Showing posts with label rmb. Show all posts
Showing posts with label rmb. Show all posts

Monday, May 18, 2009

Cheung on RMB again

I am going to revisit this topic again and again, until Beijing listens. I think this is what Prof Cheung is trying to do. So what I have to do is to just check his blog regularly and quote him when he makes some (seemingly/relatively) new point(s).

Here are the key points I would like to emphasize
  1. China can made Shanghai a financial centre (at least at the regional level) if it opens up its currency, which means getting an independent (or currency market "neutral") anchor for the RMB -- i.e. the Commodity Basket!
  2. One key strength of the Commodity Basket is that it is (largely) linear independent of any existing currency (eg USD or EUR). It provides a new dimension for other currencies in the  world to "reference". I say "largely" because some currencies do depend on some commodity (eg OPEC on oil, and AUD on its minerals, etc) but all these dependencies are only partial and more importantly, they are influenced by human factors such as the macro-economic policies (interest rates, etc) of these countries. OTOH, a Commodity Basket peg provides a "pure" axis for other currencies in this world to reference on. Countries such as Singapore can use RMB as one of the main component of its basket (it can also chose its own basket, in which case it will help to stabilize the commodity price -- i.e. make it more difficult for speculators to influence the short term price fluctuation). I think this is the most important reason for adopting the Commodity Peg.
I agree with Cheung that many countries (esp developing countries) would use RMB as one of the reference in their currency peg. However, I do not agree with him that overseas Chinese would affect the demand of RMB (perhaps Koreans would be so patirotic as to put once own saving to the state, very few people from other nationality will, Chinese are no exception). The reason for anyone, ethnic Chinese or not, to put his money in RMB is because it provides a unique proxy that nom other exisiting currency provides, and that it has very clear transparency. Commodity Peg provides both.

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《金融中心上海将远胜香港》(二○○九年四月十四日)发表后,读者差不多一致同意。该文提出的第五点,行内的朋友拍案叫好。我是这样写的:

搞金融中心,你道上海胜香港最重要是哪一点呢?我赌你猜不中。这是严格地说,港元没有自己的面目。钩着美元或转钩人民币,港元算不上是可以独当一面的货币。多年以来,港元在国际上打出一点名堂,算是了不起,但要搞出一个举足轻重的国际金融中心,自己的货币可以独当一面非常重要。

回顾历史,英镑曾经雄视地球,今天还清楚地有自己的面目。伦敦是世界级的金融中心,有其因也。美元的成功故事不用说,面目得来不易,带起华尔街。七十年代日圆呼之欲出,一时间东京红得发紫,可惜政策出了大错,一蹶不振二十多年了。欧洲采用欧元之前有三几只货币有看头,但国际上不成大器。今天的欧元有面目,但金融中心没有国籍名堂。再者,金融危机出现后,欧元能否保得住是问题,因为不同的国家需要有不同的货币政策。当年佛利民反对蒙代尔的欧元建议就是为了这一点。

要搞起一个重要的国际金融中心,货币有自己的面目重要。这是说货币需要是一只名牌,有公信力,容易被各方接受为结算单位。弱币不成,强币较好,但太强也不成。与物价水平衡量,币值稳定重要;国家本身的生产力可靠也重要。人民币有十三多亿人口的可靠生产力支持,过了一个难关,而如果依照我多次建议的以一篮子物品为人民币之锚,物价当然稳定,所有难关都过了。这里要说的,是不久前周小川先生提到凯恩斯三十年代建议的以三十种物品为货币之锚,与我建议的方法不同,施行会有困难。我建议的要点,是为锚的一篮子物品要化为任何人可以大约地在市场自由成交的物价指数。这是重点,我解释过多次了。

这里要说的,是北京不久前公布会在二○二○年在上海推出国际金融中心。那是十一年后,他们在等什么?不明白北京的朋友怎样想。经济的发展历来千变万化,见一步走一步要反应快,要判断准。搞金融中心可不是搞北京奥运,不是要按着既定的时间表进行的。金融中心早就应该搞,而对中国来说,数千年来,最有机会达大成的时机是今天。夜长梦多,再等是劣着。让我分点说说吧。

(一)搞国际金融中心最重要的条件是没有外汇管制——即是说,外人要多少人民币皆可按市价购买,其进、出口政府一律不管。搞国际金融中心,有汇管不能搞。这里有一个传统的谬误,虽然我认为是维护某些利益团体的借口。这是有些人认为放开汇管要等到什么时机成熟云云。是大错。已故的香港财政司郭伯伟曾经对我说,二战后,香港有关当局也认为需要有汇管,放开要等时机成熟。但他们当时不知怎样管,于是不管。后来见不管的效果好,就想也不再想了。

二十年前,佛利民最执着的是中国立刻解除汇管。他对我举出人类历史无数的汇管为祸的例子。后来北京把汇管放宽了不少,但不少沙石今天还在。要是中国没有放宽汇管,不会有今天。目前看,全部放开是搞国际金融中心的先决条件。

我不要在这里指出哪些团体或机构因为人民币有汇管而获利,但要指出一点北京朋友信奉的,是神话。他们认为汇管可以阻止资金外流。其实不然。汇管可以阻止或妨碍的是生意的正常运作,要把资金搬出国外的人总有办法。几个月前美国的外交部公布的中国投资于美国金融的数字,比中国央行的估计高出一倍!

(二)像中国那么庞大而有经济实力的国家,搞国际金融中心大有可为。但要打出名堂,人民币在国际上要成为名牌,要有自己的面目,不容易。数千年来,中国货币能打出名堂的成功机会最高是今天。这是因为国际金融大乱,人民币推出去会给国际人士在保值上多了一个选择,何况炎黄子孙满布地球,给祖宗一个面子我是相当肯定的。

自由地放人民币到地球云游四方,国家赚钱,有需要时收回就赚了利息。另一方面,放人民币出去不是要在国际上取代美元或其它先进之邦的名牌货币,而是因为我在《人民币的故事》(二○○九年三月三日)指出的一个重要观点:

目前的形势是,因为这些年落后之邦发展得非常快,先进之邦如在梦中,从汇率的角度衡量,前者与后者之间出现了一个很大的断层,连接不上了。上层之间有竞争,下层之间也有竞争,但上层与下层之间的竞争是脱了节的。北京的朋友认为可以容易地打上去,推出腾笼换鸟,失之轻浮。治安转劣,是腾笼换贼乎?回乡归故里是连笼子也换了吗?

目前看,上述的「断层」很现实,但向前看,这断层早晚会收窄,会平服下来。因为这些年发展中国家的生产力上升得快,而先进之邦的法定最低工资高企不下,需要的过渡期会为时甚久。人民币放出去,其它落后之邦或发展中国家的货币,不直接或间接地跟着人民币走是很愚蠢的。我反对中国做什么发展中国家的一哥,也反对中国要领导世界什么的。但我肯定今天把人民币放出去,会协助发展中国家的发展,从而可以远为容易跟他们贸易而获利。

(三)这就带来另一个重点。自二○○三年起我极力反对人民币兑美元升值,同时解释过多次,这反对不是人民币兑美元的本身,而是其它发展中国家的币值跟着美元走,人民币兑美元升值,于是兑其它竞争国家的货币也升值。解除汇管,人民币自由进出,发展中国家多了一个重要的选择,情况会很不相同。

这是说,依照我解释过的,一九九七的亚洲金融风暴之后,发展中国家的币值与人民币达到了一个均衡点,成为一个层面,跟着的发展是这层面与先进之邦的币值层面出现了一个相当大的断层。如果人民币独自在国际上提升,对中国的竞争力会带来灾难性的影响。人民币有外汇管制,不放出去,亚洲的发展中国家没有选择,跟着美元走,人民币兑美元升值是劣着。但如果央行解除汇管,让人民币自由外流,聪明的发展中国家会把其币值跟着人民币走,或起码会重视与人民币汇率的调节,也会考虑以人民币作为他们的一部分外汇储备。读者要知道,任何国家都可以随时选择及调校他们的国际币值。这调校要考虑到自己的竞争力、国际贸易的利益与国民收入的实质享受。这也是汇率在市场浮动的主要功能。如果大有差池,不按经济原则处理自己的货币的国家,执政者是要下台的。

这些年我担心因为中国有汇管,人民币兑美元升值等于兑其它发展中国家的货币升值,在竞争中会中计。解除汇管,让发展中国家多了人民币的选择,他们不按经济原则处理币值,不维护自己的外贸利益,中计的就转到他们那边去。这也是说,只要人民币解除汇管,稳定着自己的货币的购买力,避开了不可以接受的通胀或通缩,美元兑人民币怎样变动中国大可不管。中国要管的是与其它发展中国家的互相得益的竞争,而如果人民币不自由放出,他们的币值老是跟着美元走,中国不能不管人民币兑美元是何价。

上述的道理不浅,但属一等的经济分析。是纯正的价格理论。纵横学问五十年,我认为除了价格理论,可取的经济学没有其它。

(四)人民币解除汇管,有机会带来另一项麻烦。以小人之心度君子之腹,四方君子可以凭炒买炒卖来扰乱人民币在国际市场的运作。机会不高,也不难处理。中国要稳定人民币对物品的购买力,而最简单的方法是用我建议过无数次的、把人民币与一篮子任何人可以在市场直接成交的物品指数为货币之锚,也即是与这篮子物品的价格指数挂钩了。肯定可行,我解释过多次,这里不再说了。人民币下了这个锚,对任何货币的汇率皆自由浮动。这样,在货币的话题上,中国是不怕任何扰乱的。

这里要说的,是如果人民币与一篮子物品为锚,其它发展中国家的币值会跟着人民币走的意向一定激增,而某程度他们选用人民币作储备也可以肯定。这些判断我乐于赌身家。

(五)也说过多次,无锚的货币制(fiat money)不可取。这一点,不少经济学者同意,只是以大国而言,他们想不出怎样把货币下一个固定的锚。十多年前跟进朱镕基的货币政策时,我霍然而悟,想出了可以用一篮子可以在市场成交的物价指数为货币之锚。

八个月来,为了跟进地球金融危机而读到不少美国行内专家的货币言论,更证实了无锚货币不可取之见。这些专家不少是老朋友,他们的学问我历来欣赏。无锚货币的困难他们当然知道,但在美国现有的经济结构下,转用我提出的下锚制不容易。欧元可以采用,而人民币采用是更容易了。

无锚货币的一个无可救药的缺点,是适当地调控货币量难于登天。这些年美国联储用上调控利率的方法,基本上是价格管制,违反了费沙的不可能错的分析,也违反了价格浮动是引导资源使用最重要的功能。我曾经指出,美国的次贷之灾的其中一个主要起因,是联储把利率辘上辘落。利息是提前消费或提前投资之价,利率应由市场决定,央行不要管,但这重要的市场利率运作,是要在人民币下了一个可以在市场运作的锚才可以安枕无忧。

我明白如果把人民币下了一个稳定的锚,让利率自由浮动,央行的调控经济的权力会大幅下降。这是正着:市场的运作一般可靠,远胜政府的左右。不是说政府不要管经济:应该管的事项多得很,但该管的不管,不该管的却干预频频,出错的机会十之八、九也。

上海搞国际金融中心,原则上是前途无限的。要放开汇管才可以搞,而央行的工作会转到另一些重要的事项去。央行还在等什么?北京的朋友还在等什么?国际金融中心是那么重要的工程,有大成可勒碑志之,北京今天的领导人为什么要把这样重要的功绩推到接班人那边去?他们为什么要胡里胡涂地把自己的名字押在新《劳动合同法》这项劣迹上?难道将来的历史怎样写对他们不重要吗?


Tuesday, March 24, 2009

The Answer for Zhou Xiao Chuan

The answer for Zhou is already written here - as advocated by Prof Stephen NS Cheung and I recapped some 3.5 years ago. All issues Zhou raised are addressed in this system, which Zhou lamented for its being shelved some 70 years ago. China can go ahead with this solution alone while persuading G20/IMF/WB to follow suit. This is an area where China can and should lead, by doing it first, because China does not have the legacy of the developed nations. If China does so, it would surely be first joined by most nations which are now pegging their currencies to the USD or Basket (eg the gulf nations, ASEAN, some Eastern European non-Euro countries including Russia, may also follow suit)

Zhou's said, in an essay (in Chinese original here)
  • 国际储备货币的币值首先应有一个稳定的基准和明确的发行规则以保证供给的有序;其次,其供给总量还可及时、灵活地根据需求的变化进行增减调节;第三,这种调节必须是超脱于任何一国的经济状况和利益
  • an international reserve currency should first be anchored to a stable benchmark and issued according to a clear set of rules, therefore to ensure orderly supply; second, its supply should be flexible enough to allow timely adjustment according to the changing demand; third, such adjustments should be disconnected from economic conditions and sovereign interests of any single country. The acceptance of credit-based national currencies as major international reserve currencies, as is the case in the current system, is a rare special case in history. The crisis again calls for creative reform of the existing international monetary system towards an international reserve currency with a stable value, rule-based issuance and manageable supply, so as to achieve the objective of safeguarding global economic and financial stability.
  • 超主权储备货币的主张虽然由来以久,但至今没有实质性进展。上世纪四十年代凯恩斯就曾提出采用30种有代表性的商品作为定值基础建立国际货币单位“Bancor”的设想,遗憾的是未能实施
  • Though the super-sovereign reserve currency has long since been proposed, yet no substantive progress has been achieved to date. Back in the 1940s, Keynes had already proposed to introduce an international currency unit named "Bancor", based on the value of 30 representative commodities. Unfortunately, the proposal was not accepted.
  • 超主权储备货币不仅克服了主权信用货币的内在风险,也为调节全球流动性提供了可能。由一个全球性机构管理的国际储备货币将使全球流动性的创造和调控成为可能,当一国主权货币不再做为全球贸易的尺度和参照基准时,该国汇率政策对失衡的调节效果会大大增强。这些能极大地降低未来危机发生的风险、增强危机处理的能力
  • A super-sovereign reserve currency not only eliminates the inherent risks of credit-based sovereign currency, but also makes it possible to manage global liquidity. A super-sovereign reserve currency managed by a global institution could be used to both create and control the global liquidity. And when a country's currency is no longer used as the yardstick for global trade and as the benchmark for other currencies, the exchange rate policy of the country would be far more effective in adjusting economic imbalances. This will significantly reduce the risks of a future crisis and enhance crisis management capability.
  • 改革应从大处着眼,小处着手,循序渐进,寻求共赢
  • he reform should be guided by a grand vision and begin with specific deliverables. It should be a gradual process that yields win-win results for all
(English recap from AP, and WSJ  seems to have missed some key points above)
  • Zhou said the proposed new currency also should be used for trade, investment, pricing commodities and corporate bookkeeping.
  • "A super-sovereign reserve currency managed by a global institution could be used to both create and control global liquidity," Zhou wrote. "This will significantly reduce the risks of a future crisis and enhance crisis management capability." Zhou also called for changing how SDRs are valued. Currently, they are based on the value of four currencies — the dollar, euro, yen and British pound. "The basket of currencies forming the basis for SDR valuation should be expanded to include currencies of all major economies," Zhou wrote. "The allocation of the SDR can be shifted from a purely calculation-based system to one backed by real assets, such as a reserve pool, to further boost market confidence in its value."
The Economists spelled out what China's objective really is (we all know it is neither practical or feasible to replace the USD in the medium term, as most media reported superficially, or the Chinese wishfully)
  • Mr Zhou’s proposal is China’s way of making clear that it is worried that the Fed’s response to the crisis—printing loads of money—will hurt the dollar and hence the value of China’s huge foreign reserves, of which around two-thirds are in dollars.
The key issue is how to make the transition "gradual" (大处着眼,小处着手,循序渐进) to minimize potential risk. And the only way to a first step is to (i) shift the RMB peg from USD to a basket of currencies then (ii) to a basket of commodities. China did the (i)  in 2005 but it needs to do (ii), perhaps but making a gradual shift, by, e.g. first with a 90% currency b. basket + 10% commodiy basket, then lowering the weight of currency basket smoothly

Tuesday, July 22, 2008

ZT: Stephen Cheung - RMB and inflation

See below (source)

Hightlights are bolded.

Cheung raised an important hypothesis/interpretation on how the RMB basket exhcange rate works. i.e., thw weight of USD in the basket had changed over the past 3 years.

If that is the case, everything starts to make sense again. I had previously 'concluded' that the weight was USD was very high (over 90%+) back in 2005. What really happened might be that the PBOC had designated a transition period (maybe a couple years) for the weight of USD to gradually drift to where its trade weight puts it.

If that is the case, we should expect the USD/RMB rate to stabilize once the regression shows that the USD "implied weight" in the basket approaches its tradfe weight.

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从世界大变看中国通胀


今年二月份中国的通胀率高达八点七,不可谓不严重。新春雪灾当然有影响,但怎样扣除其严重性仍在。此「胀」也,早在半年前就令人担心。这是骤眼看。中国的通胀真的是严重吗?很难说。
是不容易解释的通胀现象。如果佛利民仍在,有我在旁提点「怪」处,一下子他也不容易说出道理来。人民币量的增长率无疑过高,但为什么央行出尽八宝也不能把通胀压下去呢?单是去年,国内银行的储备金率提升了十一次,破了世界纪录,而利息率则记不起加了多少次。这些不是上选的压制通胀的方法,但西方的经验,是这些方法历来生效。然而,这一轮的中国通胀,老生常谈的杀手锏不灵光!另一方面,我们没有理由怀疑北京当局要压制通胀的决心:上述的两项货币政策大手下笔,其它宏观调控的措施五花八门。然而,中国的通胀我行我素!北京当局是不能也,非不为也。
还有另一个不容易理解的现象。目前人民币在国际上甚强,而强货币是不容易有通胀的。当然,如果让人民币大幅上升,到了某一点通胀必会终止。这样做愚不可及:日本昔日的经验是前车可鉴,何况今天的中国要面对印度、越南等廉价劳力地区的竞争。问题是,历史的经验说,只要币值强劲,不升值也不会有通胀。换言之,像人民币那样强劲而还有百分之八的通胀率,人类历史没有出现过。我们要怎样解释目前中国的情况呢?

六十年代在芝大跟进当时吵得热闹的货币理论时,以佛老为首的芝加哥学派认为物价上升与通胀是两回事。他们认为通胀带来物价上升,但物价上升了不一定含意着通胀。佛老认为,通胀永远是货币的现象,必然牵涉到通胀预期(inflationary expectation)这个重要但在观察上难以捉摸的话题。这是说,一次过的物价上升,没有带来再上升的预期,不是通胀。话题不肤浅,这里不详述。
我认为目前中国的通胀,主要的一部分是物价上升,不算是通胀,所以除非央行转用一篮子物品与人民币挂钩,采用西方的货币政策不容易生效。另一方面,很头痛,物价的不断上升会引起通胀预期,不是通胀也会变为通胀了。

首先要重复说过几次的:中国的农产品价格上升是好事。目前中国的通胀,绝大部分是农产品价格上升使然。想想吧,中国农民的劳动人口,十之七八转到工商业去,农产品相对非农产品的物价,怎可以不上升呢?另一方面,中国的人均农地那么少,农产品之价不升农民的生活怎可以改进呢?关心农民的炎黄子孙,还是多花一块几毫购买农民的蔬菜,多花十元八块购买他们的猪肉吧。
细看中国农产品的价格上升,可不是那么简单。中国农民的生活急速改进,始于二○○○,农产品价格明显地上升,则起自二○○三。可能由中国带动,自二○○五年起,举世的农产品价格也在急升。我们农转工,经济成就举世瞩目,其它落后之邦也跟着农转工。以心为心,我们要向他们拍掌。如此一来,举世的农产品价格也因而急升了。严格来说是物价上升,不是通胀,虽然目前我无从估计,中国农产品的物价上升,多少是起于农转工,多少是起于人民币量的变动,也无从估计这上升有多少是因为农产品的进口价格急升而上升的。

今年二月,非农产品的物价只上升了百分之一点六。真的是上升了吗?还是下降了?相对价格当然是下降了,但我认为实质上也是下降了的。这是因为原料的价格,尤其是金属那方面,进口的,这些日子上升得非常快!这几年中国低下阶层的收入上升大有可观,在进口原料价格急升的情况下,非农产品的价格一年来只升了百分之一点六,反映着劳动的生产力也正在急升。从工业那方面看,中国不仅没有通胀,工人的生产力正在急升,抵消了一部分的原料升价,虽然最近的新劳动法是把这发展搞乱了。

上述是说,今天中国的通货膨胀,一个主要原因是昔日的落后之邦,正在一起农转工地发展起来。无疑是由中国带动,没有理由反对大家的生活一起好起来。这个发展无可避免地导致农产品的相对价格上升,而工业需要的原料,尤其是金属性的,这些年的价格上升以倍数计。

外来的物价大变对中国当然有影响,但更头痛是两个其它问题。其一是金价与油价上升得很不正常:前者达每盎司美元一千;后者达每桶美元一百一十。这样的升幅是不可以用农转工来解释的。有两个其它解释,你选哪一个?一、中东局势不稳,伊朗战争随时可发;二、举世出现了通胀预期,而这预期最明显是反映在金价与油价的变动上。不懂政治,但从报章读到的局势变动消息衡量,近来金价与油价的变动与中东局势无关。余下来的就是这样的一个大麻烦:通胀预期是地球性地出现了。有传染性,不少外资跑到中国来找避难所。

地球性的通胀预期何自起?起自美元急泻。这是第二个头痛问题。从一九五三到父亲的店子学做生意到今天,我没有见过美元跌得那么厉害。一九九一波斯湾之战后,美元一直强劲,举世争持美元,但五年前再攻伊拉克,这强势不再,跟着是倒转过来,弱势变得明显了。这其中美国的议员严重地做错了一件事:他们强迫人民币升值,人民币于是与美元脱钩,转钩一篮子货币。跟进人民币的国际汇率的朋友会知道,其后美元在那篮子的外币中的比重,逐步减低了。如果人民币继续单钩美元,美元不会跌到哪里去。如果人民币不钩美元,只钩其它,美元不知会跌到哪里去。如果局部钩美元,美元下跌,人民币兑美元上升,但对其他主要货币却下降了,是给美元拉下去的。后者不是经济学,是小学生的算术课程吧。

美国的经济历来举足轻重。世界经济大变,伊拉克之战显然打不过。政治我不懂,但在物价调整后,每天算,今天伊战比昔日越战的费用高出一倍。我同意佛利民说的,攻伊是大错。不同意佛老,认为财政上美国负担得起。能否负担不是问题所在——问题是费用或成本总要与利益比较一下。此比也,目前看,尤其是看美元与金、油价的走势,此战是输局。

如果美元继续下跌,美国的通胀急升是无可避免的。目前这通胀不明显,经济不景是原因。次按风暴当然不幸,但协助了美国债券还没有大跌。如果长期债券大跌,等于长线利率大升,联储局是无能为力的。昔日越战后的经验,岂不可鉴乎?这些可能的不幸我早就看到,但没有写出来。二○○六年五月十六日我还是发表了建议港元转钩人民币的文章,在同一天就给某评论骂了。不听老人言是要付代价的。今天我不建议港元转钩,因为时日有别,局限是转变了。

世界大变,中国稳定自己可以协助稳定世界——虽然比不上美国那样重要。央行要做的还是我提出过的三点。一、约束钞票的发行量,不要多管钞票之外的货币量;二、把人民币与一篮子物品挂钩,但要让这篮子的物价指数每年上升百分之三左右;三、解除汇管,把人民币放出去。这后者可以立刻舒缓人民币的上升压力,困难是一旦解除汇管,人民币的钞票发行量的上升率应该是多少,要眼观六路才知道。我的水晶球说,如果新劳动法不变,目前中国的外贸顺差会在一年内变为逆差。到那时才放人民币出去,与今天相比亏蚀甚巨。

是世界大变吗?还是世界大乱了?

Sunday, November 25, 2007

Stephen Cheung on RMB, Rural China (ii)

When I first started as a management consultant a dozen years ago, the MNCs focus on "big 3" -- Beijing Shanghai and Guangzhou. They complained that there is no scale in such a huge market. I laughed, and created a tiered city approach using the China City Statistical Yearbooks. Without going for the 200+ cities China does not have the scale to support these capitalist fat pigs. The role model of the time, Xian Janssen, already went to that depth while everybody was insisting only the big 3 can afford his product and they will never compromise by "lowering" their price.

The Excel database and classification I established is still in use today by the firm, quite widely, AFAIK.

Today, our focus should shift to rural China. Only those with the vision to reach rural China, and the ability to understand rural China will succeed in the coming decade.

This is why I am thrilled by Professor Cheung's speech below (ii), and (iii)

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说过多次,反对人民币升值是为了中国的农民。也说过多次,中国农民的生活搞不起,经济增长怎样了不起也没有用。说要改善农民的生活说了几千年,得个「讲」字,但今天是看到曙光了。

近来反对人民币 升值有点火气,情难自禁也。可不是因为农民的生活没有改进,或改进得太慢。正相反,大约二○○○年起,中国农民的生活改进得快,上升速度超过我的期望。形 势好,是关键时刻,泼冷水愚不可及。左盘算右盘算,我认为这几年农民生活改进的速度,如果再持续十年——从历史看是很短的时日——中国的农民会达到小康。 还要鼓励城市的工商业发展。农民生活的改进,是要靠工商业的继续励进带动的。不容易看到农民的生活与城市的人均收入打平,因为后者有大富人家。但农民的人 均收入,要达到城市的中等人家水平不苛求。那是小康,大约还需要十年吧。这是以目前农村的发展速度算,也把二○○三年起农产品价格上升的速度算进去。

说实话,要一下 子大幅提升农民的生活,易过借火。那是拜当年的日本为师,禁止农产品进口。但这样做,中国整体的经济发展会变得溃不成军,无从再进矣。我反对禁止农产品进 口,或抽进口税;我也反对最低工资,反对补贴农业,反对福利经济——因为这些会扼杀农民自力更生的机会。我赞成大事推广农村子弟的知识教育,认为最好鼓励 私营的慈善机构办学,赞成在农村推广适用于中国的农业科技,也赞成大学取录学生时,农村子弟的高考成绩不妨让个折头。

我也认为两年前取消农业税是对的。这「取消」协助了在农民大量转到工商业去的情况下,农产品的总量还继续上升:弃置了的农地再被耕耘,雇用全职农工开始盛行,而农作的机械与建设投资,虽然还简陋,是明显地急速上升了。

不要相信农民的 生活愈来愈苦,或贫富两极继续分化。就是北京也难以估计流动人口,以户籍人口算农民的人均收入不对,而外国机构的什么分化指数统计,根本不知道中国发生着 些什么事。在收入的差距上,城市与农村之间可能还在加阔,但相对的百分比升幅,这几年农民比市民升得快是没有疑问的。这发展继续,农民的收入早晚会追上城 市的居民。

北京目前的统 计,是全国农民人口下降至总人口的百分之五十六。是以户籍人口算吧。我调查了几个农村(包括河南、江苏、浙江、广东、贵州),图案竟然一样:可工作的农村 劳力,十个走了七个。近城市的走得较少,因为容易半农半工。大略地算一下,从总人口看,今天农村的实际人口只有总人口的百分之三十五左右,而从劳动人口 看,操作农业的大约是百分之二十(一位作过比较深入调查的专家朋友,说只剩百分之十五左右)。六年前在广州讲话,我说中国操农作的要下降至总劳动人口百分 之二十左右才算及格。这言论给人痛骂,说永远不可能。曾几何时,今天应该是达到了,比我六年前想象的快。今天看,农作劳动人口再下降五个百分点就差不多 了。

无可置疑,近两 年建筑工人的收入上升得很可观,反映着从农转工的速度缓慢了下来。雇用的农工兴起,而他们的全职收入,目前是略高于工厂的低薪工人。这里要指出一个考虑重 点。以低工资从工商业学起,只要勤奋,知识与日俱增,假以时日,其收入的上限有机会高到天上去。换言之,工商业的知识有很大的争取空间,机会有很大的变 化,因而收入增长的弹性高。农业可没有这样的际遇。中国的农作知识了不起,但主要是数千年的智慧积累,农村的孩子从小耳闻目染,长大后一般都学满了师。不 是说先进的农业科技对中国毫无用处,但地少人多,好些外来的科技没有多大用场。技术上,这些年中国的农业有长进,而以胶布建造温室这几年盛行了。那天我见 到农民投资五千,用胶布建一间房子,可养鸡千只,有无限感慨。是新法饲养,而令我心跳加速的是一户农家拿得出三个五千元。

无论怎样说,一 个地少人多的国家,加上农业的本质,农民收入的上升弹性远不及工商业。所以我认为一个年轻力壮的农工收入,只略高于工业的低薪是不够的。这几年农产品的价 格比工业产品的价格上升得快,是好现象。假设工业产品之价不变,农产品之价再升一倍至一倍半,加上设备投资与新技术,农民一般可达小康。这样盘算,我的估 计是再要大约十年。

漫长的黑洞,中 国的农民终于走到尽头,见到光亮了。为什么不让他们走出洞口呢?发神经!说过无数次,农转工,中国的农民起步时是转到我称为接单工厂去。这些工厂的产品没 有自己的商标,也没有任何专利,只是有单接单,有版照造,他们的竞争对手不是什么先进之邦,而是越南、印度等工资比中国还要低的地方。人民币升值,大家用 美元结算,订单会容易地跑到这些后起的地区去。今天的中国可没有日本当年那样着数,可以让日圆上升一两倍还有竞争力。一九九一年,在瑞典,我跟佛利民说得 清楚:世界大变,不久的将来地球会增加十至二十亿的廉价劳力在国际上竞争。没有看错,这竞争出现了,是地球之幸。我为印度、越南等的兴起感到高兴,而对中 国来说,落后之邦有点钱是大吉大利,因为与之贸易可以多赚一点。但让人民币升值是让赛,是轻敌,是未富先骄。

是的,就是农转 工到了一个饱和点,北京还不能让人民币升值。原因是要提升农民的收入,我们要让工商业的收入上升。这上升会自然地迫使工业改进产品的质量与引进科技,而这 几年中国的研究投资的上升率是世界之冠。人民币不升,中国的接单工业总会有抬头的一天。是的,中国早晚要放弃低下的接单工业,让改革较慢起步的接单去吧。 绝对不是看人家不起,而是中国的劳苦大众吃了那么多年苦,今天的形势是他们的血汗换回来的。

五年前说过,人民币强劲,主要是因为中国的人民大众吃得苦。人民币升值,对富有的炎黄子孙无疑有利。但劳苦大众呢?难道他们会旅游巴黎喝拉图红酒吗?

(之二)

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上文提到人民币面对两项困境。其一是兑美元上升, 外贸以美元结算,弹性系数不协助,中国的外贸顺差不跌反升。这会带来外间再强迫人民币升值,有可能一重一重地逼上去,使中国走上日本当年的不幸的路。其 二,中国的劳苦大众的工资,高于跟他们竞争的印度及越南等地,人民币再上升,这几年发展得很有看头的农民生活,会遇到严重的打击。

这里转谈第三项困境。那是这几个月中国的通胀是明 显地上升了,到了近于不可以接受的水平。这里我们要冷静下来,思量一下。首先,近来的通胀加剧主要是农产品的价格上升得快。这是好现象。农转工的人数那么 多,农产品的价格上升是自然的现象,而如果农产品的价格不升,农民的生活不容易有抬头的一天。然而,普通常识说,农转工的人数多,非农业的物价理应下降才 对。但没有,只是上升得少。原则上,中国的物价指数,农产品占三分之一,其价上升一个百分点,其它物价下降半个百分点可以抵销,使通胀率为零。但没有。在 目前中国的发展中,通胀年率低于五可以接受,目前是在六至七之间,不好,也不大坏。

大坏而又头痛的,是人民币兑美元上升了百分之十, 按照经济常规,币值上升是会带来通缩的,但没有。以香港为例,近两年港人到大陆消费,物价是上升了百分之二十强。不是说国内的人也遇到同样的通胀,分析复 杂,但可以肯定地说,因为人民币值在国际上升了,国内的通胀率其实不止目前公布的六至七之间。

这就带来一个有趣的经济学问题。币值上升,应该有通缩—读者不妨想象人民币值大幅上升,通缩必至—但为什么上升了百分之十还会有通胀加剧的现象呢?

我的解释有两方面。其一,贸易顺差急升,外资继续 涌进,外汇储备激增,这些进帐或迟或早是要用人民币兑换代替的。这会导致人民币的国内流通量增加。不是说外汇进帐要下降至零才没有通胀,但因为这进帐的激 增使人民币量上升,央行加息约束的主要是国内市民的消费与投资,不是明智之举。其二,央行以压制人民币需求的方法来纾缓其上升压力,例如禁止在国内自由地 以外币兑换人民币,有适得其反的效果。压制需求会促使市场预期人民币会继续上升,争持人民币会使币量被迫提升。

这就带来我曾经说过的一个重点:要纾缓人民币上升的压力,约束需求(目前做的)是劣着—正着是增加人民币的供应。后者,为避免国内的通胀加剧,央行要把人民币大量地放出国外—这是要解除目前的外汇管制了。

解除汇管,把人民币大量放出去,要人民币变得毫无 上升压力很容易,而放出去够多人民币值是会下降的。要注意:把人民币放出去与此前决定(而最近剎掣)的天津「直通车」到香港买股票很不相同。「直通车」是 内资外流,但人民币外放有引进外汇的效果,国家是有钱赚的。这里要说清楚:从经济学的角度看,我不反对内资外流,但指明是购买股票却是劣着。股票之价,原 则上,是反映着上市公司的回报率,市场应早有定论。无端端因为「直通车」而使港股上升了百分之四十,反映着股民一般无知,早晚会损手烂脚!买股票不是移民 潮买楼,不是自由行购物,而是市场投资,要看上市公司的投资回报。

炎黄子孙有钱出外投资,那很好,但要让他们自由选择投资的项目与回报的预期。说实话,当今之世,不容易找到一个地方投资比神州大地更可取,但如果炎黄子孙要分散一点,那到外间下点注,过瘾一下,也无不可,但不要强迫他们通过港股市场。

要纾缓人民币的上升压力,大量把人民币推出国际是 最上选的了。这里还有一个很少人注意到的重点。这两年人民币上升,主要是兑美元上升,而我说的接单工厂今天叫救命,主要是他们一律以美元结算!是个尴尬的 问题,炎黄子孙很有点面目无光:既为泱泱大国,经济搞了起来,震撼世界,但外国人购买中国货,为什么不能用人民币结算呢?这是因为中国还有汇管,人民币不 自由外放。

北京的朋友要为国家的尊严设想一下吧。但在目前的 形势下,解除汇管让人民币自由外放,有不小的机会带来相当头痛的麻烦:国内的通胀因而急速上升的机会存在。这里我们有两方面的考虑。一方面,有两点对通胀 是有利的。第一点,如果北京依照我的建议,取消进口税,贸易顺差大跌,有纾缓通胀的效果。第二点,以提升人民币的对外供应来减少该币的上升压力,市场再不 争持。另一方面,人民币自由外放,对通胀不利也有两点。第一点,人民币的强势下降的本身,会增加通胀的压力。第二点,如果外放了的人民币回流,国内的人民 币量增加也会导致通胀。人民币留在外地则不会,但外放了的总会有某部分回流,尤其是投资中国这些年成为风气了。我们无从估计外放了的人民币的回流比率会是 多少。

两点会纾缓通胀,两点会增加通胀压力,一起合并, 国内的物价会向哪个方向走呢?很难说。如果一定要我猜一下,我认为在目前的物价明显地趋升的形势下,解除汇管,外放人民币到没有上升压力的那点,国内通胀 加速的机会较高,有可能引起急速通胀。因此,我不能不旧话重提,建议人民币与一篮子物品挂钩。这后者我分析过多次,但好些读者还是不明白。应该是传统的货 币观误导了他们。我要从另一个角度再说一次。

这里要补充一下的,是人民币大量外放,中国的外汇储备会相应上升。与贸易顺差及外资涌进的储备上升不同:除非人民币大量回流,其外放带来的储备上升是不会增加通胀的。

(之三)

Saturday, May 26, 2007

Everything you need to know about the RMB valuation



The Economist has an excellent review on the RMB valuation.


  • Why the exchange rate is a fussy issue


  • Why the accusation from US politicians are logically flawed


  • Why a (mild) appreciation may not necessarily lead to disaster in China


  • Why China should appreciate RMB for its own benefit

Enjoy.

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Lost in translation

May 17th 2007 BEIJING AND HONG KONG
From The Economist print edition

If China sharply revalued the yuan, as American politicians are demanding, it could actually hurt the United States and help China
Stephen Jeffrey
CHINA is being cast as the villain once again. By holding its exchange rate artificially low, it is stealing jobs and causing the United States to run a huge trade deficit. Beijing must therefore be forced to revalue the yuan. These are the arguments behind an increasingly protectionist mood in Washington. Yet they are largely flawed. A stronger Chinese currency would not much reduce America's trade deficit. Indeed, the irony is that China, not America, has more to gain from setting the yuan free. Without a more flexible exchange rate, there is a growing risk that China's sizzling economy will boil over.
America's anger at China is clearly growing. In February it filed a complaint to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) against Chinese export subsidies. In late March the Department of Commerce announced tariffs of 10-20% on glossy paper imported from China, to offset the impact of alleged government subsidies. This reversed a 23-year-old policy of not imposing countervailing duties on a non-market economy. Then in early April the Bush administration filed two more complaints: one on Chinese pirating of DVDs and CDs, and the other over restrictions on the sale of foreign films and music in China.

Although by themselves these actions are trivial, together they point to an increasing appetite for tougher action against China. The Bush administration is under increasing pressure, particularly from Congress.
Congressmen complain that the so-called China-US Strategic Economic Dialogue (a series of high-level talks between the two countries launched last year by Hank Paulson, the treasury secretary) has so far failed to produce results. The recent deterioration in trade relations does not bode well for the next meeting, which begins on May 22nd. Many commentators now reckon that Congress will inevitably pass some kind of China-bashing legislation later this year. A sharp economic slowdown in America as a result of the collapsing housing market would make this even more likely.
The biggest risk comes from measures linked to China's supposed exchange-rate misalignment. The infamous Schumer-Graham bill, which proposed a 27.5% tariff on all Chinese goods to offset the yuan's alleged undervaluation, was withdrawn last year. But the two senators behind it are working with others on a new WTO-compatible version that could soon appear. Although the new bill is unlikely to include across-the-board tariffs, it could have sharp teeth.
Meanwhile, the target of all this hostility looms ever larger: China's trade surplus with America increased to $233 billion last year, accounting for almost 30% of America's total deficit. China's total current-account surplus reached an estimated $250 billion, or 9% of GDP, up from only 1% in 2001. Worse still, in the first four months of 2007, its trade surplus jumped by 88% compared with the same period in 2006.
The making of myths
China officially abandoned its decade-long policy of pegging the yuan to the dollar in July 2005. Since then it has risen by only 8% against the greenback. Because the dollar itself has weakened, the yuan's trade-weighted exchange rate has barely budged. In real trade-weighted terms it is about 10% cheaper than at the dollar's peak in 2002. As a result, it is not just the usual protectionist suspects that demand action, but many mainstream American economists are now calling on China to revalue by 20% or more. Yet the standard arguments for a revaluation are based partly on a series of myths.
The first myth is that there is overwhelming evidence that the yuan is grossly undervalued. China's large bilateral trade surplus with America proves nothing. It largely reflects Asia's changing supply chain. Much of what America buys from China today once came from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. China now imports components from these countries, assembles them and exports the finished goods to America. Knock out these and America's bilateral deficit with China shrinks by more than half. Even so, China's overall current-account surplus is also huge. The surge in its foreign-exchange reserves, to over $1.2 trillion, also suggests that the yuan is undervalued: without those massive purchases of dollars, the currency would have risen.
However, not all economists agree that the yuan needs to be sharply revalued. At one extreme is Morris Goldstein, of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, who argues that the yuan is undervalued by 40% or more against the dollar and should immediately be revalued by 10-15%. In the other corner many highly respected economists, including Robert Mundell, an economics Nobel prize-winner, and Ronald McKinnon, of Stanford University, strongly argue against a big appreciation of the yuan.
The devil to measure
Economists find it devilishly hard to define the “correct value” for a currency. On purchasing-power parity (PPP), the yuan is clearly undervalued against the dollar. Perhaps by as much as 50%. But PPP is not useful for determining the optimal exchange rate between two countries of such different levels of income. It is natural for average prices to be lower in poorer countries because wages are lower. As countries get richer and their productivity rises, their real exchange rates appreciate. And although the depreciation in the yuan's real trade-weighted value since 2002 looks perverse, this follows a real appreciation of 50% between 1994 and 2001 (see chart 1).
A study by two IMF economists, Steven Dunaway and Xiangming Li, found that estimates for the undervaluation of the yuan ranged from zero to nearly 50%, depending on which method was used. Another recent study, by Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie Chinn and Eiji Fujii, concluded that using conventional statistical methods it is hard to prove that the yuan is much undervalued. Such uncertainty may partly explain why America's Treasury Department has so far ducked labelling China as a currency manipulator in its twice-yearly report to Congress. Another reason is that it is loth to give ammunition to the protectionist lobby.
Myth number two is that the sharp increase in China's trade surplus is due to an explosion in cheap exports. Until 2004 China's surplus was relatively modest, but it soared over the next two years (see chart 2). Jonathan Anderson, chief Asia economist at UBS, points out that export growth actually slowed between 2004 and 2006 (see chart 3). The main reason for the bigger trade surplus was a sharp slowdown in the annual real growth rate in imports, from more than 30% in early 2004 to less than 15% last year.
The entire increase in China's trade surplus since 2004 has come from trade in heavy industrial materials and equipment. China used to import increasing amounts of steel, aluminium, chemicals and machinery, but import growth collapsed after 2004 when the government started to tighten policy, causing a sharp slowdown in construction, one of the biggest importers of machinery and materials. At the same time China continued to invest heavily in metals and equipment, creating substantial excess capacity, so import growth remained relatively weak last year. Mr Anderson argues that imports should recover as overcapacity is used up.
The third fallacy is that imports from China destroy jobs and harm the American economy. It is hard to see how China can be blamed for job losses when America's unemployment rate (4.5%) is close to its lowest for decades. Trade with China may affect the composition of jobs in America, but it has little impact on total employment. It is true that some workers are harmed by trade with China, just as there are some losers from all international trade. But the American economy overall is better off, so in theory there is ample room to compensate any losers.
Trade with China helps, not harms the average American. Thanks to imports from China, prices are lower and real incomes higher. Commentators often refer to the “cheap” yuan as being an unfair subsidy for Chinese exporters. But it is a moot question who exactly is subsidising whom. Not only do cheap imports subsidise American consumers, but China's large purchases of Treasury bonds also hold down American interest rates, thereby subsidising home buyers. Suppose that overnight the yuan rose by 30%, what would happen? American interest rates would rise as China needed to buy fewer Treasury securities and prices at Wal-Mart would increase. If consumer spending and imports then collapsed, this would certainly reduce America's trade deficit, but in a much more painful way than most Americans have in mind.
Wishful thinking
The biggest myth of all is that a revaluation of the yuan would greatly reduce America's trade deficit. The real cause of the deficit is that Americans spend too much and save too little. This means that the country has to import surplus savings from abroad by running a current-account deficit. If a stronger yuan did not cause Americans to save more, it would do little by itself to reduce the trade deficit.
Another reason why even a big rise in the yuan would do little to reduce America's deficit is that there is little overlap between American and Chinese production, so American goods cannot replace Chinese imports. Instead, other countries, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, would probably replace the Chinese. Shifting purchases to higher-cost producers amounts to imposing a tax on American consumers, says Stephen Roach, chief economist of Morgan Stanley.
Even where America and China do compete, as in electronics, the high import content of China's exports blunts the impact of exchange-rate movements on export prices, because a rise in the yuan reduces input costs. About half of China's exports consist of goods that have been assembled from imported components. And domestic wages and materials account for about 30% of the cost of those re-exports. Mr Anderson estimates that a 10% rise in the yuan would increase average export prices by only 3-5%.
If a yuan revaluation encouraged other Asian economies to follow suit, the impact on America's trade deficit would be larger, but still modest. If a 10% revaluation of the yuan were matched by all other Asian currencies, the dollar's trade-weighted index would fall by 4%. Yet, the 19% decline in the dollar's trade-weighted index since early 2002 has failed to trim the deficit.
None of this means that a yuan revaluation leaves America's trade deficit unchanged, simply that any change would probably be small. Nouriel Roubini, of Roubini Global Economics, finds evidence that China's trade balance is affected by movements in its exchange rate: the yuan has fallen sharply against the euro since 2002 as a result of the dollar's decline, and China's exports to Europe have consequently grown at a faster rate than its exports to America. A stronger yuan might therefore curb China's exports to America, but America's deficit would continue to loom large if imports from China were simply replaced by those from elsewhere.
Chinese whispers
Many of the arguments heard in America in favour of a big revaluation of the yuan are flawed or at least exaggerated. However, many of the arguments used in Beijing for why a revaluation would endanger China's economy are equally suspect. For instance, the common claim that a big jump would seriously harm China's growth and employment contradicts the argument (also favoured by Beijing) that an appreciation would have little effect on China's trade surplus with America.
Or take another popular line of defence: it is often asserted that China cannot afford a more flexible exchange rate until its dodgy banking system is reformed and strengthened. Eswar Prasad, an economist at Cornell University, says this argument has it completely backwards. The distortions caused by today's rigid exchange-rate regime may themselves be the biggest threat to Chinese financial stability. A sound banking system requires an independent monetary policy, which uses interest rates rather than blunt directives, to guide credit. And a country cannot control its monetary policy unless it accepts a more flexible exchange rate.
By tying the yuan closely to the dollar, China has been forced to hold its interest rates lower than is prudent: higher rates would attract more “hot money” from abroad, putting upward pressure on the currency. The real rate of interest paid on bank deposits is negative and lending rates are far too low for such a fast-growing economy. Cheap money results in excessive bank lending and poor investment decisions, which could lead to an increase in non-performing loans. Excessively low interest rates are also fuelling stockmarket and property bubbles.
News that China's real GDP surged by a breathtaking 11.1% in the year to the first quarter and that consumer-price inflation had risen to 3.3% in March (it eased to 3% in April), stoked fears that the economy is out of control. But concerns about overheating in the usual sense of excess demand are exaggerated. China's widening current-account surplus and its strong investment imply excess supply. Excluding food, the inflation rate is only 0.9%. Instead, the real concern is that excess liquidity, as a result of the surge in foreign-exchange reserves and low interest rates, is flooding into shares (see article). Households are withdrawing money from low-yielding bank accounts to bet on the stockmarket. China needs much higher interest rates to cool its asset markets. To regain control over its monetary policy China needs to let the yuan rise.
A revaluation could also help the government succeed in shifting the balance of growth away from investment and net exports towards consumption. A stronger exchange rate would boost consumers' purchasing power, allowing them to buy more foreign goods. Excess saving in China is as much to blame for global imbalances as inadequate saving in America.
Most of the increase in saving has come from Chinese companies, which are earning record profits. But household saving is also kept high by the poor public provision of health, education and pensions. Partly as a result, consumption accounts for an unusually low share of GDP.
The good news is that the mix of growth is starting to become more balanced: over the past year, investment has slowed while retail sales have quickened, rising by 15.5% in the year to April. In other words, consumer spending is now growing faster than GDP. Dragonomics, a Beijing-based research firm, estimates that consumption rose from 37% to 40% of China's nominal GDP growth in 2006 and is set to rise again this year.
The stronger growth in Chinese consumer spending has got much less attention in America than the sharp increase in the country's trade surplus. The contribution of net exports to China's growth has increased so far this year. However, the near doubling of its trade surplus in the first four months of the year was probably a one-off, because firms brought forward their shipments so as to avoid an expected reduction in export-tax rebates. Exporters are also thought to be overstating their export revenues in order to dodge capital controls and bring in foreign money to invest in Chinese assets. If so, the trade surplus should stabilise in coming months.
In the long run, stronger domestic consumption could trim China's trade surplus. The government can encourage this by spending more. Its spending on health care and education rose by an average of 50% last year and it is budgeted to rise by more than 60% this year—but from such low levels that it could take years to increase social spending by enough to encourage households to save a lot less. Meanwhile, a stronger yuan would help to rebalance the mix of China's growth.
Mirror image
This turns the whole debate about China's exchange-rate policy on its head. It is China that has the most to gain from allowing the yuan to rise. If the spat between America and China were to ignite protectionism or financial instability, it could endanger the whole world economy. All the more foolish, therefore, that economic relations are based on misperceptions on both sides. America needs to stop making China a scapegoat for the failures of American policy. Only if it gets its own economic house in order, by boosting domestic saving, will its “advice” to Beijing seem credible. Likewise, China has no right to criticise American policy when its own economy remains unbalanced.
America is right that China needs to revalue, but for the wrong reasons. And arguing that a revaluation helps America's economy makes it less likely that Beijing will act. Moreover, if George Bush foolishly slapped harsh trade sanctions on China, America's economy would be the biggest loser. Likewise, China is foolish to resist a more flexible exchange rate partly because it does not want to be seen as caving in to America's demands, when it is in its own interest. If the world's two leading engines of growth remain at loggerheads, everyone will pay the price.

Monday, May 7, 2007

The RMB surplus "problem" and "exchange rate problem"

Honestly, it is not really a problem if you have too much money. But it is if you have too much cash at hand and do not know how to more efficiently deploy it, and it is a problem if it becomes an excuse for other to hurt you.

Stephen Cheung proposed his solution to China's currency "problems". I will paraphrase a couple points here.

1) "There is never pressue because your currently is too strong." -- the pressure to rise and the pressure to fall do not work in symmetric manner.
My analogy will be if your boat is too light, there is no danger of it sinking. Because gravity works to your favor. When RMB is "too strong", all PBOC needs to do is too increase supply.

2) Increasing supply leads to increase in the risk of inflation. But it is so only if it stays in the domestic market. However, if the circulation is outside of China (like the greenback circulation outside the USA), it does not affect the supply level in China and there will not be pressure on inflation

3) To let RMB flow out of China the government needs to lift capital control (both ways to allow free flow) and foreign government (and people) will want RMB as one of the currencies for foreign reserve

4) However, the current strength and hence demand (and interests) of RMB in international market may not be sustainable. If the money flows back into China there will be inflation (and you cannot restrict flowing back, as no one would want to buy RMB in the first place if so).

5) To stabilise inflation China can use the commodity basket as the anchor. The commodity will then define the value of RMB and hence hold inflation to that of commodity prices.


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张五常:人民币及其它——覆茅于轼
作者:张五常  来源:东亚经济评论   发表日期: 2007-5-6

东亚经济评论 http://www.e-economic.com

茅于轼真君子也。年纪比我长,但算是同辈。我们这辈子经历过二战及之后的血泪历程的人,多多少少对国家民族有赤子之心。这方面,茅兄比我强得多了。这些年他拿着短小的本钱协助农民的教育与自力更生,令人感动。我自己只是拿着笔杆爬格子,这里那里大声疾呼,比起他亲自落手落脚,渺小得很。说赤子之心跳得比较快,比较激动,是医学之外的哲理,何况到了日暮黄昏,来日无多,这样的人免不了有点不耐烦,有点脾气了。这方面,我搞不清楚茅兄与我孰高孰低。几年前听到他在机场喝咖啡,因收费奇高,大发牢骚。当时我想,价高大可不喝,有什么牢骚可发呢?殊不知两星期前,在深圳机场,等机喝咖啡,每杯最相宜的四十,四个人坐下来,两位要喝,两位不喝,女侍应说,不喝的,只坐下,也要每位收费四十,吓得两位急急脚离开。可幸侍应提点,否则埋单收足,官司可能打到北京去。最近读到茅兄在某访问中,提到我,其中有两点与我对国家经济的看法不同。其一是间接的,没有提到我,但可能在那访问中,有人提到我只看经济效益,反对最低工资,也反对福利经济。茅兄说社会的公平与正义也重要,不可或缺。虽然公平与正义不容易鉴定为何物,我的心与茅兄的心绝对是在正确的位置。人类天生下来就不公平,所以处理这项社会问题很复杂。我的立场有五点。一、天生有缺陷的或后天遇大不幸的,我们要帮助,最好让私人或私营慈善机构处理。二、政府要放开每个人自力更生的机会,也要维护这种机会的平等。三、虽说天生下来本领不平等,但从收入那方面看,差别不是那么大,本领有别或勤奋不同而导致的收入不同我们要接受。四、机会相等但际遇不同,导致的收入不同我们也要接受,因为我们难以分辨本领与际遇所引起的收入不同。五、权势过人,或关系超凡,可以导致很大的收入差距。这后者我反对,因为违反了自力更生机会平等这个原则。是的,因为权势、关系等而导致的收入差距,是今天中国的一个大问题。反对财富不均,或反对贫富悬殊的劳苦大众,主要是见到或听到某些人靠权势及关系而大发其达。他们问:你凭什么本领比我赚那么多的钱?于是眼红,于是投诉,不平则鸣。这方面我不仅理解,而且无从反对。大家知道,因为权势及关系而导致的贫富悬殊,是中国经济改革中无可避免的。今天这改革大致成功了,还要再大走几步,是清除这类不「公平」的时候。问题是要怎样处理才对。答案当然是要清除那些因为权势及关系而说得上是腐败的机会及行为。是艰巨的工程,北京不可能不知道要做,但「关系」这回事,虽然我不懂,也可以想象不易处理。我懂的——这里要向茅兄提出——是以修改收入不均的办法会有适得其反的效果。增加累进税率吗?难不倒有权有势的人——这一点,四十多年前戴维德早就提出了,支持这论点的证据有的是。推出最低工资、福利经济等项目吗?也适得其反,因为这些不鼓励收入低下的力争上游,贫富悬殊驱之不去也。转谈人民币,茅于轼的观点与我的不同,直接地提到我。有两点,相关的。其一,茅兄认为币值上升是发展起来的国家必会出现的情况,不让人民币升值是守不住的。其二,如果中国开放金融(包括取消汇管),人民币一定升值。这两点是传统的谬误,让我澄清吧。一、欧洲经济发展得最顺利的二百年,用本位制,币值是稳定而没有上升的。日圆当年大幅上升,一则起于美国压力,二则有本土富有人士支持,其效果是发展得非常可观的经济,兵败如山倒,不景长达二十多年,到今天还翻不了身。当年我是第一个推断了日本的不幸。前年史坦福一位大教授以整本书分析日本的惨痛经验,他支持中国,极力反对人民币升值,是基于他对日本的研究了。二、蒙代尔也极力反对人民币升值,是基于二千年前罗马帝国与上述欧洲发展的经验,认为稳定币值是经济运作的一个重点。佛利民与蒙代尔之争,起于佛老认为,脱离了本位制后,一个大国不容易下一个固定的锚──佛老于是支持fiat money制。我起初站在佛老那边,但后来多番思考……的货币制度,知道一个大国的货币可以下一个固定的锚。英国的货币大师C. Goodhart也是下锚的拥护者,一九八三年香港考虑联系汇率时,我跟他研讨过。今天,大家的意见有出入之处,不是应不应该下锚,而是这个锚要怎样下才对。我考虑以一篮子物品为锚,起自一九八三,佛老当时认为成本太高,但后来朱老政策的经验,使我意识到以一个指数为锚可以稳守。一九九七我说人民币是强币,二○○二说人民币是天下最强,二○○三年初说美国一定会施压──这些走在历史前头的话是有记载的。二○○三起我再考虑,在朱老的货币制度下转用一篮子物品为锚,反复考虑无数次,认为不可能错,是最好的货币制度。以一篮子物品的价值指数为货币之锚,政府是不需要提供物品的,成本甚低也。在这制度下,央行不要手痒,学人家搞什么货币政策。回头说fiat money,用的是以目标(targets)为锚,以币量或利率调控经济的政策不能不用。精明如格林斯潘,在任二十年利息率轮上轮落轮了八次,与朱老的制度相比,输了几条街。三、说过了,币值的下降压力与上升压力是不对称的。一种货币的币值要下降,处理不容易:外汇储备可能不足,减少币量不是举手之劳,不知要减多少才对,就算成功,减少币量的效果可能要等长时日才见到。但币值有上升压力,要之不升易过借火。目前央行压制人民币上升的办法,是约束需求。这是大错。他们要倒转过来,增加供应。大量把人民币放出,是简单的事,要人民币「弱」到哪里都可以。困难是通胀的问题。解决的办法有两个要点。其一是开放金融,取消汇管,让人民币大量流出国外。数之不尽的亚洲国家、市民要持人民币,政府也要人民币作储备。把人民币放出去中国可以赚很多钱,这是劳苦大众的努力促成人民币强劲的回报了。不明白为什么央行不这样做。会有通胀吗?如果人民币在外地使用,或被外地的政府用作储备,中国本土是不会引起通胀的。人民币在外地代替了其它货币的一部分,央行赚大钱,也协助了外地的经济稳定性。其二,如果放了出去的人民币大量回流,中国会有通胀。采用我建议的以一篮子物品为锚,可大显神通矣。坚守这个锚,不会有通胀,何况这个锚的物价指数可以调整,向上向下调整都可以。万无一失,因为央行有那么多的外汇储备(简直水浸),有需要时可把人民币买回来。天下间不可能有一个国家不希望有今天中国的币值上升压力!因为压力是上升的,处理容易,央行不要让地下(其实是地上)钱庄做独市生意了。开放金融,解除汇管,上海会在三年后超越香港!这类宏观推断我历来准确。

Saturday, September 9, 2006

US-China Trade balance and RMB

Tyler Cowen has a nice piece on NYT today (cached below), speaking out the obvious about RMB and US trade balance.
  • "The United States should not be spending its international political capital on yuan revaluation, which is at best a nonevent."
Harvard's Greg Mankiw's agrees. Brad DeLong commented on a highly hypothetical worse case what-if scenario of China stop buying US treasury. He perhaps worried too much.
  • 1) Where else would China realistically put the cash? The weight of US Treasury in China's portfolio may drop gradually. But it will not be abrupt nor it will be.
  • 2) As Mankiw and DeLong both agreed, equoted, China is doing a big favor to the US, both by selling at a very low price and financing the US at very low interest rate. Even if you take the latter away, there is still the former. China did that not for charity, but because US provided what China needs: an opportunity to practice its capitalism and technology upgrade, and a low-risk option for investment. Fair trade in free market.
  • 3) Cowen is right in that, the revaluation, is therefore, a non-event for US. (Hence not worth the wasting of its political capital
In an ideal world, US may be able to assist or micro-manage China's economy, as Brad DeLong hoped. In reality, even the PRC government cannot control the rhythm of dragon heartbeat! Therefore, Cowen is spot on in that US should not try to micro-manage China. Instead, what US should do is to offer technical advice and warning to help China handle the challenge. In a globalized world economy, China's success in managing its economy has positive impact on US, and vice versa.

Brad Sester diagrees. But I do not think Cowen's conclusion and proposal contradicts with any of the facts in Brad's testimony. Because,
  • Brad's 4 points in his testimony
    1) "RMB significantly undervalued." I think RMB is undervalued. But how significant it is is a debated question, some said 40%, some said 10-15% a year ago. With the drift in the past 14 months it is now 5-10% vs 35%. The more relevant question is, what to do with it? or does it really matter what is done (to China, vs to US, vs to the world)?
    2) "China has 'heavily' intervened". Yes, any system other than free floating requires quite heavy intervention, if that is what "heavy" means. Again, I would say most of the impact/consequence (and risks) of the intervention are on China itself. If the world should worry, it should worry that China destabilizes itself and the consequence ripples through the world system
    3) "China's surplus generated impact on US financial system." Yes, low interest rate kept down by high demand on Treasury notes by China, Russia, OPEC countries, in the same order of magnitude. China isn't alone in this. Why picked China?
    4) "China's current account surplus need to be reduced for the sake of global economy". It is not obvious why china's current account surplus is neccessarily a bad thing. it certainly represents an inefficient allocation of capital/resource on china's part. It is not good for China. But the implication on US or the world is not that clear-cut. I think this is one of Cowen's key points.

    My take on Cowen is that his view is probably is similar to mine regrding the 4 points above, no fundamental disagreement, but somewaht different interpretation. The conclusions are
    1) taking into account the total impact (i wish someone with good access to the data can do a quantitative sum up) of US export, price inelastic segment of the import vs price elastic segment to US, the net effect of RMB reval on US-China merchandise trade may be quite insignificant, even though it may be in the same direction as Brad predicted
    2) as commentator Dor (in Brad's blogpost) pointed out, the job loss in US is tiny, 150k/150M =0.1%; if one takes into account the job creation/retention in Boeing/etc, it is even smaller.
    3) taking into account US business stakes in businesses in Chinese (eg eg iPOD produced in China sold to EU/Japan, KFC's profit in China market) and hence ths profit repatriated to US, the trade balance could narrow significantly. It is important to differentiate total "trade" (cashflow, including merchandise, service, investment, expatriate, etc) vs the often discussed "merchandise trade"

    Therefore,
    a) is it worthwhile to waste US political capital on an issue that is questionable to the overall US business/economic interests?
    b) it is not efficient for US to micro-manage China's economy, and micro-management from a distance often get things wrong or drive things opposite to one's original intention.
(To be continued)

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China Is Big Trouble for the U.S. Balance of Trade, Right? Well, Not So Fast

By TYLER COWEN

Published: September 7, 2006

CONTRARY to popular opinion, China may be good for our trade balance. American consumers seem determined to spend money, and Chinese businessmen have made the bill cheaper.

It is not the case that China is simply draining the United States of money. Most of the growth in Chinese exports to the United States has come from switching manufacturing and assembly from other, more expensive, Asian countries. In 1985, China, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea accounted for 52.3 percent of America’s trade deficit. By 2005, this percentage had fallen to 40.9 percent, in part because of cost savings from buying Chinese.

From 1986 to 1988, Taiwan and South Korea accounted for 60 percent of American footwear imports; China was only 2 percent. By 2001, market positions had reversed; China produced about 60 percent of the total and Taiwan and South Korea about 2 percent. Toys and sporting goods show similar gains by the Chinese, again driven by lower prices. (For these and related figures, see “China’s Embrace of Globalization” by Lee Branstetter, professor of economics at Carnegie Mellon University, and Nicholas R. Lardy, senior research associate at the Institute for International Economics, at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12373.)

American policy makers are nonetheless concerned about cheap Chinese imports. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. will visit China this month, in part to pressure the Chinese to allow their currency, the yuan or renminbi, to rise in value on world markets. C. Fred Bergsten, director of the Center for International Economics, has been calling for a revaluation of the yuan for years, in the hope that a more valuable currency will make Chinese exports more expensive.

The belief is that if the dollar has less value in China, Americans will spend less on Chinese products to offset the prices they pay per item. But even if the numbers work out so that the flow of dollars to China diminishes, American consumers will pay higher prices and see fewer goods from China. Yuan revaluation is unlikely to benefit the United States, even if it does lower its trade deficit.

The trade effects of a revaluation of the yuan are unlikely to be large, in part because many Chinese exporters specialize in assembly. China sends out money buying components like semiconductors and turns them into finished goods, thereby running a trade deficit with East Asia. A new and higher value for the yuan would largely be a wash for these activities. With a stronger currency, China would have a harder time selling its electronic goods, but this would be offset by its greater purchasing power over the semiconductors. It would not do much damage to the Chinese competitive position.

The Chinese keep the yuan low, relative to the dollar, by buying up United States Treasury securities; as of early 2006, the Chinese central bank held up to $470 billion in Treasury securities. This huge accumulation of relatively low-yielding assets is the investment strategy of risk-averse bureaucrats, but it may bring longer-term benefits. Those assets can someday be sold or otherwise transferred to underdiversified Chinese financial institutions. The accumulation gives the Chinese a stake in American prosperity and signals that the Chinese are committed to long-term participation in the global economy. On the American side, the Treasury market is more liquid and the budget deficit can be financed at lower cost.

The yuan should not, as matters stand, float freely with free capital movements. Large quantities of Chinese savings, currently restricted to the domestic currency, would probably flee the country, worsening the serious solvency problems at Chinese banks. The Chinese must first clean up their banking system before they can have free capital markets. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, a market-determined value for the yuan might well be lower than today’s exchange rate, not higher.

To the United States, the primary gains from yuan revaluation would come from the increased spending by Chinese consumers on American exports. But the Chinese are, and should be, extremely cautious. In addition to saving about 50 percent of their incomes, they are spending most of the rest on local basics, like food, cheap cars or education. Health care is a probable growth sector. China is still a poor country, and its potential to drive American export success is modest for the foreseeable future.

Revaluation advocates claim that the Chinese need a stronger currency to prevent their economy from “overheating.” China may indeed not be stable. But it is unlikely that the United States government can successfully micromanage another country of 1.3 billion people into a soft landing. Chinese economic data is very poor and Americans do not have a good record in advising transition economies. The Chinese recipe for economic growth, which encouraged exports, seems to be working, although it ran counter to efforts by American economists and policy makers to promote the privatization of state-owned companies.

The climb of the Chinese economy out of Communism and into prosperity has brought the world, and the United States, a free lunch. Consumer goods of many kinds are cheaper and the Chinese are likely to generate many scientific and technical innovations. Steering the value of the Chinese currency — from Washington — is unlikely to increase those gains. The United States should not be spending its international political capital on yuan revaluation, which is at best a nonevent.

Tyler Cowen is a professor of economics at George Mason University. He is co-author of a blog at www.marginalrevolution.com. He can be reached at tcowen@gmu.edu.

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Monday, September 4, 2006

Perturbation theory, diversion vs dam-building

Professor Steven Cheung wrote in his new piece "Buddha-Mountain's attempt in making Buddha headache" 佛山试制大头佛 describing how the new policy in Foshan (literally, Buddha-Mountain) City in Guangdong, in an attempt to cool the property market, could backfire (in Cantonese, creating a headache for the Buddha).

I will first summarize Cheung's essay, [inserting my own opinion in square brackets]. Then I will make a few brief comments

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Cheung's essay

1) Case of Foshan and Guangzhou

Background: Foshan and Guangzhou recently imposed a price cap on housing projects in certain areas in their cities. RMB3000/m2 for Foshan and RMB6000/m2 for Guangzhou. Granted, the price cap is above the current market prices. But there is still consequence to the market, as the market is not static.

Quiz: If the price is capped below market, what will be the consequences?

Answers:
  1. Auction price for land will be lower, because developers will calculate the price of land they are willing to pay based on the price of apartments they can sell for. However, the auction price will be higher than the theoretical price (i.e. using the cost model, discount rate, assuming the same profit margins, using selling price as input to calculate the cost of land). This is because developers will squeeze the cost of construction/development, including labor, materials, etc. Such "cost control" will very likely lead to low quality of the buildings, perhaps to an extent that safety parameters are compromised
      [Another example of price manipulation: if developer wants to price above market, it would have to inject many freebies, such as HK0.5M restauurant/spa coupons in Bel Air Projects of PCCW in HK -S]
  2. Since second hand apartments are not under price control, when the market goes up, it is likely that second hand apartments will be priced higher than the caps. However, if the market stays flat, second hand apartment price will not go up. This is because the new units are priced at the market already- the value matches the price as a result of "cost control" in point (1)
      [In the former case, developers and insiders may set up affiliate companies and sell all the apartments to these affiliates. The the affiliates will sell to the public at market price. Alternatively, there may be a coupon market for queuing position and right to buy (筹) such that the net price paid by consumer (i.e. including the right to buy) is the market price. In these situations, the prices of the units are slightly higher than the market price had the price cap regulation not been imposed. Because the consumer also pay for the cost of the affiliate/agent arrangements - precsiely the opposite of the intention of the regulators - S]
  3. Since the information channel/mediator of the market (i.e. price) has been distorted, the market is not functioning at its optimal efficiency. There will be waste and inefficiencies everywhere
2) Case of Beijing

Background: Beijing is contemplating restricting the number of large size units built, i.e. only 30% of new units can exceed 90m2. In guangzhou, 2 newly auctioned lots already specified that the areas of units cannot exceed 90m2. [Apparently an effort to ensure more supply with the same amount of floor size -S]

Implications:
  1. Price drop in medium and small units (under 90m2); rise for large units [supply distorted]
  2. Descrease in land price (so will overall wealth of the nation), because the market is distorted and land use is not optimal
  3. More units of 90m2 will be build (less of 70-80m2), also more at 130-250m2 cannibalizing on 90-120m2 market segment.
      [(a) this illustrates point 2 above of sub-optimum land use (b) developers will respond by building adjacent units of, e.g. 80m2 and 40m2, separated by a cheap and easily torn down wall, and sell them in bundle. Another way that waste of resources is resulted (c) This phenomenon has already be demonstrated by HK's world record in Rolls-Royce and Mercedes-Benz, in per km road or per capita measures, as tariff (and gasoline tax) deems cheap cars less desirable, like the 90-120 m2 units - S]
  4. Social stratification more pronounced, as the boundary of social class is characterized by more pronounced market segmentation and is highly visible
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Cheung illustrated in these cases why one should be careful in intervening the market. To be sure, intervention is almost always a bad thing, as you are trying to counter the force of nature, and distort the natural equilibrium/optimum points of the market. Therefore, all directives by human beings are, in reality, perturbations. Once we realize how limited our power is, we know where our strategy should focus on, i.e., "leveraging". This applies to economic, business and even political and military maneuvers.

A good analogy is illustrated by the lesson of Dujiangyan, "Diverting the water flow is always a better solution than building a dam when it comes to flood control". I would illustrate this principle with 2 examples below
  1. Cheung's earlier suggestion of a lesser-evil option for discouraging speculative activities with a tax imposed on un-used and un-leased empty apartment unit. The measure is very specific and does not affect the normal market functions, it only discourages profiteering by changing hands, but does not penalize normal transactions based on "need" (i.e. shorting holding period before changing hands, with no tax penalty). However, as Cheung said, it is only a less-evil/second-best option because some of the changing-hand transaction (that could be held ,unexpectedly, longer than planned) are legitimate market activities.
  2. China's commodity negotiation strategy (souce: FT): FT reports that China was trying to leverage its volume to bargain for a better price in commodity market. However, volume is only a secondary factor in determining price. i.e. it only works if you have a credible alternative (or if the sellers are really divided). Such tactics are as good as dam building. One plausible "diversion" tactic would be top tackle the issue from another facet, e.g., first negotiate for long term commodity contracts in US$ and then let the RMB appreciate. (but there are side-effects/implications for RMB appreciation)

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Wednesday, August 30, 2006

Predicting RMB exchange rate - Ronald McKinnon

Ronald McKinnon examined the interest rate differential between RMB and USD, observed that the return for putting the money in RMB and USD are approximately the same over a year, and speculates (and suggestes) that this may be how the target zone for RMB is managed.
  • 1 year bond yield for USD is 5.7% (spot in London, May 2006), meanwhile PBOC's 1 year RMB bond yield is 2.6%. interest rate differential 3.1%
  • cumulative appreciation for RMB from Jul/21/2005 to Jul/21/2006 is 3.28%, approximately equals the interest rate differential
Yes, the exchange rate will be managed such that it would be hard for the speculator to profit, as I have speculated a year ago,or other investment pathway neutral rationale. McKinnon has provided the economic rationale (of inflation targeting) for managing such target. The quantitative results are similar.

Does this mean speculators can pack and go home? Not really, if you are really good, you could spot the discrepany (e.g. 2H 2005 vs 1H 2006) and make some reasonable profit, but the rate of return will only be proportional to your effort and risk.

McKinnon's Original in op-ed in WSJ requires subscription but cached temporarily below.
A Chinese translation is available here.

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The Yuan and the Greenback
Ronald I. McKinnon. Wall Street Journal.(Eastern edition). Aug 29, 2006. pg. A.14

China's central bank anchored the national price level from 1994 to Sept. 21, 2005, by keeping its currency, the yuan, fixed at 8.28 yuan to the U.S. dollar. The policy was a great success: Over that period, China's consumer price inflation dropped to around 1% to 2%, from more than 25%, and inflation-adjusted GDP grew at a healthy 9% to 10% clip per year.

Today, however, the U.S. monetary anchor isn't as stable as it once was. U.S. inflation is spiraling up, with consumer prices rising to 4.1% and producer prices to 4.2% on a year-on-year basis through last July. Clearly, China's foreign monetary anchor is slipping. Worse, the Federal Reserve Bank has been indecisive about caging the inflation dragon, leaving the interbank federal funds rate at just 5.25% -- an unduly stimulatory level -- at its August meeting.

So what should China do? Since July 21 last year, when the People's Bank of China unhooked the yuan and allowed a discrete appreciation of 2.1%, the mainland's policy makers have allowed the currency to appreciate slowly. The total appreciation equaled 3.3% after a year -- and seems to be continuing at about this annual rate.

The initial motive for unhooking China's peg to the dollar was probably to defuse -- or confuse -- misguided American political pressure to appreciate the yuan's value versus the greenback. The premise of such arguments, that yuan appreciation would reduce China's large and growing trade surplus, is widely held but wrong. The trade imbalance between China and the U.S. results from China's high savings combined with the opposite tendency in the U.S., neither of which is predictably affected by changing the yuan-dollar exchange rate.

China's inflation is, however, predictably affected by sustained exchange-rate changes. Although unhooking the yuan-dollar exchange rate to reduce China's trade surplus was wrongly motivated, the subsequent small appreciation has had a positive effect: It's helped to insulate China from surprisingly high U.S. inflation. So should small controlled exchange appreciation now become China's monetary guideline for maintaining internal price stability?

Consider the evidence: China's consumer price inflation registered just 1% over the year through last July, while the U.S. rate hit 4.1%. This inflation differential of 3.1 percentage points was consistent with the yuan's appreciation of 3.3% year over year, as the chart nearby shows. That the inflation differential mimicked the appreciation so closely is partly a statistical coincidence, and probably unlikely to happen again. Nevertheless, cause and effect are also important. Beyond just U.S.-China trade, the dollar is an international currency widely used for pricing foreign trade in goods and services in Asia and the world. When a highly open economy such as China's gears its domestic monetary policy to a slow, but well signaled, appreciation against the dollar, its price inflation can be expected to fall correspondingly below the American rate.

This reasoning leads to a new monetary rule for China: Pick some target rate for annual inflation in China's CPI, say 1% (it could be as high as 2%), then see how much higher American inflation, say 4.1%, is above China's internal target rate. The difference, in this case 3.1%, then becomes the planned annual gradual appreciation of the yuan rate against the dollar. As is already the case, the exchange rate would be tightly controlled by China's central bank, with only tiny movements on a daily basis -- around which the narrow band fluctuations would continue. And the exact timing of these movements would be arbitrary, so that speculators don't get any free lunches. Finally, if Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke does succeed in reducing American inflation, China's exchange rate appreciation would slow accordingly -- and stop altogether when American inflation stabilizes at China's internal target rate.

Although this new monetary-cum-exchange-rate rule is straightforward enough, it has strong implications for the behavior of yuan interest rates. Those that are not officially pegged are already endogenously determined by the expected path of the exchange rate. The chart shows the paths of one-year interest rates for China and the U.S., and the corresponding yield spread. In May, the yield on dollar bonds quoted in London was 5.7%, while the yield on bonds issued by China's central bank was 2.6% -- a spread of just 3.1%. The chart then superimposes the path of the yuan's appreciation since July 21, 2005. Remarkably, by July 2006, the two curves conjoin: The 3.28% appreciation over the year roughly equals the interest differential! Investors in yuan assets were willing to accept a lower return because they expected the yuan to appreciate a little over 3%. This interest differential of 3% or so will continue as long as investors project that the yuan will continue to appreciate by that amount -- as per our new monetary rule for targeting China's domestic rate of price inflation at a lower level than in the U.S.

It is important to keep the rate of yuan appreciation moderate and in line with the inflation differential between the two countries. Suppose the rate of appreciation was accelerated to 6%, with U.S. inflation remaining at 4.1% and the dollar interest rate at 5.7%. Financial markets, which are quick to adjust, would bid interest rates on yuan assets toward zero -- from which they would be bounded from below: the infamous liquidity trap. In goods markets, where prices are slower to adjust, inflation would begin to fall below the 1% target -- and then could even fall below zero, so as to create outright deflation.

Alternatively, suppose that U.S. inflation slowed to, say, 2% and dollar interest rates came down toward 3%. Then, if China's central bank stayed with its current policy of a slightly more than 3% annual appreciation of the yuan, Chinese interest rates would again be forced toward zero, with the threat of outright deflation in the general price level. Instead, the correct strategy for China's central bank then becomes to slow the rate of appreciation to 1% per year, or slightly less.

Floating the yuan, which would lead to a large initial appreciation, would be a major policy mistake. China's trade surplus would continue unabated, with a continued accumulation of dollar claims by the private sector that would force successive appreciations of the yuan until the central bank was again forced to intervene and stabilize the rate at a much appreciated level. By then, expectations of ongoing appreciation and deflation in China would be firmly in place. That scenario could mimic what happened to Japan with its ever higher yen in the 1980s through the mid-1990s -- a deflationary slump, coupled with a zero interest liquidity trap and its "lost" decade of the '90s.

The bottom line is that China's central bank must carefully watch inflation and interest rates in the U.S. when formulating its own exchange-rate-based monetary strategy. Any exchange-rate changes against the dollar should be tightly controlled and gradual -- as with the appreciation over the past year.

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Mr. McKinnon, professor of economics at Stanford, is author of "Exchange Rates under the East Asian Dollar Standard: Living with Conflicted Virtue" (MIT Press, 2005).


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Monday, August 21, 2006

Commodity peg to export price vs peg to import price

Jeff Frankel examined the impact of commodity price and menetary policy. He proposed to "Peg the Export Price" (PDF, HTML)
  • This idea is a much moderate version of a more exotic-sounding proposed monetary regime that I have written about elsewhere, called Peg the Export Price – or PEP, for short. I have proposed PEP explicitly for those countries that happen to be heavily specialized in the production of a particular mineral or agricultural export commodity. The proposal is to fix the price of that commodity in terms of domestic currency, or, equivalently, set the value of domestic currency in terms of that commodity. For example, African gold producers would peg their currency to gold – in effect returning to the long-abandoned gold standard. Canada and Australia would peg to wheat. Norway would peg to oil. Chile would peg to copper, and so forth. One can even think of exporters of manufactured goods that qualify: standardized semi-conductors (that is, commodity chips) are sufficiently important exports in Korea that one could imagine it pegging to the won to the price of chips.

    How would this work operationally? Conceptually, one can imagine the government holding reserves of gold or oil, and intervening whenever necessary to keep the price fixed in terms of local currency. Operationally, a more practical method would be for the central bank each day to announce an exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar, following the rule that the day’s exchange rate target (dollars per local currency unit) moves precisely in proportion to the day’s price of gold or oil on the London market or New York market (dollars per commodity). Then the central bank could intervene via the foreign exchange market to achieve the day’s target. Either way, the effect would be to stabilize the price of the commodity in terms of local currency. Or perhaps, since these commodity prices are determined on world markets, a better way to express the same policy is stabilizing the price of local currency in terms of the commodity.11 The PEP proposal can be made more moderate, and more appropriate for diversified economies, in a number of ways.12 One is to interpret it as targeting a broad index of all export prices, rather than the price of only one or a few export commodities. This part of the paper proposes targeting just such an export price index. This moderate form of the proposal is abbreviated PEPI, for Peg the Export Price Index.13 The argument for the export targeting proposal, in any of its forms, can be stated succinctly: It delivers one of the main advantages that a simple exchange rate peg promises, namely a nominal anchor, while simultaneously delivering one of the main advantages that a floating regime promises, namely automatic adjustment in the face of fluctuations in the prices of the countries’ exports on world markets. Textbook theory says that when there is an adverse movement in the terms of trade, it is desirable to accommodate it via a depreciation of the currency. When the dollar price of exports rises, under PEP or PEPI the currency per force appreciates in terms of dollars. When the dollar price of exports falls, the currency depreciates in terms of dollars. Such accommodation of terms of trade shocks is precisely what is wanted. In recent currency crises, countries that suffered a sharp deterioration in their export markets were often eventually forced to give up their exchange rate targets and devalue anyway; but the adjustment was far more painful -- in terms of lost reserves, lost credibility, and lost output -- than if the depreciation had happened automatically.

    The desirability of accommodating terms of trade shocks is a particularly good way to summarize the attractiveness of export price targeting relative to the reigning champion, CPI targeting. Consider the two categories of adverse terms of trade shocks: a fall in the dollar price of the export in world markets and a rise in the dollar price of the import on world markets. In the first case, a fall in the export price, you want the local currency to depreciate against the dollar. As already noted, PEP or PEPI deliver that result automatically; CPI targeting does not. In the second case, a rise in the import price, the terms-of-trade criterion suggests that you again want the local currency to depreciate. Neither regime delivers that result. But CPI targeting actually has the implication that you tighten monetary policy so as to appreciate the currency against the dollar, by enough to prevent the local-currency price of imports from rising. This implication – reacting to an adverse terms of trade shock by appreciating the currency – seems perverse. It could be expected to exacerbate swings in the trade balance, and output.

A couple comments on Frankel's proposal
  • An anchor as Frankel proposed basically a controlled "free floating", i.e. taking a few of the most important market drivers and actively manage the "peg" accordingly, mimicing what free float would do, but excluding market drivers which are not in the 'recipe'. The effect is, the currency would appreciate when the demand for one's export is high and vice versa.
  • The benefit is that it provides a relatively objective measure for the exchange rate, so that speculation factors are partially excluded (speculators cans still indirectly bet on the underlying commodity, but that would be much less efficient as it impacts a lot more countries)
  • When the 'peg' is controlled, overshoot (such as 1997 Thai Baht) can be avoided
  • However, with every benefit it comes with a price. In this case, the anchoring and hence the unfriendliness/inconvenience for speculation would also mean that the currency regime would become "metastable" as market hedging is more difficult -- but this is a minor inconvenience as one can still speculate/hedge even on a fixed peg (e.g. non-deliverable forward for RMB)
  • That commodity price (or a basket of commodity index) is chosen as the proxy is simply because it is standardizable and tradable (and that it is a 'fundamental' price driver). There is no theoretical (only pratical/technical) hurdle to pegging to the price of T-shirts, furniture, computers or anything that sells in Walmart (and "made in China"). However, these are 'secondary products' and the prices are dirven by that of more fundamental cost drivers such as commodity, energya nd labor. In an ideal model one could take everything a country exports minus everything it imports. However, for an anchor only a selection is good enough (and at least better than the more arbitrary peg to USD or some currency basket).
Frankel also commented on the issue of "peg-to-import-price"
  • But for a country that is a net importer of oil, wheat, and other mineral and agricultural commodities, such a peg gives precisely the wrong answer in a year when the prices of these import commodities go up. Just when the domestic currency should be depreciating to accommodate an adverse movement in the terms of trade, it appreciates instead. Switzerland should not peg to oil, and Norway should not peg to wheat.
This deserves some discussions.

While Frankel made a generally good argument on the disadvantage of pegging to the import price, it is for a simple economy prior globalization. In today's world the matter seems to be a lot more complicated. For example, the oil and steel China imports are largely re-exported, both directly as products (hammers & nails, plastic toys) and indirectly (the machine and buildings that house the factories, and the power consumed by the manufacturers). Therefore, to determine whether an item (commodity in this case) should be present in the peg basket we should need to look at the overall export and import flow together.

If fact, peg-to-export may not be a good proxy to use for countries which re-export is a major component in its GDP. e.g. Singapore exports a lot of refined petroleum and petrochemical products. But it is unclear if Singaporean Dollar should be pegged to the price of petrochemical products for this reason. It would make more sense, if there is a system where Singapore's petrochemical industry would realize its value-added more or less unaffected by the short term fluctuation in oil price. This could be achieved if both the import price of its raw materials and export price of its products could somehow be linked. It could be achieved if Singapore Dollar is related to the price of oil and the petrochemical products it re-exports. Of course, Singapore has a lot more industries, and oil should only be one component of its basket. Moreover, Singapore is a small country, with signifcant value of its GDP in tertiary industry (IT, service, etc) the complexity for operating an elaborate commodity peg may not be as viable as a simple currency basket peg as it uses today.

For China, being a much large country, currency may present an new problem. Because its economy is so large that it affects the value of the currency it pegs onto. This is the main complain from the US. IMO China's currency reform is necessary not because of the trade imbalance. It is the responsibility of US itself to solve its imbalance problem. But China should not (unintentionally) prevent USD from depreciating against other currencies in the world through the RMB peg. Therefore, there are reasons for China to peg its currency to something other than other countries' currencies.

The most convenient choice, as Frankel proposed, the commodity peg. The commodities China can choose are 1) what it exports 2) what goes through in its process/re-export industry.

Since China today is a net importer for most commidities (both agricultural and industrial), (1) does not work. What China exports is actually semi-skilled labor, and China is the largest exporter of labor in the world. China is, therefore, the largest factor in determining the price of semi-skilled labor. Its currency rate affects the pricing of its primary export. Therefore, even if we can standardize the price of semi-skilled labor, it still does not qualify as a content of the RMB peg. Because, it is not independent enough to act as a measure for practical purpose, otherwise we are entering into a loop of circular formula.

As a result, we are left with only option (2). Therefore, if China is to peg its currency to a basket of commodities, the rationale will be to make the cost of its re-export transparent to its economy, or in other words, a currency that automatically hedges against the change in raw material costs. Following this rationale, the content and respective weight of the commodity basket can be determined.

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Note: the implementation: Frankel offer some guideline in this paper. You can also see my earlier post on commodity basket.
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Monday, June 12, 2006

Indicators for exchange rate: is RMB under-valued?

Is RMB undervalued? If you are a poor student frequenting the McDonald's, yes. But if you are a bourgeois who prefer to pay more for the couch in Starbuck, then no. The Economist commented:
  • "Many readers will find burgernomics and lattenomics hard to swallow. Both are flawed as measures of PPP, because they are distorted by differences in the cost of non-tradables such as rents. Yet they are surely a more fun way to understand exchange rates than textbooks...
  • Burgers and coffee are therefore likelier to give some clues about currencies."
Well, they give more clue than the abstract PPP which doesn't account enough for 'quality' of goods or the nominal rates which missed the non-tradables. The real number should be somewhere in between BigMac and Tall Latte.

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A more thorough treatise is by Chinn/et al. As we know, currencies of rich countries tend to be "overvalued" by the market vs the PP value. Chinn's work attempted to see whether RMB is above or under that trend line. Results: it is slightly under (not statistically significant for an action), but it already was during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, when everybody said RMB was over-valued.
  • "As can be seen,the Renminbi (Rmb) appears to be substantially undervalued, even after taking into account the fact that absolute PPP doesn't hold. The regression line is for a pooled sample encompassing over a 174 countries over the 1975-2003 period, with plus/minus 1, and plus/minus 2 standard error bands (adjusted for serial correlation). The point estimate indicates that each one percent increase in relative (to US) per capita income induces a 0.25 percent real appreciation (these real exchange rates are the Penn World Tables "price level").

  • One key result is the confirmation that according to this criterion, the Rmb is indeed undervalued, and undervalued by a very large amount (in log terms, over 70%; in level terms about 50%). A second, equally important result, is that the 2003 estimate is within one standard error of the conditional mean. Hence, the corresponding p-value for the hypothesis that the Rmb is undervalued is larger than conventional significance levels. In other words, by conventional levels of statistical significance, the Rmb is not undervalued.

  • Speaking for myself, I do not take this as proof positive that the Rmb is not undervalued. After all, failing to reject the null hypothesis is not the same as accepting the null hypothesis. Rather, I would say it tells us something about the difficulties of defining exchange rate misalignment. One notices that the degree of measured undervaluation was not that much smaller in 1997-98, when the Rmb was widely acknowledged as overvalued, or not misaligned."



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