Tuesday, June 6, 2006

Haditha and Chinese statecraft

Background:

1) Evolving reports about Haditha, suffice it to say the scandal (whatever the final finding is) hurts not only the US reputation and the already weakened domestic support, but also the situation in Iraq. Such events are going to drive more Iraqis into the arms of bin Laden and his allies, and lead to vicious cycles of anti-US resistance and more brutality from already distressed US soldiers.
2) Thomas Barnett believes the mistakes in Haditha is a result of US not getting more systematic and serious on nation-building in Iraq. I have no doubt Bush sincerely wants to get on nation-building in Iraq, although I could agree with Barnett that Bush is not serious enough, in that various interest groups and distraction has kept him from focusing on the right direction. I also agree with him that economic is a crucial element in the formula, which has largely been overlooked. Ahh, I mean Iraqi economics, not Halliburton economics. So the disagreement between Barnett and Bush's clan (Or Cheney?) is on implementation and tactic, not on strategy.
  • Barnett also seems to be very defensive on and sympathetic with the US military, which is fine, as every suspect is presumed innocent. Although I believe no one is perfect and it is not surprising if there are bad eggs in a big basket, especially if the weather condition is hot and hostile.
Chinese statecraft

I believe there is more fundamental issue about Haditha. It would be easier to comprehend if we draw on the works by ancient Chinese statecraft, which the pentagon (and Philsbury) are aware of but seem to have focused on the less important aspects.

Why does the alleged crime in Haditha have anything to do with Chinese statecraft? One needs to note that Chinese statecraft has a much longer and wider view of war, to the extent that there is no clear boundary between war, politics and diplomacy. i.e., The objective is to solve a problem with minimum cost and maximum impact, whether it is done by militaristic, political, economic or diplomatic means. Enlarged your options would surely lower your cost.

Long before Haditha, there was this short essay in PLA's newspaper, the "China Defense/PLA Daily" (中国国防报) (original in Chinese cached below). The essay analyze how the pentagon and Bush 'regime' misread Sun Zi and other Chiense statecraft, even though most strategists in US have spent considerable time on learning Sun Zi. A important point in the discuss is the idea of "Great Scrupulousness on War" (慎战) [square brackets are my additions to the original essay]
  • Sun Zi (Ch 2), "[After wins, weapons get dulled, and soldiers get tired, your ability to attack is weakened. Prolonged expedition leads to exhaustion of domestic resources..... So I will do anything to win the war quicker even if that would mean I adopt very clumsy and stupid tactics. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.] If one is not thoroughly acqainted with all the downsides of going to war, then one is not able to understand [and apply] all the upsides of war"
  • 《孙子》说:“[其用战也,胜久则钝兵挫锐,攻城则力屈,久暴师则国用不足。夫钝兵挫锐,屈力殚货,则诸侯乘其弊而起,虽有智者,不能善其后矣。故兵闻拙速,未睹巧之久也。夫兵久而国利者,未之有也。] 故不尽知用兵之害者,则不能尽知用兵之利也。”
  • Wu Qi, "It is easy to win a war, but difficult to maintain and guard after the win. Therefore, in all the wars in this world, it is a disaster if one wins 5 wars, a tired nation if one wins 4 wars, a hegemone if wins 3 wars, a king if wins 2, an emperor if it only takes one war to reach there.
  • Xun Zi offered an explanation to Wu Qi, "People will be tired and used after several wars. The leaders will become arrogant after a few wins. Leading tired people with arrogant leader, I have not heard a single case that the nation is not annihilated."
  • 《吴子·图国》进而提出一个振聋发聩的独特思想:“然战胜易,守胜难。故曰,天下战国,五胜者祸,四胜者疲,三胜者霸,二胜者王,一胜者帝。是以数胜得天下者稀,以亡者众。”为什么胜仗打多了反而是坏事?对此,《荀子·议兵》解释说:“数战则民疲,数胜则主骄,以骄主驭疲民,未有不亡者也。”
  • Hundred War Strategy concluded, "Armed force is a dangerous tool. Going to a war itself is an immoral thing. You go to war only if there is no other choice. You cannot go to war because you are strong, your nationa is big, you have a large population [not the right reason mean there are pitfalls you have not considered and there is no guaranteed win - SB]......war is like fire, if you are not careful you are going to burn yourself sooner or later..."
  • 《百战奇略·好战》总结历史上穷兵黩武之害,说得非常好:“夫兵者,凶器也;战者,逆德也。实不获已(万不得已)而用之,不可以国之大、民之众,尽锐征伐,征讨不止,终至败亡,悔无所追。然兵犹火也,弗戢将有自焚之患。黩武穷兵,祸不旋踵。”
  • [I will add this] Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. ( 孙子曰: 兵者,国之大事,死生之地,存亡之道,不可不察也。)
The essay continue to say there are many bright strategists among hawks in US. They must have known and understood all the theories above. Sun Zi was highly regarded by US Army since a few decades ago. The war in Iraq itself was even boasted as a modern era example of executing various Sun Zi doctrines. In reality, US hawks have only taken the pragmatic (tactical) aspects of Sun Zi. They did not get the essence of the oriental statecraft in which Sun Zi showed the most representative illustrations. They taught the tactics but not the grand strategy. (BTW, Is this why China want US leaders, not the DoD, to read Sun Zi?)

The audience of this essay is for the PLA officers and soldiers, not for foreigners. So the author's intention is not propaganda against US or the infamous war on WMD. He wanted all PLA officer to understand the essence of grand strategy, and the scrupulous approach to war.

Inevitability?

While I do not have much doubt that US military is very well disciplined in general and these (Haditha, etc) are isolated events, I also believe human being are not perfect. However well trained the marines are, there will be some bad eggs. Even good eggs could turn bad occasionally under extreme environment. The question is, one in how many for the bad eggs? This then leads to a conclusion that it is a matter of sooner or later that such tragedy will happen. Better training will delay such happening, but there is no way to guarantee it not happening forever, especially when place under unfriendly environment such as, local distrust and hostility to a foreign occupying force. The source of the problem is the problematic war itself. If one is aware of such downside, one would have planned for it, or would have stop the prolonged war soon after Saddam was capture (assuming the war cannot be avoided given how evil Saddam was).

IMO it is not about nation-building. Nation-building is easier said than done, espeically if mistakes has already been made. It is, as Sun Zi said, one of the many side effects of a prolonged war, and it is about the ability to fully anticipate the downside of such a war. This is not spoken with hindsight. Should we anticipate more disasters like such? Very likely, unless the Iraqi's view on the occupation can be turned into one that is not for its oil or for setting up a puppet government.

Simple solution

Given such consideration, it is not difficult to identify the source of the problem and hence locate the solutions:
  • Leave Iraq to Iraqis, get out asap
  • (A transition model would be to leave it to UN and nations not involved with the invasion, hoping the local would be less hostile. But US itself, which is already distrusted by many in Iraq, needs to get out asasp)
Pundits may ask
  • What about nation-building?
  • What if a "Hamas" (the mullahs and their proteges) is elected?
My answers would be
  • Leave the nation-building to the Iraqi. For the pessimists: the worse case scenario? A Saudi Arabia or a Shah Pavhlevi? Let's trust the Iraqi, most of whom had rejected and hated Saddam. Let's trust democracy.
  • The chance a "Hamas" would be elected is much more likely if US occupation force stay. If a "Hamas" is elected, are you going to sabotage it? or invade it again? Does that mean democracy is wrong for Iraq? Do you trust the people? As Thomas Barnett correctly pointed out, "it is the economic, stupid!" If Iraq are well-off and happy. Iraq will be a good world citizen. This is what we should focus on, making them happy. With all the oil underground, this is not difficult as not if they are left to their own.
  • The problem for this government is that it is widely viewed as American puppet. Even though there was a democratic election, many people did not participate. Leave it to their own, they have no choice but forming their own government
US already missed the opportunity where it could have left as a saviour, and be remembered and thanked by Iraq. Now it is still possible to do the right thing.

Update: see the source of 4GW.

p.s. see useless tree as well, which I very much agree with. He also elaborated on what US military did right in the beginning of the war (re: Sun Zi) and offered a better translation of Sun Zi's line "故兵闻拙速,未睹巧之久也。夫兵久而国利者,未之有也。".

Related: 3 months ago the brilliant journalist Francesco Sisci compared "political black holes" and "rouge states", which leads to questioning the implication of TWII (the war in Iraq) implies for GWOT.

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美国鹰派伊拉克战争背错《孙子兵法》值得反思
中国国防报
2004-04-27 13:06

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尽管美国新保守主义鹰派的智囊们号称学习了有“东方兵学鼻祖”之称的《孙子兵法》,尽管伊拉克战争刚刚结束时,日本《朝日新闻》撰文称,伊拉克战争是美国借用中国《孙子兵法》的现代版,但实际上美国鹰派远未领会到以《孙子兵法》为代表的中国古典战略文化的精髓。可以说,伊拉克战争,美国新保守主义鹰派背错了《孙子兵法》。这里不妨借中国古典兵学,为伊拉克战争“看病”,或许会有一番道理。



  “道”

  中国古典战略文化特别强调“道”或“道义”。“道”、“道义”用今天的话说就是政治、公理、正义或人心。这恰恰是迷信实力的人所不以为然的。

  《孟子·公孙丑上》说得好:“得道者多助,失道者寡助。寡助之至,亲戚叛之(‘亲戚’在这里可以理解为国内外人民,包括盟邦);多助之至,天下顺之。”又说:“以力假仁者霸(中国古代战略文化中所谓‘王’‘霸’有其特定的含义,与今天的霸权主义有别,但其基本精神仍可参考)……以德行仁者王……以力服人者,非心服也,力不赡也;以德服人者,中心悦而诚服也。”

  《管子·重令》则说:“地大国富,人重兵强,此霸王之本也,然而与危亡为邻矣……天道之数,至则反,盛则衰。人心之变,有余则骄,骄则缓怠。夫骄者,骄诸侯(‘诸侯’在这里可以理解为列国);骄诸侯者,诸侯失于外;缓怠者,民乱于内……此危亡之时也。”

  《荀子·王制》有一段话跟今天的伊拉克形势非常贴切,这段话的大意是:别国有别国的家园领土,他们的人民也愿意为保家卫国而战。如果我们倚恃强力,战而胜之,那么对别国人民的伤害必然非常大。对别国人民的伤害越深,他们对我们的仇恨就越深,就越是会天天和我们战斗。并且我们倚恃强力所取得的“胜利”越大,我们对自己人民的伤害就越深。对我们人民的伤害越深,人民对我们的仇恨也越深,他们就越是会天天背离我们。这样,别国的人民要和我们拼死战斗,我们的人民也要背离我们,这就是那些强悍的霸主最后反而衰弱的道理。得到土地却失去人民的支持,背上累赘而丧失成功的机会,这就是那些庞大的帝国最后反而崩溃的道理。

  这些话反复告诫今天的人们,在国际关系中要讲道义,多做好事,以德服人,不要轻侮列国,以强凌弱,以大欺小,否则就会到处树敌,丧失人心,以致众叛亲离,在国际上陷于孤立和被动,甚至败亡。

  “刚柔”

  中国古典战略文化从哲学的高度反对纯刚纯强,强调刚柔相济,进而强调以柔克刚。这是中国传统战略思想的主要特色之一。《老子》最注重这点:“柔弱胜刚强。”“天下莫柔弱于水,而攻坚强者莫之能胜。”“天下之至柔驰骋天下之至坚。”“故坚强者死之徒。是以兵强则不胜,木强则折。强大处下,柔弱处上。”

  《列子·黄帝》发挥说:“天下有常胜之道,有不常胜之道。常胜之道曰柔,常不胜之道曰刚。”

  古兵书《军谶》残篇云:“纯刚纯强,其国必亡。”

  《三略·上略》也说:“柔者德也。刚者贼也。弱者人之所助,强者怨之所攻。”

  以上所引片段充满了关于刚柔的朴素辩证法。这种“贵柔”思想的深层含义是:从长远的、大战略的观点看,弱小的新生事物具有真正强大的生命力;而处于极盛时期的事物貌似强大,在一定条件下最终要走向腐朽没落。引申到国际政治上,“贵柔”不是片面地反对富国强兵,也不是主张对外越软弱越好,而是要向“水”那样寓刚于柔。水的柔软无以复加,而且它总是处于低下的位置,但水的冲击力(例如洪水、波涛)则强大无比。按此原理,一个真正强大的国家要把自己放在适当的位置,要懂得平等待人,以理服人,这样才有可能维持长盛的局面。而如果倚恃一时的优势,处处逞强、骄横跋扈,则迟早会向自己的反面转化,招致不祥的后果。

  “慎战”

  中国古典战略文化历来主张“慎战”,即使对待正义战争也是如此,严厉批判穷兵黩武的“好战”思想。这一点对于美国鹰派们具有特殊的意义。

  《老子》说:“夫佳兵者不祥之器,物或恶之,故有道者不处。”“胜而不美,美之者,是乐杀人。夫乐杀人者,则不可以得志于天下矣。”又说:“民不畏死,奈何以死惧之”。

  《孙子》说:“故不尽知用兵之害者,则不能尽知用兵之利也。”又说:“主不可以怒而兴师,将不可以愠而致战……怒可以复喜,愠可以复悦,亡国不可以复存,死者不可以复生。故明君慎之,良将警之,此安国全军之道也。”又说:“百战百胜,非善之善者也。”

  《吴子·图国》进而提出一个振聋发聩的独特思想:“然战胜易,守胜难。故曰,天下战国,五胜者祸,四胜者疲,三胜者霸,二胜者王,一胜者帝。是以数胜得天下者稀,以亡者众。”为什么胜仗打多了反而是坏事?对此,《荀子·议兵》解释说:“数战则民疲,数胜则主骄,以骄主驭疲民,未有不亡者也。”

  《百战奇略·好战》总结历史上穷兵黩武之害,说得非常好:“夫兵者,凶器也;战者,逆德也。实不获已(万不得已)而用之,不可以国之大、民之众,尽锐征伐,征讨不止,终至败亡,悔无所追。然兵犹火也,弗戢将有自焚之患。黩武穷兵,祸不旋踵。”

  美国鹰派们凭借美国是唯一超级大国的独特地位,罔视公认的国际关系准则,置联合国及其他国际组织(甚至包括美国自己建立的联盟)于不顾,在反恐的大旗下,动辄先发制人,想打谁就打谁,想怎么打就怎么打,一个没打完就准备着打下一个。对他们来说,上述古圣先贤的至理名言是多么响亮的警钟!

  隐患

  虽然,美国鹰派不乏搞战略的行家,不能说他们对上面道理不懂,而且,他们并非排斥东方文化。比如《孙子兵法》自20世纪90年代起,就一直受到美国军方的推崇,海湾战争中,美军人手一册《孙子兵法》,伊拉克战争更号称美军《孙子兵法》的现代版。但实际上,美国鹰派对于以《孙子兵法》为代表的东方古典战略文化的精髓缺乏领悟。他们采取的是实用主义态度,仅仅将《孙子兵法》当作行军打仗的教科书,却完全忽略了其在大战略层面上的教导。同时,美国绝对优势的军事力量和号令天下的强烈欲望也使其头脑发热。所以,尽管他们的思考中有着细致严密的战术思考,有着实用主义的战略思考……但在更高层次的大战略上,他们的思考止步不前了。因此,尽管美军能制定出相当高明的军事计划,但在大战略决策上却终究陷入了主观、冒险的陷阱。体现在伊拉克战争上,就是美军不顾国际国内反对浪潮,执意进攻伊拉克,短时间内攻城略地,推翻了萨达姆政权,但却不可避免地在世人面前输了理,直至今日陷入困境。伊拉克战争给美国鹰派们上了沉重的一课。基督教圣经中有一句话说得好:“播种的是风,收获的将是飓风。”

  美国鹰派伊拉克战争背错《孙子兵法》的隐患,看来值得人们反思了。


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