Tuesday, June 20, 2006

Case studies on strategy: Another approach to the Taiwan scandal/presidential recall mess?

One of the key tools in strategy formulation is 'leverage'. Leveraging means mobilizing resources that you would not normally be able to command, or even your enemy's resources, to achieve your objectives. The other is to choose the battleground where you are most likely to win, by tricking or forcing the opponent into there.

It seems that the descendants of Sun Zi and followers in Taiwan know this very well. As an illustration, there are two blogs in Taiwan that got the essence of Sun Zi.

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Background (Also here, and update here)

While Jujuflop pointed out the potential 'legal' mess in a non-confidence vote in Taiwan, there has been more innovative solutions proposed around the internet.

Before we go into it, let's clarify a few minor points
  • Let's note Chen himself is not guilty nor even charged at this point. Chances are that he is clean himself. Whether he silently permitted the alleged corruption or secretly conceal the alleged crime (of his wife and son-in-law) is anybody's guess. However, his inability to smell the fishy signs and act proactively before the media caught them is not something any politician should be proud of, given various allegations and rumours preceding the explosion of the scandal and how wide-spread the charges are.
  • The great Kim Dae-Jung of Korea, who had not only led Korea out of the Asian Financial Crisis, but emerge even stronger, had to resign when his sons got into similar corruption scandal. Note Kim resigned only after the sons were sentenced. Chen's son-in-law is still "presumed innocent". Note also that there is no material difference in whether 'son-in-law' or 'son' commited the crime. They both used their relationship with the president for profiteering. It is how the 'leaders' act and react that alters the voters' impression.
  • Let's also note even the son-in-law, though very likely to be convicted of multiple crimes, is still waiting for a verdict. Even though there are theories speculating that it is hard to convict him of these kinds of crimes in Western legal systems, in Asian courts OJ Simpson will not get away, same can be said about Chao
  • "Keywords" posted a nice critic on the notorious partisan media in Taiwan. See how far the partisan editors are willing to twist facts for their own political agenda. (The majority of "English teacher blogs" in Taiwan are even worse, but they are blogs that represent personal opinions, not MSM.) This is why Taiwan's road to practicing democracy still has a long way to go.
In view of this, the recall is widely considered as immature from a tactic perspective for opposition KMT. However, it can also be viewed as a prelude to the non-confidence vote of the cabinet, and hence an integral part of that grander manuever (which makes more sense). In any case, one should not let the complication of the process stop him from doing the right thing (assuming it is a right thing). Therefore, I would argue that the legal complication jujuflop introduced is an issue independent of whether KMT should go for "no-confidence" vote. Because, if, hypothetically, Chen himself is involved in corruption, and still manages to make that a case of Blue-Green duel, shall KMT go for no confidence vote (or consider the same question if switched the role of Chen with Ma and Blue with Green)?

Therefore, all we are talking about is whether "no-confidence vote" is a valid tactic or not. Because whether it is right to do so is up to the decision of every individual voter, not the politicians, nor commentators like us. And they will tell us with their votes.
  • Some argue that it may not be, because it is extremely unclear whether Blue will get 2/3 seats in such scenario, though it is sure that PFP will be further marginalized
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Now, Let's go back to the 2 case studies. View these as purely academic cases, not as my endorsement to their causes.

1) Another approach: choose the battleground to fight

A deep Blue (be warned) blogger Pifeng proposed recalling the Legislative Yuan members in northern Taiwan, where Blue voters are dominant. He noted that
  • It only takes 20,000 signature to recall a LY member
  • And if they chooses the battleground carefully, i.e., in Blue strongholds in the north, then all the Green LY member might be recalled
  • Once about 25 pro-Bian legislators are out, it is then very likely for the anti-Bian team to gather over 2/3 votes in LY.
  • If such approach is voiced as a credible threat, some of the LY members in question might switch side, hence saving the troubles of the recall actions
By choosing the right battleground, the chance of getting the required 2/3 vote is greatlky enhance (vs a general LY re-election)

The assumption here is: people are firmly behind the recall, which seems to be very unclear as now it has been turned into a partisan fight. I am still not quite sure what the real poll data look like yet. The other issue is that the Green camp may do the same in the South, though they may not get votes from the centrists this time. And if they do it, it is precisely the situation a 'no-confidence' vote would lead to.

2) Leveraging: get the middle and light green

A classical story of leveraging is "Borrow the Eastward Wind and Borrow Arrow Legends" in Romance of The Three Kingdom.

This is from a (self-claimed) centrist who has been critical of both Green and Blue. He is as critical on Soong as he is on Bian. However, today the deep Green may label him 'light Blue' because he is definitely a supporter of 'recall'.

His ideas essentially take the centrist path, maximizing support from all camps and turning DPP's weapons against itself. To maximize support, he argues Ma needs to leverage support from the middle and light green like himself and those slightly (or considerably) greener than himself. The key insight (surprise!) is that Ma does not need to care about the deep Blue and should not be bothered about short-term dip in poll. What he lost in these polls are the deep Blue supporters who would vote for him in 2008 blindly. Therefore, Ma made a big mistake when he danced to Soong's tunes. Instead, Ma should switch back to the color-indifferent (or "purple") appeal, and find common ground with these people. To turn DPP's old tricks against itself, he proposed the China card, i.e. neutralize DPP's usual divisive China threat tactics and compare the scandal with that of the mainland in 1989
  • 大家再想想,每次選舉時,陳水扁都是用哪些策略來打擊泛藍?第一,黑金牌:指的就是兩蔣時代留下的國民黨黨產,以及李登輝時代以劉泰英為掌櫃,至今仍逍遙法外的黑金集團。第二,愛台灣牌:用出生地來分化族群,用外省人當原罪來打擊對手。第三,中共牌:抹紅對手為中共同路人,把所有對他不利的事實都塑造成是對岸的統戰陰謀。這三張王牌自陳水扁當年從諸位泛綠大佬出線以來,每戰必用,每用必勝,已經變成他私人調兵遣將用的「兵符」了。陳水扁之所以還能再度發起本土政權保衛戰,手上靠的也就是這三支能替他招來群眾的兵符。...
  • 最後是「中共牌」。長久以往,民進黨就處心積慮地要讓國親和中共扯上關係。而泛藍從來也沒有辦法成功地反擊這張牌,充其量只能冷凍這張牌,不去回應。現在大好的時機來了。我建議泛藍上街時,請務必打出悲壯的六四天安門紀念主題曲,因為我們每個人都是貪污扁政府下的「民主烈士」。這首歌曲實在非常應景,面對全台大爆料,我們可以看到泛綠政客的反應,的確就是:「

    蒙上眼睛,就以為看不見(貪污);
    摀上耳朵,就以為聽不到(抗議);
    而真理在心中,創痛在胸口;
    還要忍多久?還要沉默多久!!!

    這首歌在全球華人的記憶中,所唱出的都是足以讓人握拳到滲血的憤怒,如果能打造新裝與罷免活動相結合,遊行的時候播放也好,當成揭發弊案廣告短片的背景音樂也好,那麼所產生的效應將是排山倒海。因為扁政府一旦與共黨政權畫上等號,這道兵符將會乖乖地落到台灣人民的手中,回頭全部起來造他的反!

  • ...如同馬主席所言。罷免案,我們要的只是要陳水扁下台,呂秀蓮繼任,我們不是要清光民進黨,更不是要搶奪政權,沒有必要發起台灣藍綠人民互相對抗的焦土作戰。我們要的是更多曾被阿扁愚弄的人民與我們站在一起,而不是為了激起更多含淚保衛貪污政權的台灣人民來與我們對立。三國演義中,曹操兵矢連營數十里,孔明草船借箭,不費吹灰之力得矢十萬,利用曹操的箭來回擊曹操,成為佳話。馬主席、宋主席,現在東風已起,你們準備好去接收陳水扁的那三道兵符了嗎?

To be fair, the corruption (and the reluctance to tackle corruption) in mainland 17-20 years ago was definitely a lot more serious than what Taiwan faces today. So I am not sure if many will take that analogy. But it is a good trick. More importantly, his ideas of leveraging are good demonstration of what good strategist should be thinking about.

In fact, the mainland government has been very cooperating these days. e.g., by staying away from the politics on the island, and even go as far as censoring reports and commentary about the scandal in mainland. (I believe many observers mis-read that as fearing democracy and criticism on its own corruption).

The last lesson on strategy, it helps one to see the big picture if one can step back and take a by-standers' point of view. Because it is usually the neutral parties who are able to think rationally. The centrist/light-Blue blogger is able to see this because he can observe objectively.

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(Update) Wow, this is fun. Great drama to watch. Chen Shui Bian has just opened a new can of worms. He said, "I did not have sexual relatioship with that woman". Sorry, what he actually said was,
  • Mr Chen claimed the First Lady had never directly received gift vouchers in exchange for support in a struggle over the management of the Sogo department store as alleged by the opposition.
  • He also said "I asked her again if she has met with merchant Chen You-Hao and her answer was negative". (The allegation of meeting Chen You-Hao is a separate case of political contribution) The remark drew immediate response from DPP legislator Shen and Chen YH himself.
  • Chen also chose to speak Minnan dialect in his speech, wooing deep-Green audience who are already supporting him without reservation, but alienating the middle Hakka voters. A decision he will regret in future.
The recall tactic alone might have caused more damage than we had thought.

Update 6/21 It is hard to find neutral commentaries in the polarized media in Taiwan. Apple Daily and Jiang Chunnan are the rarities. But it seems Jiang is on vacation or Jimmy Lai has received some instruction from his higher-up again (I hope this is only a joke).
Anyway, I will make compromise by looking at the dissenting voice within the 2 camps. Here is from DPP legislator Lin Cho-shui (more radical than CSB in promoting independence. e.g. He tried to lay all the blame of the scandal on the (alleged) strategic mistake of the Blue camp. He also denied it was the ethnic divisive drive DPP took that "eased" CSB's crisis. So keep in mind his deep green biase and his conflict of interests in intra-DPP power struggle). But interesting to read and to see the other end of the spectrum.

大廝殺 只問陣營不論是非
林濁水

為了一個一定不會通過的罷免案,朝野動員群眾大對決,整個社會陷入歇斯底里的對立之中。
click to read full article cached

罷免總統,動作雖然大,但是卻是體制內的行為,體制內的國會既已經在處理中,若要動員當在立法院通過後,為什麼就大張旗鼓舉辦一連串的群眾動員,藍軍的解釋是要鼓舞社會對罷免案的支持。假使目的真是如此的話,那麼從民意的變遷來看,效果其實適得其反。在趙建銘收押時,罷免的支持度最高,有4成5,但目前反而略略下滑到4成出頭;相反的,反對罷免的由3成出頭上升到4成,雙方旗鼓已經快相當了。 (Not sure where the sources are. China Times poll has 43% for recall vs 34% against)

台灣意識成社會主流
對這現象,一種說法是扁嫂病危,陳幸妤思夫、小安安想爸爸...等親情牌奏效。不過這解釋是有問題的,因為在這一段期間,社會對第一家庭有不好印象的,大幅上升到近6成。
另一種說法是,本土社團強烈打本土牌,訴求保扁才能保護本土政權,鞏固了基本教義派的支持,但這種說法的弱點也顯而易見,因為本土台灣主體意識雖然已成為社會主流,但基本教義派群眾目前還沒高達4成。
根據最近一項政大作的民眾認同調查,認同自己是中國人創新低只有5.1%,這可算是統派的基本教義派;認同自己既是台灣人也是中國人的43.5%,算是不統不獨的中間派;認同自己是台灣人的高達46.4%。但這些恐怕不能認為都是基本教義派,基本教義派大抵接近3成。 (Again, there is probably minor biase in these numbers. But the trend he quoted is quite true)

民調映民眾矛盾心理
不久前對陳總統和民進黨的支持度掉都掉到兩成,這可以說連基本教義派都流失了,但在和最近罷免案一起做的民調中,陳總統的支持度已經拉到近3成,對備受批評的第一家庭有好印象的也近3成,兩個相當的數字都說明基本教義派民眾回頭來支持扁,但其實從在扁滿意度只有兩成時,反罷免的仍有三成,表示基本教義派再不滿意扁時的3成比目前反罷免的仍少了1成。由此可見反罷免的不只是基本教義派,連相當比例的中間人士都反罷免了。罷免和反罷免加起來高達8成,可以說台灣民眾高度向兩方集中的現象,而其餘不表態的只剩不到兩成,這些與其說主要是中間派,不如說多是對政治素不關心的人士。
反罷免的人遠多過滿意扁的,而且成上升趨勢,說明了民眾的矛盾心理,不少人既不滿阿扁,但對藍軍的罷免也反對。這些人除了不希望罷免帶來政治的不安之外,恐怕不少人是不能接受藍軍以清廉、正義自居。尤其在馬英九透過藍軍立委和縣市長發動罷免更令人側目:這些人中不少自己有案在身,是弊案主角,卻倒過來指控阿扁,而扁並非自己涉案,涉及的是家屬、親信。
對本土基本教義派訴諸「本土政權」最有動員力,至於對中間人士,恐怕藍軍愈動員,愈顯得雙重標準才是他們反罷免的理由。對他們最犀利的廣告是在電視上不斷重播馬統帥替台東縣長助選說的一段話:「罪不及妻孥,道理就這麼簡單」。為了鞏固自己的政權,「罪不及妻孥」講得理直氣壯,為了打擊政敵,動員前是說等到扁有直接證據,動員後則說不必有直接證據;動員前對趙建銘案說要哀矜勿喜,動員後則說要給他死得很難看。這種做法無非是只論陣營不論是非,也談不上前後一貫,中間人士當然怕怕,所以愈動員效果愈反動員。
(One thing I agree with Lin, is that Ma's failing to detach himself from corrupted factors in KMT, e.g. Taitung, backfires)

冒進代價是藍軍受傷
罷免是宋先發動的,宋目前的作戰目標在搶奪深藍基本盤,取得基本盤才能在藍軍中立於不敗地位,至於淺藍、中間的流失不是目前計較的。深藍既被挑動,馬感到威脅,於是兩人比冒進。其代價則是整體藍軍受傷,這猶其次,怎樣冷卻社會陷入歇斯底里的對殺,才是目前最重要的課題。

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