, and that there be no occupation of Japa

In view of the votes inside the Japanese cabinet it should be less debate about who is responsible for the victims in Nagasaki.

In fact, even Nagasaki was not able to end the war. Further bombing on Aug 14th did. And all these A-bombs and fire-bombs did little for the hardlines such as Anami, only the Emperor changed minds on 14th, which was decisive.

• The Big Six and the cabinet spent August 13 debating their reply to the Allied response, but remained deadlocked. Meanwhile, the Allies grew doubtful, waiting for the Japanese to respond. The Japanese had been instructed to reply with an unqualified acceptance in the clear, but replied in code, which was taken as a qualified response.
  The Allies also detected increased diplomatic and military traffic, which was taken as evidence that the Japanese were preparing an "all-out banzai attack." President Truman ordered a resumption of attacks against Japan at maximum intensity "so as to impress Japanese officials that we mean business and are serious in getting them to accept our peace proposals without delay."^[99][100] The United States Third Fleet began shelling the Japanese coast. In the largest bombing raid of the Pacific War, more than 400 B-29s attacked Japan during daylight on August 14, and more than 300 that night.^[101] A total of 1,014 aircraft were used with no losses.^{[102]
  ....}
  
  
• As August 14 dawned, Suzuki, Kido, and the Emperor realized the day would end with either an acceptance of the American terms or a military coup.^[106]
• The Emperor met with the most senior Army and Navy officers. While several spoke in favor of fighting on, Field Marshall Shunroku Hata did not. As commander of the Second General Army, the headquarters of which had been in Hiroshima, Hata commanded all the troops defending southern Japan—the troops preparing to fight the "decisive battle". Hata said he had no confidence in defeating the invasion and did not dispute the Emperor's decision. The Emperor requested that his military leaders cooperate with him in ending the war.^[106]
• At a conference with the cabinet and other councilors, Anami, Toyoda, and Umezu again made their case for continuing to fight, after which the Emperor said,

It should also be noted that even till today, the word "surrender" is categorically avoided as sort of a taboo in Japan. They call it "the termination of war" (shyusen, 終戦の日（しゅうせんのひ）), as in the Termination of the War (大東亜戦争終結ノ詔書 Daitōa-sensō-shūketsu-no-shōsho). There was no surrender, nor is there anyone to blame for starting the war. The emperor ended the war to seek peace for his citizens, period.

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Here is the wiki entry as of Aug 8th, 2010

August 8–9: Soviet invasion and Nagasaki

Detailed reports of the unprecedented scale of the destruction at Hiroshima were received in Tokyo, but two days passed before the government met to consider the changed situation.
At 04:00 on August 9 word reached Tokyo that the Soviet Union had broken the Neutrality Pact,^[31] declared war on Japan^[79] and launched an invasion of Manchuria.^[80]

A-bombing of Nagasaki

These "twin shocks"—the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet entry—had immediate profound effects on Prime Minister Suzuki and Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori, who concurred that the government must end the war at once.^[81] However, the senior leadership of the Japanese Army took the news in stride, grossly underestimating the scale of the attack. They did start preparations to impose martial law on the nation, with the support of Minister of War Anami, to stop anyone attempting to make peace.^[82] Hirohito told Kido to "quickly control the situation" because "the Soviet Union has declared war and today began hostilities against us."^[83]
The Supreme Council met at 10:30. Suzuki, who had just come from a meeting with the Emperor, said it was impossible to continue the war. Tōgō Shigenori said that they could accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, but they needed a guarantee of the Emperor's position. Navy Minister Yonai said that they had to make some diplomatic proposal—they could no longer afford to wait for better circumstances.
In the middle of the meeting, shortly after 11:00, news arrived that Nagasaki, on the west coast of Kyūshū, had been hit by a second atomic bomb (called "Fat Man" by the Americans). By the time the meeting ended, the Big Six had split 3–3. Suzuki, Tōgō, and Admiral Yonai favored Tōgō's one additional condition to Potsdam, while Generals Anami, Umezu, and Admiral Toyoda insisted on three further terms that modified Potsdam: that Japan handle her own disarmament, that Japan deal with any Japanese war criminals, and that there be no occupation of Japan.^[84]

[edit] Imperial intervention, Allied response, and Japanese reply

War Minister Korechika Anami

The full cabinet met on 14:30 on August 9, and spent most of the day debating surrender. As the Big Six had done, the cabinet split, with neither Tōgō's position nor Anami's attracting a majority.^[85] Anami told the other cabinet ministers that, under torture, a captured American B-29 pilot had told his interrogators that the Americans possessed 100 atom bombs and that Tokyo and Kyoto would be bombed "in the next few days". The pilot, Marcus McDilda, was lying. He knew nothing of the Manhattan Project, and simply told his interrogators what he thought they wanted to hear to end the torture. The lie, which caused him to be classified as a high-priority prisoner, probably saved him from beheading.^[86] In reality, the United States would have had the third bomb ready for use around August 19, and a fourth in September 1945.^[87] The third bomb would probably have been used against Tokyo.^[88]
The cabinet meeting adjourned at 17:30 with no consensus. A second meeting lasting from 18:00 to 22:00 also ended with no consensus. Following this second meeting, Suzuki and Tōgō met with the Emperor, and Suzuki proposed an impromptu Imperial conference, which started just before midnight on the night of August 9–10.^[89] Suzuki presented Anami's four-condition proposal as the consensus position of the Supreme Council. The other members of the Supreme Council spoke, as did Baron Hiranuma Kiichirō, the president of the Privy Council, who outlined Japan's inability to defend itself and also described the country's domestic problems, such as the shortage of food. The cabinet debated, but again no consensus emerged. Finally, around 02:00 (August 10), Suzuki then addressed Emperor Hirohito, asking him to decide between the two positions. Although not recorded, from recollections of the participants, the Emperor's statement was:

I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war can only mean destruction for the nation and prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. ...

I was told by those advocating a continuation of hostilities that by June new divisions would be in place in fortified positions [east of Tokyo] ready for the invader when he sought to land. It is now August and the fortifications still have not been completed. ...

There are those who say the key to national survival lies in a decisive battle in the homeland. The experiences of the past, however, show that there has always been a discrepancy between plans and performance. I do not believe that the discrepancy in the case of Kujukuri can be rectified. Since this is also the shape of things, how can we repel the invaders? [He then made some specific reference to the increased destructiveness of the atomic bomb]

It goes without saying that it is unbearable for me to see the brave and loyal fighting men of Japan disarmed. It is equally unbearable that others who have rendered me devoted service should now be punished as instigators of the war. Nevertheless, the time has come to bear the unbearable. ...

I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister.^[90]

According to General Sumihisa Ikeda and Admiral Zenshirō Hoshina, Privy Council President Hiranuma Kiichirō then turned to the Emperor and asked him: "Your majesty, you also bear responsibility (sekinin) for this defeat. What apology are you going to make to the heroic spirits of the imperial founder of your house and your other imperial ancestors?"^[91]

Once the Emperor had left, Suzuki pushed the cabinet to accept the Emperor's will, which it did. Early that morning (August 10), the Foreign Ministry sent telegrams to the Allies (by way of the Swiss Federal Political Department and Max Grässli in particular) announcing that Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration but would not accept any peace conditions that would "prejudice the prerogatives" of the Emperor. That effectively meant no change in Japan's form of government^[92]—that the Emperor of Japan would remain a position of real power within the government.

.....

August 13–14

The Big Six and the cabinet spent August 13 debating their reply to the Allied response, but remained deadlocked. Meanwhile, the Allies grew doubtful, waiting for the Japanese to respond. The Japanese had been instructed to reply with an unqualified acceptance in the clear, but replied in code, which was taken as a qualified response.
The Allies also detected increased diplomatic and military traffic, which was taken as evidence that the Japanese were preparing an "all-out banzai attack." President Truman ordered a resumption of attacks against Japan at maximum intensity "so as to impress Japanese officials that we mean business and are serious in getting them to accept our peace proposals without delay."^[99][100] The United States Third Fleet began shelling the Japanese coast. In the largest bombing raid of the Pacific War, more than 400 B-29s attacked Japan during daylight on August 14, and more than 300 that night.^[101] A total of 1,014 aircraft were used with no losses.^[102]
In the longest bombing mission of the war,^[103] B-29s from the 315 Bombardment Wing flew 3,800 miles to destroy the Nippon Oil Company refinery at Tsuchizaki on the northern tip of Honshu. This was the last operational refinery in the Japan home islands and produced 67% of their oil.^[104] After the war, the bombing raids were justified on the basis that they were already in progress when word of the Japanese surrender was received, but this is only partially true.^[105]

A leaflet dropped on Japan after the bombing of Hiroshima. The leaflet says, in part: The Japanese people are facing an extremely important autumn. Your military leaders were presented with thirteen articles for surrender by our three-country alliance to put an end to this unprofitable war. This proposal was ignored by your army leaders... [T]he United States has developed an atom bomb, which had not been done by any nation before. It has been determined to employ this frightening bomb. One atom bomb has the destructive power of 2000 B-29s.

At the suggestion of American psychological operations experts, B-29s spent August 13 dropping leaflets over Japan, describing the Japanese offer of surrender and the Allied response.^[99] The leaflets had a profound effect on the Japanese decision-making process. As August 14 dawned, Suzuki, Kido, and the Emperor realized the day would end with either an acceptance of the American terms or a military coup.^[106]
The Emperor met with the most senior Army and Navy officers. While several spoke in favor of fighting on, Field Marshall Shunroku Hata did not. As commander of the Second General Army, the headquarters of which had been in Hiroshima, Hata commanded all the troops defending southern Japan—the troops preparing to fight the "decisive battle". Hata said he had no confidence in defeating the invasion and did not dispute the Emperor's decision. The Emperor requested that his military leaders cooperate with him in ending the war.^[106]
At a conference with the cabinet and other councilors, Anami, Toyoda, and Umezu again made their case for continuing to fight, after which the Emperor said,

I have listened carefully to each of the arguments presented in opposition to the view that Japan should accept the Allied reply as it stands and without further clarification or modification, but my own thoughts have not undergone any change. ... In order that the people may know my decision, I request you to prepare at once an imperial rescript so that I may broadcast to the nation. Finally, I call upon each and every one of you to exert himself to the utmost so that we may meet the trying days which lie ahead.^[107]

The cabinet immediately convened and unanimously ratified the Emperor's wishes. They also decided to destroy vast amounts of material pertaining to matters related to war crimes and the war responsibility of the nation's highest leaders.^[108][109] Immediately after the conference, the Foreign ministry transmitted orders to their embassies in Switzerland and Sweden to accept the Allied terms of surrender. These orders were picked up and received in Washington at 02:49, August 14.^[107]

A-bomb again - the "strange calculus of war"

It was a closed topic. But every year it was brought up again.

I made some estimate on the The net effect of Little Boy and Fat Man 3 years ago. This year Kozak wrote for WSJ, quoted,

• "Japan remains the only country ever to have been targeted by atomic bombs. More than 120,000 Japanese died instantly from the bombings and perhaps as many succumbed to radiation poisoning afterwards (the exact number will never be known). It should be noted that when President Harry Truman was considering whether to invade Japan instead of dropping the bombs, his advisers estimated that an invasion would result in one million American casualties and at least two million Japanese deaths. In the strange calculus of war, the bombs actually saved Japanese lives."

Not far from my estimates. I estimated around 5M Japanese death had Japan defended to the last preferture. Truman's advisor's number is about half of that, quite realistic if assuming Hirohito would give up when he lost about half of his towns.

===

The full article via google cache is below (WSJ seems to require subscription for this article)

A Hiroshima Apology?

Japan's continued focus on remembering the bomb has been an understandable sore point for its Asian neighbors, who suffered greatly at its hands.

By WARREN KOZAK

For the first time since the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Japan 65 years ago, today the U.S. ambassador to Japan will attend the official commemoration ceremony at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial. The U.S. ambassador has always declined the annual invitation, but this year is different. President Barack Obama decided to acknowledge the event with the presence of a high-level dignitary. As State Department spokesman Philip Crowley explained, Ambassador John Roos will be there "to express respect for all the victims of World War II."

Gene Tibbets—the son of Brig. Gen. Paul W. Tibbets Jr., the pilot who dropped the bomb on Hiroshima—called the Obama administration's decision "an unsaid apology." Whether or not that's the case, by saying "all the victims" Mr. Crowley raises the specter of moral equivalence, a problem that's grown worse over the years when it comes to judging right and wrong during World War II and throughout history.
The U.S. dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945. When the Japanese still didn't give up, the U.S. dropped a second bomb on Nagasaki three days later. On Aug. 15, the Japanese surrendered unconditionally, ending the most brutal war in the history of the world.
Japan remains the only country ever to have been targeted by atomic bombs. More than 120,000 Japanese died instantly from the bombings and perhaps as many succumbed to radiation poisoning afterwards (the exact number will never be known). It should be noted that when President Harry Truman was considering whether to invade Japan instead of dropping the bombs, his advisers estimated that an invasion would result in one million American casualties and at least two million Japanese deaths. In the strange calculus of war, the bombs actually saved Japanese lives.
If the Obama administration wants to ease the friction over this event or even to apologize, then perhaps it is also a good time for the Japanese government to begin to discuss World War II truthfully with its own people.

View Full Image

Getty Images

Saved by the bomb? Japanese civilians watch U.S. occupation forces arriving in Kyushu, September 1945. President Truman was told two million Japanese might have died fighting a U.S. invasion.

Since 1945, Japan's narrative has centered almost exclusively on the atomic blasts and its role as victim—with short shrift given to the Japanese invasions of China, Manchuria, Korea, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Indochina, Burma, New Guinea and, of course, the attack on Pearl Harbor. Japanese children have learned little about the Rape of Nanking or the fact that as many as 17 million Asians died at the hands of the Japanese in World War II—many in the most brutal ways imaginable.

There is also the inconvenient truth that Japan started the war in the first place. There would have been no war in the Pacific between 1937 and 1945 had Japan stayed home.

Focusing on the atomic bombs paints the Japanese as victims, like other participants in World War II. They were not. The Japanese, like their German allies, were bent on global conquest and the destruction of other people who did not fit their bizarre racial theories. Japan's continued focus on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been an understandable sore point for its Asian neighbors, who suffered greatly at its hands.

There are times when ordinary citizens understand history better than their leaders. In approaching Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Mr. Obama should consider a related event that took place 25 years ago. On May 5, 1985, President Ronald Reagan made a rare public relations gaffe when he visited the Kolmeshohe Cemetery near Bitburg to lay a wreath at the graves of German soldiers.


His reasoning came from a decent place—he wanted to help bolster his ally, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and he thought that enough time had passed to allow both countries to move on together. But a firestorm erupted when it was learned that the graves were not just those of ordinary Wehrmacht soldiers but of SS troops as well. President Reagan dug in his heels despite strong protests and laid a wreath at the brick tower that loomed over those graves.

The protests came not because people refused to move on or because the postwar bonds between Germany and the U.S. were not strong and real. They were then and they remain so today. Rather, the anger came because the president's act created a tacit understanding that U.S. soldiers were no different than SS Storm Troopers, whose bloody tracks still leave a horror throughout Europe that can barely be equaled in that continent's long, lamentable history. The G.I.s were liberators. The SS were demented murderers. Period.

Young people today may have a hard time understanding that point because of the moral equivalence and political correctness that have taken over our society, our media and especially our universities. It teaches our children that all countries have good and bad elements within them—something so obvious that it's trite. But this lesson has become so powerful that it is not out of the norm for young people today to believe that, while World War II was certainly horrible, all sides share some blame.

Concerning today's event in Hiroshima, the State Department said "at this particular time, we thought it was the right thing to do." It may indeed be the right time for our two countries to share this event. But by tacitly placing all of World War II's participants in the same category, we undermine the ability of future generations to identify real evil, putting them at great risk.


Mr. Kozak is the author of "LeMay: The Life and Wars of General Curtis LeMay" (Regnery, 2009).

The Continental Shelf Extension claims in East Asia

By now all countries have submitted their claim on UNCLOS, which states

• The continental shelf is defined as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin’s outer edge, or 200 nautical miles from the coastal state’s baseline, whichever is greater. State’s continental shelf may exceed 200 nautical miles until the natural prolongation ends. However, it may never exceed 350 nautical miles from the baseline; or it may never exceed 100 nautical miles beyond the 2,500 meter isobath (the line connecting the depth of 2,500 meters). Coastal states have the right to harvest mineral and non-living material in the subsoil of its continental shelf, to the exclusion of others. Coastal states also have exclusive control over living resources "attached" to the continental shelf, but not to creatures living in the water column beyond the exclusive economic zone.

The claims can be found here and here.

• Japan has submitted a 78-page long "executive summary", to which China and Korea challenged the legitimacy of Okinotori Rock, which USA (North Mariana Island, i.e. Saipan and Guam) and Palau reserved their rights on overlapping claims
• Korea and China each submitted their claims, both pushing the continental shelf to the Okinawa Trough
  
• (Note all 3 countries ratified UNCLOS, which DPRK did not)
  

Japan's continental extension claim focuses on the souther part of its EEZ claim (i.e. lower half of this map)

Consisting of 5 major areas:

• SKB Shikoku Basin, the large vertical strip south of Shikoku Island and north of the Okinotori 200 nm circle.
• The area between Ogasawara/Iwo Jima (OGP) and the Minami-tori Shima (island) 200 nm circle (MTS)
  
• KPR, the area between the Okinotori circle and Palau's 200 nm EEZ boundary (potential overlap)
• 2 smaller pieces ODR and MIT to the east and west of the Okinotori circle
  

A very nice map for Chinese and Korean claims can be found in the red firefly blog (a very nice map blog in Chinese)

• The orange area is the co-development zone (1st phase) reached by China and Japan a year ago
• The green area is the Joint Korea-Japan Fishing Zone
• Blues lines are the 200 nm lines for Korea and China
  
• KOR1-KOR5 are sample points (joined into a line) of Korean claim
• D1-D4 are sample points of Chinese claim
• Both the KOR and D points are where the continental shelf end at the Okinawa Trough
  

Here is the technical definition of China's calim

• A -- the base-point (land territory) where the claim distance starts to count (usually an island close to the continent)
  
• B -- 200 nm line
  
• C -- continental shelf slope start to fall (FOS), point of maximum change in gradient
  
• D -- deepest point when continent shelf falls to the trough (lowest sea level)
  

Note that China's "preliminary example point" has carefully avoided to overlap with Korea claim points, apparently for a few reason (that I can think of)

1. To avoid controversy with Korea
2. To have Korea on its side over a potential rebuff from Japan (Japan's argument may be quite weak given the fact that it also submitted similar claim to the other side of its ocean)
3. The example points are only "examples" to establish the Okinawa trough as the boudary, China can then negotiate with Korea (if the trough is established) regarding how to divide the trough between them, most likely it would be the equidistant principle which is not far from D1/KOR1

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Related:

• The East China Sea deal - details
• The funny shape of the East China Sea "co-development" zone
• Japanese Air-Defence Identification Zone (Map)
• Greedy Asians?
• Tsugaru Strait: Japanese territorial claim is not always "greedy"

Aso shows you how to abdicate (反面教材)

Via FEER's TT

See Japan Probe for translation, and other election ads in Japan.

The funny shape of the East China Sea "co-development" zone

Source: FYJS , Yomiuri

The funny shape of the co-development zone in East China Sea recently nogotiated between China and Japan has puzzled many. I have speculated some reason in the choice of location (e.g. as far from Diaoyu / Senkaku as possible, largely on the disputed zone but includes a bit of the area west of Japan claim line to show goodwill, etc.) But the shape is still mysterious.

One theory (according Yomiuri - in its report also said explicitly now that Longjing Asunaro is not within the area) is that this area is chosen so that it satisfies two conditions
1) as far north as possible (as I speculated)
2) but avoid any potential dispute with Korea (!!!)

One may ask, what does Korea have anything to do with this. The map above shows (in white outline) the area stipulated by the February 1974 agreement between (South) Korea and Japan, as their codevelopment zone. Coordiantes of the polygon corners are:

• Point 1 32°57.0'N 127°41.1'E
• Point 2 32°53.4'N 127°36.3'E
• Point 3 32°46.2'N 127°27.8'E
• Point 4 32°33.6'N 127°13.1'E
• Point 5 32°10.5'N 126°51.5'E
• Point 6 30°46.2'N 125°55.5'E
• Point 7 30°33.3'N 126°00.8'E
• Point 8 30°18.2'N 126°05.5'E
• Point 9 28°36.0'N 127°38.0'E
• Point 10 29°19.0'N 128°00.0'E
• Point 11 29°43.0'N 128°38.0'E
• Point 12 30°19.0'N 129°09.0'E
• Point 13 30°54.0'N 129°04.0'E
• Point 14 31°13.0'N 128°50.0'E
• Point 15 31°47.0'N 128°50.0'E
• Point 16 31°47.0'N 128°14.0'E
• Point 17 32°12.0'N 127°50.0'E
• Point 18 32°27.0'N 127°56.0'E
• Point 19 32°27.0'N 128°18.0'E
• Point 20 32°57.0'N 128°18.0'E
• Point 1 32°57.0'N 127°41.1'E

The problem is, in 1974, China was still a closed country, far behind the bamboo curtain. This area overlaps with the Chinese claimed line (based on the Ocean trough, and 200 nautical miles -- shown in the map above). To make real progress and not complicate the problem it thus makes sense to defer any discussion that may involve another new interest party (which is also highly nationalistic).

• update: according to Mark Valencia's study, China had protested loudly in 1974.
• "On February 4, 1974, China protested loudly:
• 
  The Chinese Government holds that, according to the principle
  that the continental shelf is the natural extension of the continent,
  it stands to reason that the question of how to divide the continental
  shelf in the East China Sea should be decided by China and the
  other countries concerned through consultations. But now the
  Japanese Government and the South Korean authorities have
  marked off a so-called . . . “joint development zone” . . . behind
  China’s back. This is an infringement on China’s sovereignty"

p.s. It is a bit puzzling for me to understand why Japan had agreed to such a zone, as the south portion of the polygon extends far south of Cheju Island (or even Huang yan reef, which is the weaker version of 'okinotori' for Korea). It actually extended south of Kyushu and as far south as the latitude of Okinawa.

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传中日顾虑韩国因素 放弃开发龙井油田

【星岛网讯】中日双方日前正式就共同开发东海油气田问题达成共识，有消息称，由于顾虑韩国的关系，双方未把龙井（日本取名翌桧）油田列为共同开发的对象。只就龙井油田南侧海域的达成共识。　　

日本《读卖新闻》报道，中日双方在东海油田开发谈判中，把龙井油田排除在共同开发的对象之外，双方也将不单独开发，事实上是暂时放弃对这个油田的开发。　

报道指，中日两国由于分别顾虑到龙井靠近中国和韩国的中线海域以及接近日韩大陆架共同开发区，若进行开发有可能和韩国发生冲突而避开对这个海上油田的开发。　　

日本政府18日发表和中国达成的协议，只对龙井油田的南侧海域进行共同开发。日本在当天并未明示理由，只表示和中国的谈判结果是如此。　　

日本和中国的谈判中曾要求在跨越日本主张的日中东海中线一带的龙井（翌桧）、春晓（日本名白桦）、断桥（楠）和天外天（木坚）四个油田共同开发，结果只就共同开发龙井南侧海域以及日方出资参加中国已着手开发的春晓达成协议。　　

日本主张以日中两国海岸等距离的中线为两国的东海分界线，中国则坚持大陆架所及的琉球海沟是双方的分界线，成为谈判的最大争议点。这次以将争议点搁置方式达成共同开发的协议，中国并重申未承认日本主张的中线。---

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日中、東シナ海ガス田「翌檜」の開発断念…韓国に配慮し

Note Yumiuri had a strange (and wrong) label of Sino-Korea median line。 (1) a China-Korea line would run North-South wise instead of East-West wise, (2) there is no median line agreed at between China and Korea. what is relevant is the 200 nautical line as indicated in the first map of this post.

　日中の東シナ海ガス田協議で、翌檜(あすなろ)（中国名・龍井）を共同開発の対象としないことで合意していたことが２０日、分かった。
　日中ともに単独開発も行わず、翌檜は事実上放棄される。翌檜は〈１〉中国と韓国の境界の基準となる「中間線」〈２〉日韓大陸棚共同開発区域――に近接しており、開発すれば韓国と摩擦を生じかねないと判断、韓国に配慮した。
　日中交渉筋によると、両政府は翌檜の共同開発を一時検討。しかし、ガスを含む地層が、中韓の「中間線」をまたぎ日韓大陸棚共同開発区域に広がっている可能性があることがわかった。開発すれば、韓国が「資源を吸い取られる」と主張する懸念があった。一連の協議には韓国は加わっておらず、日中両政府は、翌檜の開発断念で一致した。
　政府が１８日に正式発表した東シナ海ガス田開発に関する日中合意では、翌檜は共同開発の対象から外され、翌檜南側の海域が共同開発の対象となった。理由について、政府は「交渉の結果としか言えない」と説明していた。
　東シナ海で日本が中国に共同開発を求めた４ガス田のうち、白樺（中国名・春暁）は日本が出資する形の共同開発で合意した。
（2008年6月20日14時43分 読売新聞）

Related:
Another Yomiuri East China Sea Map for Martin J. Frid… Wait, It Gets Better